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Abstract 
Balikumbat and Bafanji are the names of two villages in the Northwest Region of 
Cameroon that have been warring against one another over Bangang, a tract of fertile 
land. The conflict hinges on perceived differences about who should have access to this 
fertile land. Both villages claim ownership. This conflict has persisted from colonial 
times to the present with no tangible resolution. Understanding the place of land within 
the political, social, and economic fabric of the lives of both villages prior to and after the 
arrival of the colonial administration is the centerpiece of this research endeavor. This 
study sheds light on why the conflict persists. The land tenure decree of 1973, which was 
later promulgated into Cameroon law in 1984, is the most recent attempt at resolving 
disputes over land. It did not resolve this conflict. A clash of cultures between the 
indigenous population and the European colonizers may have triggered a legacy of land 
conflict between these two communities. This study unravels and seeks to explain when 
the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages transitioned from being two loving neighbors, 
capable of sharing their use of and kinship to the land, to hostile enemies ready to fight 
and kill one another at the earliest opportunity. In this study, interviews, observations, 
journal intakes, field notes, as well as document reviews, are pivotal tools used in 
justifying the claims highlighted in the research. 
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Chapter One 
Land ownership is a gift of nature endowed with an infinite number of properties 
for the well-being of humanity. Conversely, it can also be the source of endless strife and 
conflict. According to Wehrmann (2008), “land conflicts are indeed a widespread 
phenomenon, and can occur at any time or place.” (p. 1) Intertribal conflicts over land are 
common in post-colonial African states. Cameroon, which is situated on the gulf of 
Guinea in the Central Region of Africa, is inundated with examples of land and boundary 
disputes. The ministry of territorial administration in Cameroon has realized some 
positive results by delineating administrative units like regions, divisions, and 
subdivisions. However, the issue of tribal borders within these administrative units still 
poses many challenges. These challenges are rooted in Cameroon’s triple heritage of 
indigenous traditional authorities, and two colonial authorities (Germany and Britain, in 
the case of Southern Cameroon) and the present La Republic du Cameroon, which 
governs both East and Southern Cameroon. This conflicting political history of 
Cameroon has left a good number of intertribal boundaries unresolved and poorly 
demarcated.   
The present Land Tenure System of Cameroon, which was enacted in 1973 and 
promulgated into law in 1986, has made the Ministry of Territorial Administration the 
sole custodian of land in Cameroon. However, the ministry’s lax attitude toward clearly 
demarcating tribal borders has plunged the country, especially the North West Region, 
into a series of intertribal land disputes. Such is the case of two neighboring villages 
named Balikumbat and Bafanji, who have engaged in war over their interpretations of the 
boundary of Bangang, a fertile piece of land. 
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This conflict, which is the focal point in this study, represents a small example of 
the recurring conflicts that pertain to land and boundary demarcations. The villages of 
Balikumbat and Bafanji are a microcosm of an issue of epic proportions that exist at the 
core of Cameroonian conflicts. Studying the various dynamics of this particular conflict 
and highlighting the definitive role that land has played in fueling the dispute will 
contribute to the field of conflict resolution by highlighting how deep these kinds of 
conflicts affect and, in some cases, traumatize civilian populations.This dissertation 
explores and seeks to explain the fundamental causes of the land conflicts in the North 
West Region of Cameroon by focusing on the case of the Balikumbat and Bafanji 
villages.  
The study is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background of the 
problem, the research objectives, and questions. It establishes a blueprint of the conflict 
under investigation and the historical shifts that have occurred within it. Chapter 2 
reviews relevant concepts, theories, and other studies in relation to land disputes that 
pertain to the present study. Chapter 3 presents the methodology of the study, indicating 
the design, instruments, and methods of data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 focuses 
on the presentation of findings from the field study. Chapter 5 concludes the study with a 
discussion, recommendations, and suggestions for further research. 
Background of the Study 
 This study was conceived and propelled by a wide array of variables that have 
contributed to the conflict between Balikumbat and Bafanji and the factors that continue 
to sustain it. To begin with, it is important to examine the historical, geographical, and 
socio-economic backgrounds of Cameroon, which leads naturally into an examination of 
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the contextual background of the Balikumbat and Bafanji Fondoms (kingdoms). This 
approach clarifies our understanding of the landscape in which this conflict was 
conceived and how it has evolved over time. 
Historical Backgrond 
 The history of Cameroon involves numerous interventions from European 
powers, which play a significant role in the country’s diversity. The first contact between 
Cameroon and the Europeans was in the 15
th 
century. Portuguese traders and missionaries 
established bases along the coastal land (Fonlon, 1969:29 in Fonkeng, 2007, p. 14). At 
that time, Cameroon was referred to as “Rio dos Cameroes” which, in Portuguese, means 
“river of prawns.” The British later changed this name to “the Cameroons,” but when 
Germany later annexed Cameroon, the German version of the name (Kamerun) prevailed. 
When the French took over from the Germans, the French appellation “Cameroun” was 
adopted (Fonkeng, 2007). 
 During the scramble for Africa in the second half of the 19
th
 century, Cameroon 
fell under the colonial rule of Germany from 1884 until the end of World War I, when 
Germany lost the war in Europe. As a result, the allied powers took control of the 
German territories by employing the mandate system. This system is derived from the 
tradition of the Roman Empire “Mandatum.” The principle of the Roman law of 
Mandatum implied that a mandarius or agent could administer a territory on behalf of the 
Mandatum or owner (Fonkeng, 2007 p. 16). To this effect, Kamerun, a colony of 
Germany, was recognized as a possession of the League of Nations. In this way, 
Cameroon became known as a mandated territory, which was administered by France and 
Britain on behalf of the League of Nations. 
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 One consequence of this mandatory system was the formation of an Anglo-French 
condominium. Therefore, in 1918, Cameroon was divided into two sections between the 
French and British. The partition of the region gave France control over more than two 
thirds of the territory while Britain only acquired a small section. The League of Nations 
supervised the administration of Cameroon through the permanent Mandates 
Commission. However, this League of Nations’ mandate was terminated in 1945 after 
WW II and replaced by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations Organization. As a 
result, Cameroon became a trust territory of the United Nations Organization but it was 
still under the control of the French and British administrations. 
 On January 1
st 
1960, French-speaking Cameroon, known as La Republique du 
Cameroun, declared its independence from the French-Administered United Nations 
Trusteeship. In October 1961, English-speaking Cameroon, known as West Cameroon, 
became independent of the British-Supervised United Nations Trusteeship. This led to the 
emergence of a Federal Republic of Cameroon. North Cameroon, the northern section of 
the British mandate, became part of Nigeria at independence. Southern Cameroon, the 
English Southwestern highlands area chose to follow a separate course and joined the 
French-speaking regions. A decade later, on May 20, 1972, the Federal Republic was 
transformed into the United Republic of Cameroon. In 1984, the United Republic of 
Cameroon became known as the Republic of Cameroon (Fonkeng, 2007).  
 Any historical survey of Cameroon will reveal that foreign influences have played 
a big role in its history. These events enhanced the emergence of Cameroon as the first 
country to have two European or colonial languages. Today, Cameroon has ten 
administrative regions. Eight of these regions are Francophone: Far North, North, 
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Adamawa, Centre, Littoral, Western, Eastern, and Southern. Two regions are 
Anglophone: Northwest and Southwest. Appointed governors, in addition to the 
Divisional and Sub-divisional officers, administer these regions. Executive powers are 
conferred on the President of the Republic. Since the bicultural nature of Cameroon is 
rooted in colonial influence, knowledge of its history provides an explanation of the 
conflict that lies in the land tenure system of Cameroon. 
Geographical Background 
 The Republic of Cameroon is located in Western Central Africa. This country is 
bounded to the north by the Chad Republic, the west by Nigeria, the east by Central 
African Republic and to the south by Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo Brazzaville. 
Cameroon measures about 475,440 square kilometers in area, of which 6000 kilometers
2
 
is water.Slightly larger than the state of California in the United States of America, the 
terrain of Cameroonis primarily composed of coastal and inland plains, mountains, and 
high plateaux.  
 The climate of Cameroon is also varied, ranging from hot and semi-arid in the 
North to tropical along the Atlantic coast. Four natural regions exist in Cameroon. First, 
the Atlantic coast is dominated by mount Fako that measures over 4000 metres in height. 
Here, one finds an equatorial climate where heavy rainfall is common. The second region 
of low plateaux starts from Yaoundé and serves as a transition between the vast 
equatorial forest and the savannah (Fonkeng, 2007, p. 9). The climate of this zone is dry 
and relatively fresh because of its altitude. The third region of high plateaux is dominated 
by the Adamawa with the mountainous region to the south. The fourth region constitutes 
the Benue Plain and Lake Chad in the North. This is an impoverished savannah, which 
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progressively transforms to steppe as it approaches Lake Chad. The whole territory 
stretches from sand beaches and dense forest along the southern coast through mountains, 
grassy hills, and plateaux to a dry savannah in the North. Cameroon is sometimes called 
“the hinge of Africa” since it sits between the first and thirtieth latitudes, north of the 
Equator. Cameroon has a rapidly growing population, as compared to other African 
countries in the central African sub-region.  
The geographical diversity of the country finds its parallel in the ethnic, religious, 
and cultural differences. It is composed of a heterogeneous population replete with social 
and political differences from one region to another. By 2010, the population of 
Cameroon had increased to approximately 20 million people from 130 different ethnic 
groups. These groups include Highlanders 30%, Equatorial Bantu 19%, Kirdis 10%, 
Fulanis 10%, Northwest Bantu 8%, and Eastern Negritics 7%. Approximately 13% of the 
country’s population belongs to other African ethnic groups. Less than 1% of all people 
in Cameroon are non-African in ethnic origin. Twenty-four indigenous language groups 
are represented amongst the spoken languages alongside English and French. The 
religious breakdown is 40% Christian, 20% Muslim, and 40% practice Indigenous 
African Religions (www.unicef.org/infobycountry/Cameroon 2011). 
 The pygmies, also known as forest people, inhabit the southern forests. This 
population does not make up a large political group but practices a distinct culture. Each 
tribe is organized around its chief whose authority covers the whole village. In the 
southern region, the personality of the chief generally enhances the importance of his 
tribe. Agriculture and fishing are the main economic activities of the people in this 
region. In the northern part of the country, there exists a system of Lamidat or sultanate, 
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which characterizes the functioning of political authority (Fonkeng, 2007, p. 10). The 
map in Appendix A portrays the location of Cameroon in Africa and the different 
countries sharing its boundaries. 
Socio-Economic Background 
 The economy of a country refers to the relationship between production, trade, 
and its supply of money (Hornsby, 2000, p. 369). The economy of a country or region 
influences the practice of education since it is highly determined by the forces of supply 
and demand. Of primary concern is the provision of basic school requirements like 
infrastructure, personnel, and didactic materials. In Cameroon, between 60 to 75 percent 
of the population works in the agricultural sector. Most farmers practice subsistence 
agriculture using traditional farming methods. This situation has the effect of low 
production in individual yields. Consequently, a high rate of unemployment prevails for 
approximately 30 percent of the population. 
Contextual Background 
The Balikumbat and Bafanji villages are located in the North West Region of 
Cameroon.    Bafanji is a village of the Tikar people, while Balikumbat is a village of the 
Chamba group (Mbah, 2008). These ethnic groups differ in language, culture, and 
history. Both villages are headed by a traditional ruler referred to as the Fon. Both, 
however, are migrant populations who occupied their respective territories because of 
mass migration into the region in the late 17th century. For government administrative 
purposes, both Bafanji and Balikumbat fall within the same division called Ngoketunjia, 
but each retains its own distinctive local authority. 
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Brief History and Description of the Bafanji Fondom 
Oral tradition explains that Bafanji people (Fieh LungLué-Mangieh) migrated 
from Ndobo, North East of Tikari in the Adamawa plateau down to Ndop in the 16
th 
century with four of its neighborhood groups: viz Bamali (Peuchop), Bamunka (Mekoh), 
Bamukumbit (Mankon) and Bambalang (Mbaw-Yakum).Under the leadership of Hong 
Piamikia,who was regarded as the firstfonof the village, the people of the Bafanji finally 
arrived at Njanung quarters and settled there. They named this place “Piamika” after their 
leaderfor his charismatic leadership. In a series of wars with other groups such as the 
Mbakwa and the Tonkung, the Bafanji people finally conquered the Tonkung and 
absorbed them into one Fondom of Bafanji Other conquered rulers shared powers with 
ranks of Sub-Fons. http://fadca.webnode.fr/actualites/ 
During the first century of their settlement in their present site, Bafanji endured 
attacks from the Fulanis in series of raids, common to that era. Due to their fear of 
extinction, most Bafanji people took refuge in the Bamilke land of Bamoun and Mbounda 
from 1843-1895. Under the direction of Ardo Sambo of Tibati andthe Lieutenant of 
Madibo Adama of the Adamawa Region from the Sokoto Empire, these raids were 
efficiently executed by warriors with spears on horseback. After returning from self-
imposed exile, the Bafanji people faced steep resistance from some Fulanis and other new 
neighbours who had begun encroaching onto their communal lands.  
During these battles to defend their territorial spheres, the Bafanji people (Fieh 
LungLué-Mangieh) dug trenches 15 to 20 metres deep and five to seven metres wide that 
pointed towards their boundaries, especially at entering routes. Using rudimentary tools, 
such as unsharpened knives and sticks, workers dug these trenches to prevent the 
9 
 
 
Fulanis’horses from crossing into their land. Today, these trenches serve as amazing 
tourist attractions that clearly demonstrate the engineering and creative potential of the 
first Bafanji settlers. Later, the Bafanji people (Fieh LungLué-Mangieh) adopted non-
violent means of settling inter-village boundaries. Territorial conflicts that erupted for 
more than a decade were finally laid to rest by the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) Buea in 
1971. 
Bafanji (Fieh lunglue-Mangie) is one of the 13 villages of the Ngoketunjia 
Division and one of the five villages that make up the Balikumbat Sub Division of the 
Northwestregion of Cameroon. It is located between 5°and 13°N and 10°and 55°E of 
latitude and longitude respectively and found at approximately 2289m above sea level. It 
has as neighbors in the north by Bambalang, Bali-Gashu, and Bamunkumbit in the south, 
Balikumbat in the south-west and in the east by the Bamboutous division of West region. 
Bafanji (Fieh lunglue-Mangie) has relatively level land and many swamps around the 
village. These characteristics produce a very rich ecosystem that covers a surface area of 
an estimated 115.5km². A hardworking population of approximately 22,000 people 
inhabit this area. Bafanji (Fieh lunglue-Mangie) is lying peacefully in Ndop plain with 
land surrounded by water sheds including the Bamindjim dam that replenishes the Song-
Loulou Electricity Dam, several springs, rivers, and streams. Bafanji village (Fieh 
LungLué-Mangieh) serves as a crossroads for agro-businesses, the cultural heritage of 
Ndop plain, and a museum of different ethnic or tribal origins 
http://fadca.webnode.fr/actualites/. 
Culture is the identity card of a people. Consequently, a person without a culture 
does not exist. The Bafanji people have a very rich cultural heritage that is reflected in 
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their feeding habits, way of dressing, dancing, sitting, talking, and walking. Their norms, 
values, and morals are seen in their daily lives and occupations. The language of the 
Bafanji people is called NCHUFIEH that, when translated, means the “words of Fanji.” 
The Holy Bible has been translated into the Bafanji dialect.A traditional Bafanji meal is 
created from pounded cocoyam/colocosia that is eaten with yellow soup spiced with 
special ingredients, as well as tilapia/mud fishes/mushrooms or the skin/meat of bush or 
domestic animals. This special meal is washed down with good raffia wine (nduog of 
mulloġ fu) on every sad or happy occasion where people gather. The Bafanji man has 
established traditions and a cultured way of life that treats elders and authorities with 
respect. For the Fon, all indigenes greet the Fon with three handclaps while bowing 
down. No one shakes hands with the Fon. Several other groups of notables and leaders 
are given due respect to their positions in descending order.  
The Bafanji people are best at handicrafts and iron smeltering. They carve, weave, 
and plant items. Physically, these people are very handsome and beautiful with an 
average height of 1.65m, are very patriotic, and are largely peaceful. They hold no 
grudges, even against those who consider them enemies, since most are God-fearing with 
high cultural and moral standards that have been nurtured over years of regulated society. 
The Bafangi man loves all that is good not only to the eye but to the body and soul. This 
is evident when examining their rich diet and beautiful women. A typical Bafanji man 
believes that a man with no pride has no dignity. This makes him a very proud man. The 
Bafanji man is very hard working and has a passionate hatred for lazy people 
(http://fadca.webnode.fr/actualites/). 
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The politico-socio cultural institutions of the Bafanji people (Fieh LungLué-
Mangieh) have close relations to those of Tikaris groups such as the Bamouns, Bamiliké, 
the sudaness of Adamaoua and Chiefdom of Widikum. These institutions were installed 
by the first settlers of Bafanji in the 16
th
century and are organised as follows: a) Political 
Institution, b) Traditional Council, c) Quarter Judges, d) Regulatory Society (Kwehong), 
e) Noble Society, and d) FADCA. These institutions have sub groups and titleholders that 
animate the actions and decisions of the institution. 
The Mamgaieh Shrine 
 In the legend of Mamgaieh, it is believed that this woman was the mother of the 
first four Fons: Bamali (Peuchop), Bamunka (Mekoh), Bamukumbit (Mankon) and 
Bambalang (Mbaw-Yakum) claim common genealogy. This is linked to a myth that 
‘Mamgaieh’ was a mother of a set of twins who became Fons of these villages. A mighty 
rock that lies at peg three southwest of Bafanji, in the Minji Quarter, testifies about this 
common ancestral genealogy. The shrine is visited annually by traditional elites from one 
of the above villages for libation. The rock opens an aperture when an indigene from one 
of these villages comes for such a sacrifice. In essence, the shrine is a center of justice. In 
the myth, it was said that, if a criminal comes to the shrine because of an allegation and 
cannot speak the truth, he will receive punishment from the goddess. However, the 
criminal may be proven innocent by Mamgaieh. It is important to note that the Mamgaieh 
shrine is located in the same place where war between the Bafanji and Balikumbat has 
occurred. One can infer that, for traditional reasons, the Bafanji people will never let go 
of this land(http://fadca.webnode.fr/actualites/). 
12 
 
 
A Brief History and Description of Balikumbat Fondom 
 According to Galabe (2014), the history of Balikumbat is very similar to the other 
four existing Bali Fondoms of the Northwest Province of Cameroon. The Balikumbat 
people are a faction of the Chamba people who migrated from North Eastern Nigeria 
(Yola) during a wave of migrations in the West African region towards the end of the 
17th century. Being highly skilled in the use of bow and arrow, they fought their way 
towards the West into the present Republic of Cameroon by conquering territories as they 
marched on. When they reached the grassland region of Cameroon, their natural ruler 
“disappeared.” Following a total disagreement among the leader’s four male children and 
one female child over who should succeed their father, each child decided to break free of 
the group, go their separate way, and take their followers with them. Each faction 
continued its warring march and conquered the inhabitants of the lands over which they 
passed until it found a suitable place to settle in the fertile farm lands. This is how the 
five Bali Fondoms of Cameroon came into being. The Bali Fondoms include Bali-
Gangsin (Gavabineba), Balikumbat (Nebkoluba), Bali-Nyonga (Nyongneba), Bali-Gham 
(Nebgamyidba), and Bali-Gashu (Gansunneba) (Galabe, 2014). 
The Balikumbat people occupy their present site after defeating and expelling the 
Bamunkumbits who lived there previously. The Balikumbat people chose this location 
for two specific reasons. First, the available farmland was fertile and abundant. Second, a 
central plateau allowed them to see approaching enemies before they could attack. At this 
writing, the Fon’s palace is located on this plateau. 
Balikumbat is located approximately 15 kms west of Ndop, the capital of 
Ngoketunjia in the Division of the Northwest Province of Cameroon. It is bounded on the 
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east by the villages of Bamali and Bambalang, on the west by Bafanji, on the south by 
Bamumkumbit and on the north by Babanki Tungo, and Awing. The population is 
approximately 16,000 inhabitants who are predominantly peasant farmers. Balikumbat 
has the status of a Sub Division, which also includes four other neighbouring villages. It 
also has Rural Council (Galabe, 2014). 
As in the other four Bali Fondoms, the Fon is the paramount head of the 
Balikumbat traditional administration and custodian of the tradition. He is assisted in the 
execution of his functions by organs such as the “Ndagans” (Kingmakers) who act as his 
advisers and the Traditional Council, which is the legislative organ of the village. Quarter 
heads act as the liaison between the population and the Traditional Council together with 
the Fon. Sectoral committees like, the Health and Education Committee, exist and are 
charged with the monitoring and orientation of specific activities under the supervision of 
the Traditional Council or the Village Development Committee, depending on the 
specific nature of the activity (Galabe, 2014). 
 While the Bafanji and Balikumbat settlements are very close, these two villages 
have noteworthy differences. The Bafanji village speaks an indigenous language called 
bafanji (locally known as chuufi). The people of Balikumbat speak chamba-leko. Another 
notable difference is that they migrated from different parts of Cameroon with varying 
cultural heritages. While differences persist, social mingling, in the form of inter-
marriages and common gatherings such as markets, the villages engage in frequent 
contact. This suggests that the inhabitants of both villages have come to know one 
another very well (Mbah, 2008).  
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Understanding the Balikumbat vs Bafanji Conflict in the Context of Intractable 
Conflict 
A deeper understanding of this conflict calls for a discussion of the various 
characteristics that have been posited by the conflict and understanding these 
characteristics within the larger field of conflict resolution. Conflict refers to a clash 
between individuals arising out of a difference in thought processes, attitudes, 
understanding, interests, requirements, and sometimes perceptions. In a more refined 
way, conflict can be construed as “a social fact in which at least two parties are involved 
and whose origins are differences either in interests or in the social position of the 
parties” (Imbusch, 1999). Conflict can result in intense arguments, physical abuse, and a 
loss of peace and harmony. Any form of conflict holds the potential to alter relationships 
to the point where friends become foes. Many stages compose a conflict through which 
the land dispute of this magnitude must have travelled. According to Wehrmann (2008), 
the stages of conflict are pre-conflict, confrontation, crisis, outcome, and post-conflict. 
a. Pre-Conflict: In this phase, the goals of the two parties are incompatible and 
can be the reason for the conflict in the first place. The conflict is not yet clear 
to everyone except that some of the conflicting parties may be aware that 
something is brewing in the horizon, which may culminate in a conflict. 
Avoiding tactics may already be at work. 
b. Confrontation: The conflicting parties are already aware that they are in 
conflict with one another and are mobilizing all their resources to use against 
the other. There are already signs of overt fighting. Both parties are growing 
away from the other. 
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c. Crisis: This conflict is now out of control. There is heightened tension and no 
party is ready to back down. Communication mediums have been 
compromised and are broken. Each party is now making their case against the 
other and a state of war is unfolding. 
d. Outcome: The tension is now beginning to decrease and some transforming 
has happened. It could be that one party is stronger than the other is, has 
defeated them or both parties see no reason to continue to be in conflict. 
Perhaps both parties are poised for negotiation but, whatever the case, the 
conflict is deescalating albeit not over yet. 
e. Post-Conflict: Both parties at this time are making efforts towards the 
restoration of communication channels. The triggers of conflict have been 
resolved. If not, there is a chance that the circle will begin again.  
 A wide variety of conflicts exist, including verbal, religious, emotional, social, 
personal, organizational, community, and situational, among others. The Balikumbat 
versus Bafanji conflict is best classified within the framework of an inter-group or ethnic 
conflict. 
Land Conflict Defined 
The characteristics of land conflicts are numerous. They can be understood as 
“social facts in which at least two parties are involved, the roots of which are different 
interests over the property rights to land” (Wehrmann, 2008, p. 9). Additionally, “the 
right to use land, to manage the land, to generate an income from the land and, to exclude 
others from the land, to transfer it and the right to compensation for it” are important 
tenets (Wehrmann, 2008, p. 9). This land definition is inclusive and includes various 
16 
 
 
triggers that can result in conflict. Land conflict understood in this sense means that, once 
land is owned, there is no room for others to claim ownership or even purport to have 
control over the same piece of land.  
In the case of Balikumbat and Bafanji dispute, the piece of land in Bangang must 
belong to one party and not the other. It stands as a typical win-lose situation in conflict 
resolution terms. This excludes the possibility of a joint occupancy of this land. Since 
neither party is willing to cede total ownership of this piece of land to the other, conflict 
is inevitable and has persisted for a long time. 
The struggle between villages appears to have the characteristics of an intractable 
conflict. According to Coleman (2000), “Intractable conflicts, broadly defined, are 
intense, deadlocked, and resistant to de-escalation or resolution. They tend to persist over 
time, with alternating periods of greater and lesser intensity. Intractable conflicts come to 
focus on needs or values that are of fundamental importance to the parties. The conflict 
pervades all aspects of the parties' lives, and they see no way to end it, short of destroying 
the other side. Each party's dominant motive is to harm the other. Such conflicts resist 
common resolution techniques, such as negotiation, mediation, or diplomacy” (p. 
428).Many intractable conflicts focus on identity rather than resource issues that are 
deeply rooted in the past. Core disputes in intractable conflicts also tend to proliferate, 
producing a complex web of interlocking complaints that can be very difficult to analyze 
(Coleman, 2000). 
Intractable conflicts often arise in contexts of extreme power imbalance, social 
injustice, or structural violence where people find it difficult to satisfy their basic human 
needs. Cultural norms that sanction the use of force make such conflicts more likely to 
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turn violent. As conflicts escalate, parties shift from substantive interests, to relationship 
concerns, to basic needs and values, and ultimately focus on survival. Communication 
becomes impaired and eventually nonexistent. Parties adopt a win-lose attitude and then a 
lose-lose attitude where the goal is to inflict as much harm on the other as possible. 
Various social psychological dynamics contribute to escalation. These include selective 
perception, over commitment, self-fulfilling prophecy, dehumanization, cognitive 
rigidity, competitiveness, and miscommunication (Coleman, 2000). According to Burgess 
and Burgess (2003), many intractable conflicts, especially at the inter-group and 
international levels, are embedded in a context of long-standing differences and 
inequalities. They are "rooted in a history of colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, 
or human rights abuses" (Burgess and Burgess, 2003, p. 9) which cause a large imbalance 
of power.   
 Supported by the views of Coleman (2000), and Burgess and Burgess (2003), the 
Balikumbat/Bafanji conflict is clearly intractable. For a conflict that is deeply rooted 
from the colonial period of the 1800s to present day, a solution has yet to be found. 
Ethnocentrism appears to be at fault because of unfair colonial policies in land 
demarcation. These seemingly haphazard decisions did not take into consideration the 
perception and conceptualization of the indigenous people. For instance, the disputed 
land harbors the Mamgaieh shrine, a sacred institution of the Bafangi people. Allowing 
free access to the Balikumbat people would violate the sanctity of the shine for the 
Bafangi. Conflict is bound to reoccur until the present Cameroon government learns to 
respect the land beliefs and traditions of the indigenous people and acts accordingly.  
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Indigenous Affinity to the Land and Land Demarcation Mechanisms 
According to Ng’ombe and Mushinge (2014), indigenous people believe that land 
is “endowed with a sacred character… conceive[d] as a sort of deity who [is] the fount of 
fertility and guardian of public morality since it [is] witness to all transactions of man” (p. 
223). For customary people, land is indeed the primary resource for all activities 
(Ng’ombe & Mushinge, 2014). Besides being perceived as the space on which man lives 
and farms to secure a livelihood, land is also considered to be the center for all human 
relationships, values, language and ambitions. It is a source of all wealth, power, 
integrity, and symbolism (Leonard & Longbottom, 2000). Deininger (2003) equally adds 
that land is also associated with prestige and subsistence, which are considered the 
primary economic goal by most rural communities.  
Land in customary areas is also considered to be the commodity that unites the 
past, the current and future generations (Ng’ombe & Mushinge, 2014). Chief Olsei of 
Odogbolu in Western Nigeria affirmed before the West African Land Commission in 
1908 that “I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are 
living, and countless are still unborn”(Ike, 1984, p. 475). Another Nigerian chief stated, 
“We came from the ground and we have to go back to the ground and it is altogether out 
of place for anyone to think of selling the ground. They who are born and they who are 
yet unbegotten and they who are still in the womb require the means of support.” (Ike, 
1984, p. 476).  
In Africa, land is a sacred asset with strong ancestral ties. It is inalienable and is to 
be passed on to the ancestors’ posterity intact. As a result, other than working and 
harvesting from the land, it is enough for an individual to claim ownership of the land by 
19 
 
 
simply convincing surrounding others that their ancestors are buried in that piece of land 
(Ng’ombe & Mushinge, 2014; Carino, 2006). One’s place of origin is considered a place 
where they have not only physical but also spiritual roots. Tribal communities practice 
what Chikhwenda (2002) has called trusterty theory, whereby all property is owned by 
groups but used by individuals.  
The perception of land in Africa indicates that cultural beliefs have a significant 
impact on the way communities manage natural resources. In fact, this is endorsed by 
Article 26 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN, 
2008) which, in recognition of the importance of culture and beliefs in rural land 
management practices, implores all governments to ‘respect ... the customs, traditions and 
land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples.’ Similarly, Article 13(1) of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention no. 169 (1989) obliges governments 
‘to respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the [indigenous] 
peoples of their relationship with the lands...in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship’ (Ng’ombe & Mushinge, 2014). 
Furthermore, the right to property is actually a human and peoples’ right. This is 
provided for by Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which 
states that “The right to property shall be guaranteed.” Schoffelleers (1979) believes that 
land belongs to the dead, which clearly demonstrates that there is a role played by 
ancestors in the administration of this valuable resource. It is widely believed that the 
ancestors cannot allow complete land alienation, especially to outsiders, as this could lead 
to their descendants being deprived of their rights to enjoy the interests in land (Agbosu, 
2000). Most traditional communities therefore believe that actions that violate this 
20 
 
 
customary code of conduct have the potential to destroy the link between past and future 
generations (Agbosu, 2000). Additionally, Agbosu (2000) asserts that the inability to 
comply with these rules can lead to an ancestors’ wrath on the wrongdoers (Ng’ombe & 
Mushinge, 2014). 
From the above indigenous perception of land, it is clear that land does not only 
have an economic value to Africans. Instead, land is sacred and is replete with ancestral 
overtones. Land harbors shrines and places of traditional sacrifice that makes it 
inalienable to the ethnic group that owns it. Customary land demarcation policies need to 
take these indigenous perceptions of land into consideration.Intertribal borders were 
never arbitrarily done by pen and paper. Instead, the chiefs of the two different tribes 
would physically meet on the site of the disputed ground and agree on geographical 
features like trees, hills, big rocks, shrines, and rivers that would serve as boundary 
markers. These geographical features then become permanent, immovable, and fully 
respected by both ethnicities. This is not what happened when the colonial masters were 
scrambling for land in Africa in 1884. The respected indigenous beliefs about land and 
their demarcation mechanisms were cast aside.   
The Advent of Colonialism and Poor Land Demarcation Policies 
The Berlin Conference of November 1884 to February 1885, and the events that 
followed, gave Africa its present borders. It also attempted to integrate Africa into the 
European concept of nation-states with clearly defined and demarcated borders 
(Muhammad, 2013). Many arguments tend to qualify or denounce the artificiality and 
arbitrariness of African borders. Ground realities and testimonies from key actors who 
witnessed the design and construction of the boundaries conclusively confirm that the 
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borders are indeed arbitrary and artificial (Muhammad, 2013). The following examples 
justify the non-respect of indigenous beliefs in boundary demarcations by the colonial 
masters.  
When the Anglo-French Convention on the Nigeria-Niger boundary was signed in 
1906, Lord Salisbury, then British Prime Minister, was credited to have remarked:  
We [the British and the French] have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps 
where no white man’s foot ever trod. We have been giving away mountains, 
rivers, and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediments that we 
never knew exactly where the mountains, rivers, and lakes were. (Anene, 1970, p. 
3) 
Similarly,in relation to Nigeria’s eastern border with Cameroon, a British Colonial officer 
recorded the method used in delimiting the borders. He said:  
In those days, we just took a blue pencil and a ruler and we put it down at Old 
Calabar, and drew that blue line to Yola. I recollect thinking when I was sitting, 
having an audience with the Emir (of Adamawa), surrounded by his tribe, that it 
was a very good thing that he did not know, that I, with a blue pencil, had drawn a 
line through his territory (Anene, 1970, p. 3) 
Naturally, the result of this common practice all over Africa (including the BaliKumbat 
and Bafanji of Cameroon) was division of its people, bifurcated political and social 
systems, and fractured cultural traditions. This careless apportioning eventually led to 
further dislocations and disorientations, particularly amongst the border populations 
(Muhammad, 2013). 
According to Asiwaju (1984), 
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… Boundaries were drawn across well-established lines of communication, 
includinga sense of community based on tradition, concerning common ancestry, 
usually very strong kinship ties, shared socio-political institutions and economic 
resources, common customs and practices, and sometimes acceptance of a 
common political control. In many instances, […] the boundary has separated 
communities of worshippers from age-old sacred groves and shrines. In other 
instances, well exemplified by the Somalis, the water resources in a 
predominantly nomadic culture area were located in one state and the pastures 
were in another.” (Asiwaju, 1984, p. 3) 
The borders were fundamentally determined without considering any social, political, or 
cultural characteristics of the partitioned people. This assertion has been confirmed by 
Posner (2006) who observed that a clear indication of the arbitrariness of the borders is 
the fact that 44 per cent of African boundaries follow either meridians or parallels. 
Another 30 per cent follow other rectilinear or curved lines. Further indication of the 
disrespect these authorities held for the people they partitioned comes from Asiwaju’s 
(1984) estimate that the 104 international borders existing in Africa in 1984 and 1985 
have dissected 177 culture areas or groups. 
Land as Ownership 
During colonization, Cameroon was divided between Britain and France as part of 
the League of Nation mandates. The new colonial boundary demarcations, established in 
the 1930s, introduced new dimensions to land use. Land was commodified. More 
importantly, land became the subject of ownership. According to Nkwi (2011), the 
Europeans’ arbitrary lumping of people and the complete ignorance of ethnic 
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composition caused differences in boundary understanding of most of the African States. 
In some instances, these boundary misunderstandings have resulted in inter-village or 
ethnic crises. The Balikumbat contesting their common border with the Bafanji is an 
excellent example. However, the Balikumbat and Bafanji situation is compounded by the 
fact that Cameroon had two colonial masters, the Germans and British. This means that 
two colonial boundaries exist between the Balikumbat and the Bafanji.  
In reference to the Balikumbat/Bafanji struggle, Ngwochu (2012) believes that, 
“the land issue remains a colonial legacy which Africa must resolve to facilitate the 
region’s socio-economic advancements” (vol 2, No. 12). Colonial land tenure was 
allocated based on village subservience to a colonial authority whose governing 
maintained a vice-like grip over land distribution. Peace was enforced through police and 
military coercion, which was a system that was entirely alien to African people. As 
Ngwochu (2012) states, “this was what was obtained when the European land tenure, 
based on individualization, collided with that of Africa, characterized by communality, 
during and after colonization.” In short, the village or group who were favored by the 
colonial administration received preferred treatment. This situation prevailed in the 
Balikumbat and Bafanji settlements.  
   Although some tension existed between the villages from the 1930s to the 1960s, 
there were no signs of overt conflict. For the most part, the two villages co-existed in 
peace and harmony for over 30 years. According to Mbah (2008), the disputed area of 
Bangang “posed no serious threat to peace until the 1960s when an increase in the value 
of land and the fertile soil of the land in question introduced a dispute between the two 
over the interpretation of the exact location of the colonially demarcated boundary” 
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(p.188). After Cameroon attained independence in the 1960s, rapid changes in the 
economic and political landscape occurred. Most of the colonial power eroded. This 
fueled enthusiastic desires of asserting legitimate rights to land reclamation. Balikumbat 
and Bafanji clashed and confronted one another over the land in Bangang. Both villages 
claimed ownership and argued that the colonial boundaries were wrong.  
 The core of the conflict appears to stem from the incompatibilities between the 
precolonial understandings of land, as held by the indigenous population, and the colonial 
land policies. In the pre-colonial Balikumbat and Bafanji villages, land was revered as a 
communal heritage and held in the highest regard. Before the colonial period, the lives 
and souls of the inhabitants of the land were intrinsically tied to the land. However, as 
Mbah (2008) contends, “the notion that land could be communal property, jointly 
exploited by two or more villages in a clan or ethnic group, was alien to the colonizers” 
(p.103). Prior to the arrival of the colonial masters, joint cultivation of the now contested 
territory of Njah in Bangang did not pose a conflict. However, since the colonial 
understanding of land was based on individual ownership, the introduction and 
implementation of its policies sowed the seeds of intense conflict that continues to this 
day. 
Due to conflicts between the indigenous perceptions of land and the colonial 
policies and the inability of the present La Republic du Cameroon to define tribal 
boundaries, the Balikumbat and Bafanji people have engaged in multiple minor 
confrontations. Worthy of note is the 1995 bloody war that lead to myriad human and 
property casualties on both sides.  
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The 1995 Land Dispute 
The conflict between Balikumbat and Bafanji transitioned from a latent conflict to 
one of overt dimensions on June 2, 1995. At this time, multi-party politics took effect in 
Cameroon.  Elections were held but they were marred by fraud and discontent. In the 
North West Region, lawlessness caused a state of pandemonium. Villages that were eager 
to show aggression saw this lack of social order as a prime opportunity to exert control. 
The Fon of Balikumbat ordered an attack on Bafanji to reclaim the fertile land of 
Bangang that had been allocated to Bafanji through the colonial process. During this 
wanton aggression, the orders of the Fon were executed to the letter. All the pillars that 
were erected to demarcate boundaries were removed. The village of Bafanji was locked 
down by the Balikumbat fighters. Women were raped, men were beaten and killed, and 
the market square was burned down. Any Bafanji resistance was outmatched by the 
Balikumbat fighters. In effect, war was declared on Bafanji.   
This was the first time the conflict had turned violent. Available statistics reveal 
that, “eighteen people died from gunshots, spears, cutlasses, poisoned arrows, or through 
beatings from sticks and clubs; sixteen of them were from Bafanji and two from 
Balikumbat” (Mukong, 1997, p. 3). This violent confrontation reveals both a deep affinity 
both villages have for the land and the desire to do whatever it takes to control and access 
it. The aftermath of the conflict was not without significant consequences to the 
communities. It is reported that, “roughly 3,000 Bafanji men, women and children fled 
the village” (Mbah, 2008, p. 230). This chaotic environment, coupled with building and 
property damage, meant that it would take a long time for peace and normalcy to return. 
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To date, the root causes of the 1995 conflict have not been addressed. Both 
villages remain unsure about the actual location of the boundaries. The first 
disagreements about the boundaries appeared in the 1960s. In response, the colonial 
administration referred the problem to the West Cameroon court. Its resultant resolution 
was that pillars would be erected at the boundaries as dictated by the colonial 
administration. However, war still broke out. In 2000, indications of another conflict over 
the same territory emerged but authorities quashed the threats. To date, both sides still 
claim ownership of this contested piece of land: 
 
Figure 1. Picture of Contested area in Njah around Bangang 
Investigating the perception of this land, the history of the dispute, the role of the 
colonial and present governments, and possible solutions to this reoccurring border crisis 
warrants close attention and rigorous research.  
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Problem Statement 
The boundary disputes between Balikumbat and Bafanji persist. Despite the 1998 
truce, serenity and freedom of movement are not plentiful emotions among these 
neighbours. Currently, fighting erupts repeatedly with deadly consequences on both 
sides. My observations have revealed frequent attacks, looting, and the destruction of 
crops and property, especially during the planting and harvesting seasons. Both tribes still 
claim ownership of this disputed area. The need to investigate the causes of this persistent 
conflict and its motivation drives this research.  
The Balikumbat and Bafanji conflict rests within the larger problem of Cameroon 
itself.  According to Havnevik (2005), this problem revolves around land ownership in 
Cameroon, which is a major source of conflict. Land is construed as a vital means of 
survival and hence the primary reason why people and communities vie to exert control 
over it. The court systems in Cameroon are deluged with land related conflicts. In fact, 
the frequency of land disputes is so common in Cameroon that it is featured in the 
USAID country report. In highlighting this phenomenon, USAID findings conclude that, 
Disputes over access to land are relatively common in Cameroon. The main 
causes of these conflicts are changing land use patterns, increasing land 
degradation, increasing population densities and a lack of policies and rules for 
managing land disputes (USAID, 2011, p.11) 
Local land and boundary disputes between different ethnic groups have become a 
national problem. The problem is compounded by colonial policies that appear to have 
fueled most of the land related conflicts. The fact that these policies have not been 
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replaced by more friendly guidelines that could mitigate the reoccurrence of these 
conflicts irritates the problem. 
This study examines the history and patterns of recurring land and boundary 
disputes between the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages in the Northwest Region of 
Cameroon. This situation is a case of a local level conflict that is part of the larger 
national problem in Cameroon.  
Research Objectives 
Main Objective 
This study is investigated whether colonial land tenure and policies set the stage 
for recurrent land and boundary disputes between the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages.  
Specific Objectives 
 First, this study examined the pre-colonial indigenous perception of land and its 
importance to the indigenes of Balikumbat and Bafanji. 
 Second, this study diagnosed the causes, history, and recurrences of the land 
dispute. 
 Third, an inquiry was conducted into the colonial land policy and its contribution 
to the land dispute in Balikumbat and Bafanji. 
 Fourth, this study determined the role of the present La Republic du Cameroon 
government in the solution of the dispute. 
 Fifth, this study providespossible solutions to the conflict byestablishing a long 
lasting truce between the neighbouring tribes. 
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Research Questions 
The overarching research question is, “Did colonial land tenure set the stage for 
recurrent land and boundary disputes between the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages?” This 
is followed by a series of others, which help answer the central research question. 
 First, what are the constituents of the pre-colonial indigenous perception of land 
and its importance to the indigenes of Balikumbat and Bafanji? 
 Second, what are the causes, history, and reoccurrences the land dispute? 
 Third, to what extent did colonial land policy contribute to the land dispute in 
Balikumbat and Bafanji? 
 Fourth, what are the possible solutions toward establishing a long lasting truce 
between the two neighboring tribes? 
Justification and significance of the study 
This qualitative case study is justified for a number of reasons. It enlightens 
readers about the role that the colonial administration of Cameroon played in causing and 
sustaining land disputes in the Northwest Region of Cameroon. A gap in the literature 
pertaining to this conflict exists because very little reference has been made on the impact 
of colonial policies to land disputes in this region. This study deepens our understanding 
of what such conflicts suggest to the post-colonial administration. Findings from this 
study provide future researchers of land-related conflicts with strategies in relation to 
how to approach these kinds of conflicts. The study creates recommendations that could 
advance the quest for a solution to the dispute. While the purpose of this research is not to 
generalize about land disputes, findings increase our understanding of land disputes in 
post-colonial territories.  
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Land and boundary disagreements seem to be an area of incessant disputes. Scholars 
and policymakers constantly search for skills and ideas to help them resolve ever-
increasing disputes in their communities. This research project makes recommendations 
that could help increase the latitude of approaches available to these stakeholders. 
Moreover, what makes this research useful to the field of conflict analysis and resolution 
is the fact that it focuses on the issue of colonial legacy in the Northwest Region of 
Cameroon. Unfortunately, the Northwest Region of Cameroon is not the only area 
plagued with problems related to colonial rule and their aftermath. Drawing from the 
Balikumbat and Bafanji example, one may extrapolate useful ideas for future research. 
Although the findings of this single case study cannot be generalized and made 
applicable to all land and boundary disputes, this research helps highlight problems that 
are particular to small villages dealing with the policies of colonial regimes. 
Moreover, the contribution of this study is relevant to the ongoing discourse about 
literature pertaining to land conflicts. A noticeable gap exists in literature that explains 
peculiar characteristics of land disputes from the onset of a conflict to its escalation to 
violence. Every land dispute is unique in its own right. This study of the Balikumbat and 
Bafanji land dispute lends additional literature to the field of peace building and 
international conflict resolution. Land ownership appears to be the trigger of these 
conflicts. Adding clarity to the evolution of land conflicts and their ability to interface 
with international conflict resolution makes perfect sense. Conclusions from this study 
create a better understanding of conflict that emanates from perceived land boundary 
differences and the factors that sustain them.   
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Definition of Key Concepts 
Land Tenure/Ownership 
Land tenure derives from the Latin word ‘tenere’ that means ‘to hold’ (Barnes, 
1986). Thus, land tenure describes the system of access to and control over land and 
related resources. It defines the rules and rights which govern the appropriation, 
cultivation, and use of natural resources on a given space or piece of land. Strictly 
speaking, it is not the actual land that is owned, but rights and duties over it (Ng’ombe & 
Mushinge, 2014). Land tenure can be either private or communal. In the case of the 
disputed land between Balikumbat and Bafanji, the Bangang area is communal land. 
However, individuals farm on this land by virtue of the belongingness to the ethnic 
group.  
Intractable Conflict 
 According to Coleman (2000), “Intractable conflicts, broadly defined, are intense, 
deadlocked, and resistant to de-escalation or resolution. They tend to persist over time, 
with alternating periods of greater and lesser intensity. Intractable conflicts come to focus 
on needs or values that are of fundamental importance to the parties. The conflict 
pervades all aspects of the parties' lives, and they see no way to end it, short of utterly 
destroying the other side.”(p.6) Due to the traditional and religious attachments these 
villages hold to the disputed area, the conflict between the Bafanji and Balikumbat people 
is intractable, with both villages not willing to surrender to the other.  
Colonialism 
This term refers to the establishment, exploitation, maintenance, acquisition, and 
expansion of a colony in one territory by a political power from another region. It is a set 
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of unequal relationships between the colonial power and the colony and often between 
the colonists and the indigenous population. The Berlin Conference of November 1884 to 
February 1885 and the scramble for Africa by imperial Europe for political, social, 
religious, and economic domination is a classic example of colonialism. Contextually, 
Cameroon was home to two colonial masters, the Germans and the British. The presence 
of two colonial maps demarcating the boundary between Balikumbat and Bafanji have 
left the two tribes and the present Cameroon government in cognitive dissonance as to 
any possible solution to this intractable conflict. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presented the background of the study to create a better 
understanding of the context of the problem. The objective is to determine whether the 
colonial land tenure system is responsible for the recurrent land and boundary conflict 
amongst the Balikumbat and Bafanji people. It raises the following research question, 
“Did the colonial land tenure set the stage for recurrent land and boundary disputes 
between the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages?” To answer this question, this chapter 
divided it into five different components. These questions are:  
 First, what are the constituents of pre-colonial perception of land and its 
importance?  Second, what are the causes, history, and recurrence of the land dispute?  
 Third, to what extent did colonial land policy contribute to the land dispute in 
Balikumbat  and Bafanji?  
 Fourth, are there possible solutions to the intractable conflict that has arisen? 
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The next chapter reviews relevant literature pertaining to this inquiry. Chapter three 
presents the methodology used in the study, chapter four discusses the findings and 
results, while chapter five offers conclusions and recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of Relevant Literature 
This chapter presents the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical framework of this 
study. It begins with a review of documents that explain the major concepts and research 
objectives of this study. This is followed by a review of explanatory theories. The chapter 
concludes with empirical studies of land disputes in other areas of Africa. 
Conceptual Framework 
Indigenous Conception of Land and its Importance 
The vast majority of African people generally believe that land is a gift from God 
and that it is at the center of human existence. Land occupies a central place in the 
African worldview. In the African belief system, land establishes the interconnectedness 
between different tripartite African worlds. These are the Macrocosmos, Mesocosmos, 
and Microcosmos (Mbiti, 1969).  
The Macrocosmos refers to the Supreme Being and the divinities or deities who 
execute his commands. It is the superior hierarchy of the world inhabited by superior 
beings. These are God the Moulder and Creator of the Universe and divinities such as the 
Earth, Sea, Sun, Moon, Rain, and Thunder. These beings are the agents that execute the 
instructions of the Supreme Being. These agents function within the context of land 
(Mbiti, 1969). 
The Mesocosmos refers to the ancestors (living dead) who serve as intermediaries 
between human beings on earth and the superior beings in the Macrocosmos. By offering 
sacrifices and prayers, the mesocosmos serves as the intermediary between the 
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Microcosmos and the Macrocosmos. In times of need and crises, Africans appeal to the 
Macrocosmos for both spiritual and material sustenance (Mbiti, 1992; Soseh, 2011). 
The Microcosmos constitutes human beings and all the creatures around. These 
creatures range from human beings, land, and minerals. Land, as a microcosmos, links 
human beings to other worlds. This is possible through spiritual (sacrifices and prayers) 
and material sustenance. For these reasons, the importance bestowedupon land ranges 
from spiritual to material needs. From a spiritual point of view, Africans use land and its 
components to venerate their ancestors and worship God to enhance their well-being. 
From a material dimension, land provides subsistence in the form of shelter, food, wealth, 
and power (Mbiti, 1992; Soseh, 2011).  
In an area where three-quarters of the population relies on agriculture, either 
grazing or farming, the importance of land cannot be overemphasized. Since land is 
considered precious and of high value, the practice of land grabbing is prominent. 
Without a strict control mechanism for the distribution and demarcation of land, conflict 
over land is inevitable (Chabel, Engel & Gentili, 2005). The disputed land in Bangang, 
that lies between the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji, is fertile and used for habitation, 
cultivation, and to host shrines for traditional ritual sacrifices. Since the land is used in 
these ways, the tendency to acquire more land and forge boundary lines is tempting. It is 
within this framework that tradition and culture influence conflict between the people of 
Balikumbat and those of Bafanji (Mbah, 2008). For those who believe that this land is the 
abode of their ancestors, they believe that it is better to shed blood than relinquish it. For 
those who believe it is their sole source of subsistence and livelihood, there is no choice 
but to fight to retain it. 
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 Though constitutional law has replaced customary laws, many governments have 
failed to manage local disputes without repressive measures. The absence of traditional 
forms of dispute resolution and the use of modern weaponry accelerate the transfer of 
assets from the politically weak to the politically strong (Campbell et al., 2000). Local 
conflicts escalate into political conflicts and render the weak vulnerable. The customary 
role of elders as peacekeepers changed in the post-colonial period into sources of party 
ideology and political manipulation. Because colonization turned land into a commodity, 
people now fight to win it whereas before, it was held in trust for all including future 
generations. The arbitrary boundaries then just added to the fighting because now, 
boundaries became exclusionary based on ownership, even though they were in the 
wrong places. Political inclinations of tribal leaders, like Fons, now compromise the 
process of justice (Bryant, 1998). The fact that all of the political institutions of the sub-
division are based in Balikumbat, and that the former Fon enjoyed political immunity 
from the incumbent government, prevented the possibility of effecting just decisions 
about the conflict (Brochhaus et al., 2003; Brochhaus, 2005). The weakness of the 
political will in handling the problem of conflict has been laid bare. 
 Furthermore, the scarcity of and competition over natural resources is a major 
cause of the land conflict between the Balikumbat and Bafanji people. A major cause of 
the conflict is attributed to competition over declining resources (Lind, Jeremy & 
Sturman, 2002). This arises from the natural resource base, population pressure, and 
environmental degradation (Hartman, 2001; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Peet & Watt, 1996). 
The massive population movements pushed and pulled other groups in the search for 
fertile lands. Large areas of once fertile land have become desertified. Available fertile 
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land is reduced, which intensifies competition over it (Moritz, 2006a, McCabe 2004; 
Kum, 1983). Fon Galabe III underscores this point when he testifies about the different 
crops cultivated in the disputed land (Letter of 14th 08/1969). 
 Additionally, the land tenure system in the country is a critical issue. Land 
degradation is caused by climate change and human activities such as farming and cutting 
trees. Resource competition intensifies, which in turn, causes social inequalities. 
Economic deprivation and environmental degradation escalate as poor inhabitants of 
degraded ecosystems are forced to compete for diminishing resources (Blaikie 
&Brookfield, 1987; Breusers, 1999; Burnham, 1980). Moreover, the weak political will 
and lack of prompt government action have frequently exacerbated conflict rather than 
provide relief and solutions to the land and boundary disputes of the Balikumbat and 
Bafanji people. In this turbulent atmosphere, disrespect for the rule of law heightens 
insecurity. People arm themselves for protection against violence and theft of their 
resources. Inter-communal fighting and social and political breakdowns enhance the 
destruction of the needs of the opponents. This belligerent attitude creates excessive 
leeway for illegalities such as looting, lawlessness, and deadly battles (Braukamper, 
2000; Sabina, 2006; Arditi, 1997). 
Endemic poverty, vast inequality, and a paucity of opportunity are reliable 
predictors of conflict. According to Benjaminsen & Boubacar (2009), poverty of great 
magnitude “contributed to the emergence of war by exacerbating underlying social 
tensions and depriving governments of the means of ending war. Poverty limits 
opportunities in education, unemployment, and economic advancement.”(p.103). A 
consistent lack of opportunity intensifies a sense of ignorance among social groups 
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suffering from discrimination (Barrot, 1992; Barth, 1959; Mitchell, 1981). With scarce 
opportunities, discrimination takes away any hope of finding employment. Deep 
resentment develops quickly and destroys the intrinsic feeling among its victims that they 
have a stake in society. Denial of opportunity and the impoverishment of people is 
closely linked to societal resistance to state rules and regulations (Bett, 1994; Steve, 
2000).  
With Balikumbat as the administrative and religious headquarters of this sub-
division, the people of Bafanji feel that they are unnecessarily subordinated to violent and 
wicked neighbours. As a result, they are ready to resist any authoritative action from the 
people of Balikumbat (Moritz, 2006). The people of Bafanji also believe that both 
religious and civil authorities are perpetuating their subordination to the people of 
Balikumbat. For these reasons, the people of Bafanji maintain a suspicious relationship 
with them (Pelican, 2006). This attitude does not enhance the process of peace between 
the two parties. Therefore, persistent conflicts on land and boundary disputes are 
sustained (Peluso, Lee & Watts, 2001). 
Another exacerbating factor is a strategy leaders use to gain and consolidate 
power. Colonial rulers, government officials, and the church have fueled ethnic tension 
by deliberately favoring some ethnic religious groups at the expense of others. These 
divide-and-rule strategies created and sustained ethnically defined economic and political 
inequalities that help fuel continuing cycles of rebellion and repression (Sandole, 1999; 
Steve, 2000). Having to endure discrimination from national governments causes much 
resentment in the people of Bafanji. Since the conflicting parties belong to different 
ethnic and clan groups, ethnicity is an effective form of political mobilization. It is an 
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imperative embedded in the foundation of the political order. Ethnicity also functions as a 
controlling factor in the political process. It is intrinsically political since it naturally 
encourages ruling groups to go to great lengths to emphasize their political affiliation. 
Ethnicity is also the ruling principle of economic and social differentiation. It divides 
groups that confront each other while completing for material and social resources (Prutt, 
Dean & Kim, 2004). 
It is a misunderstanding to limit conflict in Africa to tribal warfare. Western 
analysts attempt to place the burden of violence in sociological factors inherent in Africa. 
This view ignores the fact that asymmetrical modernization in Africa gave ethnic groups 
incentives to organize and increase the level of competition that already existed in most 
countries. Modernization generally causes ethnic competition to degenerate into a new 
form of social organization that centers on the capitalist means of production (Richards, 
2005). Rapid modernism creates competition for limited resources that mobilizes ethnic 
competition.  However, a rational basis exists for ethnic competition. Each ethnic group 
actually represents politically mobilized coalitions used to attain limited income and 
capital. The most fundamental resources that groups require are land, the market, power, 
and jobs (Little, 1987; Kurtz, 2001; Kriesberg, 2007). Competition for these resources 
can be fierce. With modernization, it is clear that some groups will benefit 
disproportionately because of the factor of space. Balikumbat and Bafanji are noted for 
the production of crops such as groundnuts, okra, corn, and beans they ship to major 
cities in Cameroon. This is a lucrative business for these people. The acquisition of large 
tracts of land results in a great means of production. In this capitalist spirit, giving up 
privileges gained from agricultural activities is something no one wants to do. 
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Competition for land in this context entails conflict between the two ethnic groups 
(Mitchel, 1983; Hussein, Sumberg & Seddon, 2000). 
From colonial times, the local administration was the primary agent of 
modernization. Groups tended to be organized along ethnic and tribal lines. This meant 
that groups that were better “spatially located” received a greater share of the benefits of 
modernization. These groups had incentives to mobilize support and gain political power 
to ensure that they retained these advantages. Political power with authority over the 
distribution of many of the benefits of modernity became tied to ethnic mobilization. 
Furthermore, the distribution of limited resources became a primary focus for politicians, 
their supporters, and more curious surrounding others (Hurault, 1998). 
In sum, competition for political power can exacerbate ethnic tensions. Political 
leaders in many African countries have attempted to mobilize supporters through appeals 
to ethnic identity. This has worsened underlying ethnic resentment, which in turn, has led 
to conflict. In particular, poorly designed or implemented elections, which are seen to 
represent voter preferences, have aggravated ethnic tensions within the region. 
Cameroon Land Tenure System from Pre-Colonial to Post Colonial Era 
 Cameroon is one of the Central African countries whose population of over 20 
million people is characterized by great linguistic and ethnic diversity. It gained 
independence from the joint Anglo-French colonial rule in 1961 and 1960 respectively. 
Like many African nations, Cameroon evolved rather quickly after independence into a 
one-party state until 1991 when multiparty democracy was instituted (Fonjong 
&Markham, 2008). Its social structure is marked by strong loyalties to ethnic heritage 
and local villages (Gwan, 1982). 
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Despite numerous formal legal provisions to the contrary, Cameroon remains a 
male-dominated society where men are privileged by custom. Men continue to dominate 
legally in land ownership, the inheritance of land and property, access to credit, and the 
right to grow cash crops. The right to determine who can use family lands, family 
planning, the right to enter areas where women are excluded by taboo, and the right to 
take multiple wives are other privileges men enjoy (Guya, 1984; Fonjong, 2001; Endeley 
& Sikod, 2007; Fonjong & Markham, 2008). 
In Cameroon, like elsewhere in West Africa, the land tenure system was shaped 
by historical, economic, and especially political developments. Hence, the land tenure 
system has therefore evolved from the pre-colonial to the present period. 
The Pre-Colonial Era 
Before colonization, there were basic tenets embodied in the way of life of 
indigenous communities in Cameroon that were used to regulate ownership and use of 
land. These tenets were usually connected to the manner in which land was first acquired 
by the community. To the natives, land was not viewed in terms of economic value. Just 
like water, air, and fire, land was not considered an object capable of individual 
ownership (Henry, 1983; Rayner, 1898; Whiteman’s Report 1921). Instead, it was, and 
still is, a source of the socio-cultural wellbeing of a people, a deity, and a spiritual link 
between a people and their god. Land provided the basic needs of sustenance. It was not 
thought of in terms of its economic value. As an ancestral gift, a trust was created by the 
present members of these customary communities to protect and pass on the land to the 
next generation (West African Land Commission 1912: 183). That is why land could not 
be alienated through sales for fear of depleting the family or village patrimony. 
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This land, which was acquired through conquest or first settlement, belonged to a 
community as a village or a family, just like a corporate entity. The traditional authority 
or family head personified these entities in the sense that he controlled the land for, and 
on behalf of, the village or family. The land was not in his private name. Any member 
who needed this land for farming or cultivation requested allocation in perpetuity of an 
aliquot from the traditional authority. This land then became his for generations to come. 
The individual, however, had no rights to alienate this land without the consent of the 
traditional authority or family council (village or family elders), or chief or family head 
(Rayner, 1898; Mabogunje, 1981). According to the Fon of Kom of Northwest 
Cameroon, allocation of land in this way was given mainly to men and not to women. 
Women could only come onto the land through their male matrikins or patrikins. These 
allocations could not be made to women because they did not have the customary legal 
capacity to perform customary symbolic ownership rights, which was mainly the pouring 
of libation. 
The Colonial Era 
Cameroon had two main colonial experiences. These eras were the German 
colonial rule from 1884 to 1914 and the joint Anglo-French administration from 1918 
until independence. It is during this era that individual ownership introduced by the 
European colonizers of Cameroon(see for example, Viscount Haldane in Amodu Tijani v 
Secretary of Southern Nigeria) awakened the natives to the commercial value of land. 
The Period of German Rule (1884-1914) 
The German rule in Kamerun was ushered in when Nachtigal ratified the Treaty 
of Annexation. It was signed by King Akwa on behalf of Kings and chiefs of Douala, 
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Cameroon and Adolf Woermanon on behalf of German firms. By this treaty, the 
traditional chiefs agreed to abandon their influence relating to sovereignty, legislation, 
and administration of the territory and turn it over to the Germans. In return, the Germans 
were to respect the customary laws of the natives. 
The Germans pursued a policy of land appropriation from the natives with little or 
no consideration for plantation agriculture. Subsequently, the German Imperial 
Government enacted the German Kronland Act of July 15, 1896. It provided that all 
lands, which were not effectively occupied by the natives, were herrenloss land (terra 
nullius). They were assimilated as part of German overseas dominions and the property 
of the German Imperial Government. They failed to take into account the fact that, even 
though the natives were not effectively using the land, at no time had the land been 
abandoned by them (Mabo v. Queensland, 2005). The land in question could be land on 
fallow, hunting grounds, or allocated for community reserves. At that time, the land that 
natives could effectively occupy was insignificant when compared to that which was 
unoccupied. However, all native land was appropriated by the German imperialists 
except that which was ‘effectively occupied’ by the chiefs, the customary communities, 
and that which the Germans had been given freehold interests. 
German land policy was based solely on their economic interest rather than the 
general interest of the host communities. For example, at the foot of Mount Cameroon, 
where the land is very fertile and suitable for plantation agriculture, the natives were 
carted into reservaats (reserves) around Protestant and Catholic missions (Njoh, 2000: 
246). Von Puttkamer, the governor of the colonial state, decided that the natives would be 
granted no more than 1.5 hectares for residential purpose (Njoh, 1998: 409). This land 
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policy was to restrict the amount of farmland available to the natives in a bid to convert 
them to wage labor. This policy fostered the appropriation of land and shifted the power 
over it from the local chiefs to German colonizers. 
Land concessions were granted to the South Cameroon Company and Northwest 
German Company, so that by 1896, these two companies controlled one-fifth of the land 
in Kamerun. Two German companies, Woerman and Jantsen and Thormahlen, owned all 
of the land in the Bakweri and coastal Mboko (Mbuagbaw, 68). Most were taken from 
the natives by force, tricks, or insignificant payments (5 marks per hectare). Similarly, the 
Germans further contravened the annexation treaty by taking over land control from the 
Fons and traditional chiefs. This act enabled the Germans to redistribute or re-allocate 
land for agriculture and to convert the indigenes into wage laborers after depriving them 
of access to their ancestral land. The Germans went further by introducing a land register 
(Grundbuch) for land registration against a fee. This act guaranteed the title of German 
companies and individuals who had bought appropriated land at the expense of the 
natives. 
Summarily, the German colonial rule was marked by a complete dismantling of 
the native collective system of land control and by asserting their supremacy over the 
country’s lands. With German established supremacy over land, fertile land previously 
used for food production would be converted into plantation land for the cultivation of 
cash crops destined for colonial markets. As a result, the number of German plantation 
farmers in Cameroon rapidly increased from seven in 1891, to 182 in 1913. The total land 
owned and occupied by the Germans and German companies, uniquely for plantation, 
rose to 264,000 acres in the coastal region of the South West alone (Njoh, 2002).  
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The Anglo-French Colonial Era (1914-1961) 
With the defeat of the Germans in the First World War, the British and the French 
formally took over Cameroon after the Anglo-French Declaration of July 10, 1919. 
Cameroon became a mandate territory of the League of Nations and subsequently as a 
trust territory of the United Nations in the ratio 1:4 respectively. The British ruled one-
fourth of the territory of Cameroon as an integral part of Western Nigeria until its 
independence in 1961. French Cameroon was ruled as a separate French colony. During 
the period until 1947, the British and French took over the German plantations (Acworth 
et al., 2001). Just like the Germans, the French declared all unoccupied lands as ‘terres 
vacantes et sans maître’ or ‘vacant land without landlord’. This gave them the right to 
exploit the land and resources without native approval. 
The principal land tenure law (Ordinance No. 1 927) stated that all lands, except 
the estates registered and recognized by the British, were native lands. These lands were 
under the control and disposition of the Prime Minister who was to hold and administer 
the land for the natives. In other words, no use of native land was valid without the Prime 
Minister’s consent. By this ordinance, the indigene’s rights of ownership over ancestral 
land were converted into customary rights of occupancy as per Article 2. The natives 
were accorded use and occupation of the land while non-natives, who had acquired it 
illegally, were given certificates of occupancy. Even though this document was a 99-year 
lease, where the holder paid rent to the government, it was regarded by mostly colonial 
economic operators as documents of title (Fonjong et al., 2010). 
The German and Anglo-French colonial land policies dispossessed the natives of 
their rights to ancestral land. These policies contravened both the annexation treaty and 
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the trusteeship agreement by marginalizing these natives in land matters, particularly 
women who needed land for food crop cultivation. The post-colonial period did not seem 
to bring along with it much hope, as it was a continuation of colonial land policy by the 
new Cameroonian administration. 
Both the colonial and post-colonial administration helped to destroy the notion of 
communal land rights and made land a commercial asset. The new notion of viewing land 
as an individual or commercial property, in places like Wum, had to wait until 1967 when 
the Wum Area Development Authority became commercialized. Land registration 
introduced by the Germans after the 1896 Act was fostered by the British who granted 
only rights of occupancy (usufruct rights) to the natives. Non-natives were given 
certificates of occupancy, which gave them security of tenure over the land they 
possessed. 
The Post-Colonial Era 
At independence, the two Cameroons inherited two separate legal and 
administrative cultures, one from the French and the other from the British. As federated 
states of the unified Cameroon, each territory was allowed some autonomy in land 
administration until 1974, when there was an attempt to harmonize the many land laws 
through the 1974 Land Ordinances. These ordinances attempted to curb haphazard 
dealings that underpinned land transactions, promote maximal use of land through a more 
rational system of allocation, and remove the customary notion of inalienability of land to 
assure proper land administration, which would lead to growth. The intention was also to 
ensure a system of land registration by way of legal enactment, which provided security 
of tenure to customary landowners. This was prompted by the fact that the economic 
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agenda of this agrarian economy was to convert customary farmers into bourgeois 
planters with secured tenures. This was one of the principal missions of ‘Operation Green 
Revolution’ launched in 1973 by President Ahmadou Ahidjo (Fonjong et al., 2010). 
Section 1(2) of Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974 provides that the state is the 
guardian of all lands in Cameroon and it may intervene to ensure the rational use of land 
in the imperative interest of defense or in the economic policies of the nation. To render 
this provision operational, it nationalized all land irrespective of effective occupation. 
Private lands with valid registration documents and state lands as per Sections 14 and 15 
of Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974 were exempt. Natives who had effectively been on 
the land before August 5, 1974, but without any registered title, were given 10 and 15 
years in urban and rural areas respectively, to obtain land certificates. After this period, 
their lands would efflux into national land according to Section 4 (1) (new) of Ordinance 
No. 77-1 of January 10, 1977. The same principle applied to holders of miscellaneous 
deeds and final court judgments according lands to them.  
The management of the national land was thus placed under the management of 
national Land Consultative Boards as per Section 16 of the Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 
1974, which is under the control of the local administrative officers of their jurisdiction. 
The chiefs or traditional rulers who were the customary custodians of such lands were 
reduced to just members of this board. Decree No. 77/245 of July 15, 1977, categorized 
these chiefs into first, second and third class chiefs and reduced them to mere adjunct of 
administration, thereby demystifying the sacred nature of customary royalty. To create 
better categorization, these chiefs worked with the administration to cart away indigenous 
lands (Fonjong et al., 2010). 
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Conclusively, the African Development Bank states “In Cameroon, like in most 
sub-Saharan African countries, land tenure is characterized by the coexistence of a 
traditional or “customary” land tenure system which is in a state of transition and a 
“modern” land tenure system which is written, introduced through colonization to 
promote individual landownership basically by colonialists. Cameroon was subjected to 
German, British, and French colonial rule. Accordingly, it has three different land tenure 
systems introduced by each of these colonial powers” (African Development Bank, 
November, 2009, p. IV). 
From the above quotation, one can infer that the precolonial land tenure systems 
were purely communal with little or no private ownership of land. The family heads, 
chiefs, and Fons were traditional custodians of land. This communal dimension to land 
tenure was changed during the colonial period. Custody over land was arbitrarily taken 
away from the traditional authorities and handed over to the colonial powers. Instead of 
communal land ownership, the colonial masters introduced plantations, which were 
owned by the colonial firms. Gradually, land tenure shifted from communal to private 
ownership. In the post-colonial era, the present Cameroon government policy on land 
tenure seem to be a continuation of the private land tenure of the colonial masters. 
Authority over land is completely taken away from the traditional leaders and the 
government is its sole custodian.   
Causes of Land and Boundary Disputes 
Conflict makes life a constant process of adapting to basic insecurity and 
permanent crises for generations caught up in war. Wars displace populations and create 
homelessness. They prevent people from meeting their basic needs by destroying crops, 
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land, and the environment. Wars destroy physical and social infrastructure, human 
capital, and local economic institutions (Morton, 1969). 
The causes of armed conflicts are numerous and interconnected. They range from 
individual to group volition to structural inequality and injustice. Some causes are local 
while others arise from national transformations dating back to pre-colonial, colonial, and 
post-colonial epochs. Although the quality of governance has apparently improved, 
continuing economic crises leading to material insecurity have influenced the activities of 
many communities in the country (Hagberg, 1998). This situation explains persistent 
conflicts and lack of political stability.  
The causes might have been trivial but the effects are far reaching. This sub-
section examines the different causes of land and boundary disputes. These causes are 
classified under systemic external and internal, and proximate external and internal 
causes of conflicts. 
Systemic Causes of Land Conflict 
 Systemic causes of conflict refer to the structural conditions that influence the 
outbreak of war between two or more parties. These conditions are either external or 
internal. For external conditions, one refers to legacies of the colonial masters and 
administrative bottlenecks. Internal conditions include geophysical conditions, scarcity of 
resources, poverty, socio-economic inequalities, and ethnic divisions. 
External Systemic Causes of Conflict 
 Colonial legacies comprise the external systemic causes of the tribal conflicts 
between Balikumbat and Bafanji. Colonialism has had tremendous cultural ramifications 
in most African states. Scholars like Mbah (2008), Nkwi (2001), Kurtz (2001), and Barth 
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(1959), portray the interrelatedness between conflicts in Africa and influences from the 
colonial period. Culture is Africa’s antennae into the unknown future and their reference 
point into the past. People, who are robbed of their heritage during occupation, 
enslavement, and political and religious colonization, become disoriented and 
disempowered. The world cannot ignore the centuries of cultural adulteration of the 
African people through mental indoctrination against their heritage. With the advent of 
colonization, Africans have been weakened culturally, economically, and politically. The 
crisis of leadership is prominent in African society (Mbah, 2008; Nkwi, 2011; Kurtz, 
2001; Barth, 1959). 
The problem of cultural alienation and distortion cannot be overemphasized. 
According to Sobseh (2011), the attempt of colonialism to replace indigenous values with 
western ones produces a cultural dualism. Referring to the tribal conflicts between 
Balikumbat and Bafanji, one of the most important legacies of the colonial era was the 
formalization of expansionism. The Germans, who were the first colonial masters of 
Cameroon, planted boundaries demarcating these two villages. With the defeat of the 
Germans after the WWI and with the advent of the British, new boundary demarcations 
were introduced with the planting of pillars disregarding the German border definitions. 
This fact is confirmed by Fon Galabe III, who acted as plaintiff on court judgment and 
representative of Balikumbat (Administrative Letter, suit No. FCJ/3/1970). 
The discrepancies in colonial legacies in relation to the introduction and definition 
of boundaries constitute a major source of conflict between the two tribes. While the 
Balikumbat people claim the boundary line defined by the Germans is the right one, the 
Bafanji people maintain that the correct boundaries were those defined by the British. 
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The inability to reconcile these conflicting opinions between the two tribes has been 
responsible for persistent land conflicts in the Balikumbat area. Each party claims that the 
definition of boundary lines is contrary to the law when not ruled in their favor 
(Administrative Letter, suit No. FCJ/3/1970). 
Another colonial legacy that sustains the land conflict is the dichotomy between 
the French and British administration. During the colonial period, Cameroon was placed 
under the French and the British Mandate of the League of Nations as an aftermath of the 
WWI. This was later changed to the Trusteeship of the United Nation Organization after 
the WWII. These transformations still placed Cameroon under the control of Britain and 
France (Mbah, 2008). As a result, two colonial policies and approaches to administration 
were effected in Cameroon. The French employed a direct rule in the policy of 
administration, where traditional rulers had no say in the administration of the state. The 
British embarked on an indirect rule where local chiefs participated in administrative 
affairs. These administrative discrepancies were introduced in Cameroon as colonial 
legacies. 
At independence, the British West Cameroon and the French East Cameroon had 
two different approaches to administration. In spite of that, both were maintained in a 
federation. With the unfolding of political events in Cameroon, these two parts 
metamorphosed to a United Republic in 1972. This transformation implied that two parts 
of a country that were administered differently had to be administered as one country. 
Here, the prominence of conflicting values of administration serves as an added impetus 
to the land conflict in question. For English-speaking administrators, to resolve land 
conflict between the two tribes, traditional authorities have a great role to play. 
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Conversely, the French bypasses these authorities, pronounce statements, and injunctions 
without due consultation of the local authorities (Mbah, 2008; Sobseh, 2011). This 
situation has aggravated the land and boundary conflicts between Balikumbat and 
Bafanji. 
 Harmonization of the legal system in Cameroon means giving prominence to the 
French legal system. With the French approach to administration, problems and conflict 
between these two tribes remains inevitable. Attempts to solve this problem without 
referring to the indigenous rulers fails to maintain a lasting peace in the area. Decision-
making fails to pertain to the needs of the people as the civil authorities operate from an 
epic perspective (Interviews with traditional Authorities, 55 and 58 years, August 3, 
2015). 
Internal Systemic Causes of Conflict 
 Internal systemic causes are changes that occur from within the context in which 
the crisis occurs. The breakdown of values and traditions stands at the root of the conflict 
between Balikumbat and Bafanji people. The rates of rural-urban migration escalate 
throughout Africa (Adebayo, 1997; Bassett, 1986, Dafinger, Andreas, Pelican, 2006). In 
most villages, it was perfectly natural to feed at any table and lodge in any hut. However, 
in the cities, communal existence no longer holds. One must now pay for lodging and be 
invited for breakfast, lunch, or dinner. In this state of affairs, young men find out that 
relations cannot sustain them anymore. They join other migrants and slip gradually into 
the criminal processes of city life (Interviews with Divisional Officer, Balikumbat, 51 
years, August 6, 2015). 
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 One of the most painful consequences of this exodus is depersonalization and 
deculturalization. The way of life in the village still procured a certain reassurance and a 
feeling of solidarity. In the city, families face competition from other families. They are 
ill prepared for this task. The immigrant in the city must abandon his system of values 
and traditional behavior to meet up with the exigencies of city life (Turner, 1957). The 
inevitable consequences of these conditions are unemployment, crime, alcoholism, 
debauchery, and divorce. This leads to diminishing values such as the respect for one’s 
elders and parental authority. Urban tendencies encroach on the lives of young people 
including those in the village setting. With degrading traditional practices and scarce 
opportunities in traditional settings, young people resort to practices such as banditry, 
looting and loafing. Activities such as drinking at market places and village squares 
without any sense of purpose become common (Max, 1995). 
 What prompts the disintegration of traditional values from most African societies?  
Rampant circulation and smuggling of modern weaponry gives leeway to criminal acts. 
Traditional values are not still being passed down when displacement causes community 
breakdown (Bailey, 1969). The absence of a legal system to try crimes outside the 
military system and the replacement of traditional authority by military authority reduce 
prospects for local approaches to peace. Additionally, as with the Balikumbat and Bafanji 
people, declining resources and growing impoverishment strangle traditional values and 
render them vulnerable (Davidheiser & Luna, 2008). 
Proximate Causes of Conflict 
 Proximate causes of conflict refer to political and institutional factors that 
influence systemic conditions thus giving rise to violent reactions. These causes are also 
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external and internal. The former refers to economic reforms, dislocations, ideologies, 
arm flows, and military aid. The latter imply militarization, competition for state power, 
war making for economic gain, and problems of political liberalization. 
External Proximate Causes 
First, deeply held ideologies have become a source of tension amongst societies. 
Within the contemporary practice of democracy in Africa, partisan politics have 
provoked many conflicts rather than maintain peace (Barth, 1959; De Haan, Driel & 
Kruith, 1990). In the context of Balikumbat and Bafanji land and boundary conflicts, 
political practices have enhanced provocations, which lead to bloody conflicts in the sub-
division. There are disagreements that are more salient over the models of governance 
and political allegiance to political parties. The former Fon of Balikumbat was a staunch 
supporter of the political ideas of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Party of incumbent 
government (Sobseh, 2011). Conversely, the people of Bafanji are staunch supporters of 
the Social Democratic Front who are the prominent opposition political party in the 
country. These divergences in political opinions and attitudes give room for provocations 
and counter provocations during municipal, parliamentary, or presidential electoral 
periods. With the tense atmosphere that normally characterizes electoral periods in 
Cameroon, these provocations give rise to armed conflicts and war between the two 
villages. For instance, the 1997 tribal conflict between the two villages broke out 
immediately after the proclamation of the results of the elections (Sobseh, 2011). 
Therefore, the land conflicts between the two villages are often provoked by other 
factors, which do not necessarily arise from the use of land. 
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Second, external military support from the incumbent government has contributed 
to persistent conflicts in this sub-division. The presence of gendarmes in Balikumbat and 
the ability of these people to lobby them for support in times of conflict make them feel 
empowered. The people of Bafanji do not feel the same way. To lobby for support, the 
former traditional ruler of Balikumbat paid allegiance to the political ideologies of the 
political party (CPDM) of the incumbent government (Sobseh, 2011). In times of 
conflict, the greater transfer of resources like armed soldiers to the area of conflict 
worked in favour of the people of Balikumbat. Private arms dealers from the 
neighbouring tribes have also fueled the persistence of this conflict over land. These 
weapons are used to attack women in the farms. With the intervention of men, the attack 
becomes an armed conflict with deadly consequences (Goheen, 1996; Gulliver, 1979). 
Proximate Internal Causes 
Political exclusion through single party support, which is a state dominated 
authoritarian expression, is an important cause to deepening land crisis between the 
people of Balikumbat and Bafanji. This “top-down commandism” compromises the 
process of democracy in the sub-division. The condition produces a concerted aggression 
of one tribe against the other. This fact is experienced in the manipulation of the electoral 
processes. A disregard for political opponents is also witnessed. This is seemingly 
making “ethnocracy” a reality in the sub-division of Balikumbat.  Monopolistic control of 
the State by one or more ethnic group is a major cause of conflict (Breusers et al., 1998; 
Breusers et al., 2000). This is the situation in the Balikumbat sub-division where 
Balikumbat hosts all the administrative and religious authorities. This gives the people of 
this ethnic group a sense of superiority and power over the people of Bafanji.  
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An interviewee from Bafanji argues that all of the civil and religious 
administrators who live in Balikumbat ensure that most of the cases are ruled in favour of 
Balikumbat and to the detriment of the people of Bafanji (Interviews with Church 
Leaders in Bafanji, August 7, 2014). Bothtribes fall under one administrative and 
religious unit viz, Balikumbat sub-division, and Balikumbat Parish respectively. This 
gives them a sense of superiority and the possibility of manipulating authorities to their 
advantage. 
Mbah (2008) contends that conflicts in the Northwest Region of Cameroon have 
resulted from “grave errors of policy and conduct” by regimes in power. Decision-
making processes in the administration of the people erroneously offer no room for the 
participation or expression of the affected communities. Typically, there are no channels 
for people to express their grievances. The blame for this situation dates back to the end 
of the colonial period where most states became consumed with corruption and the 
consolidation of power. Most ethnic groups lost the possibility to participate in the 
governing affairs of the state. To buttress this argument, Sobseh (2011) argues that in 
post-colonial Cameroon, most persons from the Northwest Region have become entirely 
alienated from the State.  
The State is seen as in partnership with predatory elites who perpetuate conflict 
for their private interests. This conception of the State betrays the weaknesses of the 
incumbent government in handling inter-tribal conflicts because of its support of some 
elites from a particular tribe. The sub-divisional officer traces one of the causes of the 
persistent conflict to the absence of the use of local authorities in the resolution. In this 
interviewee’s view, instructions are imposed from above without taking into 
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consideration the reality in the field of conflict (Diduk, 1989; Gunder, 1967). This “top-
down commandism” in decision making at times compromises the process of justice. 
With the compromise, one party always feels cheated in the process of resolving the 
conflict. Thus, persistent conflict between the tribes of Balikumbat and Bafanji remain 
(See Appendix; Letter of Fon against Court Decision on the matter). 
Second, competition for state power creates unequal access,which inevitably leads 
to persistent conflicts. State power here is used to combat and repress those seeking to 
displace persons from the area of conflict (Boutrais, 1996). This power is used to capture 
a great deal of state resources. From this perspective, state power is one of the main 
causes of conflict (Blench, 1984). This cause comes irrespective of the contexts for which 
it is fought. State provisions of services to the Balikumbat area makes the Bafanji tribe 
permanently subordinate to them. The Police post, Gendarmerie, Municipal Council and 
the Sub-divisional Office are state institutions that are located in Balikumbat. This 
condition is aggravated by the fact that even private institutions like banks and micro 
finance groups are all situated in Balikumbat. From a group discussion with five 
members of the Bafanji catholic mission council, it became obvious that the people of 
Bafanji are not happy about this permanent situation because the likelihood of conflict 
between the two societies is always present. This post-colonial trend comes as a heritage 
of the colonial period. This trend intensifies inequalities between all social groups and 
regions. 
Third, war for economic gain due to “crass profiteerism” causes persistent conflict 
in this sub-division. Active manipulation of violence by greedy individuals is very 
prominent. This condition is worsened by individuals who want to be manipulated into 
58 
 
 
violent activities. Most combatants are “crass profiteers” who are motivated by self-
interest (Mbah, 2008; Sobseh, 2011). Asset stripping is a primary feature of this “crass 
profiteerism” (Kiven, 1997; Quentin, 2005). The participants of this type of conflict are 
motivated by profit and plunder. They use ethnicity and fear to mobilize and terrorize 
villagers. The availability of modern weaponry aggravates the situation. As economic 
rationales of the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict change, warfare may mutate like a virus.  
Outside assistance becomes difficult when this shift is not understood. Since 
profit making is overriding and corrupt practices are on the rise, most authorities 
calculate what they gain from prolonged conflict rather than what can be obtained from a 
long lasting peace. In this context, insecurity and conflict are manipulated for economic 
and political interests in the following ways. Raiding, official corruption, and charging 
people to move from one area to another are prominent examples of using conflict for 
private interests. The use of force to send women away from their farms, destroy some 
crops, and steal others for private use are other methods of conflict in the area.  
A letter from the quarter head of Jogoru in Balikumbat on 11th of May 2011 
explains the use of arms, aggression, and threat of lives, theft, and destruction of houses 
by the people of Bafanji village. Another letter from the Balikumbat traditional council 
explains the trespass and destruction of Balikumbat people’s crops by the Bafanji people 
on Monday 1st of May 2013 and testifies about the ulterior motives of this inter-tribal 
conflict. Ejecting people from productive and fertile lands without providing an 
alternative to their agricultural activities is no resolution of conflict. Some groups are 
immune to the costs of violence. These people believe that they benefit from violence 
rather than losing. This fact is very important to explain. People will exploit the 
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persistence of this tribal violence to plunder the property of others or settle scores. For 
example, a stranger who was working in Balikumbat was shot in the guise of tribal 
violence. However, close examination revealed that he was wooing a Bafanji man’s wife. 
Therefore, this tribal conflict persists because some unscrupulous individuals exploit it 
for their private interests. 
Fourth, political liberalization is a risky means of management because it gives 
room for conflict in society. Change of any sort is likely to cause instability. When 
ethnicity is an important factor in party affiliation, losing an election might mean 
exclusion from power for an entire ethnic group. Discrimination and repression are sure 
to follow. The advent of multiparty politics in the 1990s helps to explain the persistence 
of conflict between these two tribes. A testimony to this fact lies in the political 
affiliations of the various Fons of these two villages and some of their attempts to 
manipulate the electoral processes. This is a sensitive issue in the Northwest Region, 
especially when a leader indulges in fraudulent electoral activities to favour the 
incumbent government. This has often caused resentment and conflict because of the 
people’s sense of justice and their political affiliations to one opposition party (Mbah, 
2008; Sobseh, 2011). For this reason, political liberalization and multi-party politics lie at 
the root of land conflict between the two tribes. Every situation of conflict is reminiscent 
of land conflicts, which soon escalate into war between the two tribes. The root causes of 
this attitude lie in political corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, and human 
rights violations. 
The legacy of European colonialism and the devastating impact of the artificial 
boundaries created by colonial rulers have created the conflict between the people of 
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Balikumbat and Bafanji. In the 1870s, European powers were bickering among 
themselves about the spoils of Africa. To prevent further conflict among them, all 
interested parties convened at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to establish the 
partitioning of Africa. Some colonial administrators had to rely on the local power 
structure to manufacture tribal claims to power and hold ceremonies to suit their interests. 
This “invention of tradition” threw many societies into disarray (Robbins, 2002: p. 302).  
Misinformation and intrigue played by traditional rulers during the colonial era 
continues in the current conflict between the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji. The letter 
of the Divisional Officer of Ngoketunjia, Ndop dated 11/09/95 explains dubious activities 
and collusions of the Fon of Balikumbat. This letter comes because of the Fon’s intention 
to object to the map and documents retracing the boundary between Balikumbat and 
Bafanji. According to the Fon, the process of justice has been compromised by this 
activity. The Senior Divisional Officer explained that he is giving false information in 
order to incite rebellion and perpetuate conflict between the two tribes (Letter, Ref no.E. 
31/045/308 OF 11/09/1995, at Ndop). 
Lastly, the colonial administration had almost erased cultures and communities 
with an “education” and “civilizing” program that gave Africans only a minimal skill set 
that served European colonial interests. According to Bob Geldolf: 
To develop a type of nationwide government, (European) colonial administrators 
effectively set about inventing African traditions for Africa that would make the 
process more acceptable to the indigenous population. The most far-reaching 
inventions of tradition in colonial Africa occurred when administrators believed 
they were respecting age-old African customs whereas (…) what were called 
61 
 
 
customary law, customary land rights, and customary political structure and so on 
were in fact all invented by colonial codification. The most pernicious of the 
traditions, which the colonial period bequeathed to Africa, was the notion of 
tribalism. Just as every European belonged to a nation, every African must belong 
to a tribe, a cultural unit with common language, a single system and established 
customary law (2014, p. 234). 
 In Zambia, the chief of a little known group once said, 
My people were not soli until 1937 when the Bwana DC told us we were. The 
concept of Zulu as a discreet ethnic group did not emerge until 1870. The 
colonialists imposed a new political geography on these dangerous sands. 
(Rosenberg, 2014; in 
http://www.geographyabout.com/library/weekaa21601/ahtm. accessed August 23, 
2015). 
This process has been enthusiastically reinforced by the Africans themselves. 
Tribes have become the objects of passionate African imagination. The British ruled 
through local hierarchies, a process that unconsciously promoted the most malleable, 
collaborative or corrupt local chiefs. Where none existed, they simply created one, 
enabling ambitious individuals and groups to achieve positions of status, dominance, and 
wealth that might otherwise have been unattainable. This situation led to the creation of 
tribes and chiefdoms where none existed. As a result, many tribes continuously claim 
ownership originators in a particular area.   
 This situation exists between the Balikumbat and Bafanji. The people of 
Balikumbat claim that Bafanji never existed whereas those of Bafanji claim that they 
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were the first people to settle in the land. The people of Balikumbat came later and met 
them in this area. This situation proves how colonialism created tribes and demarcations 
that never existed in Africa. There is a need to find a lasting solution to this situation 
otherwise, accusations and counter accusations will only end in bloody conflicts between 
the two tribes. 
Theoretical Framework 
 The Balikumbat and Bafanji conflict was analyzed within the prism of two 
conflict resolution theories, Human Needs Theory and Post-Colonial Theory. Theories of 
conflict resolution have been developed to set a barometer or a measuring rod to help 
understand conflict.  Theories of this nature provide the tools, skill-sets, and/or lenses to 
assist in developing solutions to ever-occurring conflicts. 
Human Needs Theory 
 This theory states that all human action is driven by some kind of need. 
According to Burton (1979), the need for identity, freedom, personal fulfillment, 
recognition, security and safety, participation, love and belongingness and distributive 
justice are most important to all people. These needs are responsible for upholding a 
person's dignity. This assumption gives this theory a universal character because people 
of all races, creeds, and cultures can relate to these fundamental human needs. Therefore, 
conflict resolution must always consider these needs and all the people vying to satisfy 
them. Expanding on this thought, Katrin Gillwald suggests that “needs are all the 
exigencies of human existence and development and are an important driving force 
thereof.” (Katrin Gillwald in Burton, 1970, p.115) Human behavior can be predicated on 
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the particular need impacting the person in question. Viewed from this perspective, needs 
have a universal character and are greatly embedded in the human psyche.   
 Northrup (1989) contends that certain universal human needs are critical to 
human existence and, until such needs are addressed, conflict could assume an intractable 
character.  Using the idea that human needs generate happiness among people, Maslow 
(1970) designed a hierarchy of needs that transcends cultures and, once they are satisfied, 
can lead to optimal happiness. Accordingly, to Maslow, “in one society, one obtains self-
esteem by being a good hunter. In another society, by being a great medicine man or a 
bold warrior, or a very unemotional person and so on" (Maslow, 1970, p. 22). Maslow's 
hierarchy is divided into needs that are physiological, safety/security oriented, and 
focused on love/affection/belonging, esteem and self-actualization. In short, this theory 
hinges on the notion that, to resolve conflict amicably and permanently, these human 
needs must be satisfied in the conflict resolution process. 
 The human needs theory as construed above speaks to a very static character of 
the theory. However, some researchers also suggest that human needs can be dynamic in 
nature. Reflecting on this issue, Christopher Mitchell argued that “there is considerable 
evidence that human needs theorists regard at least the hierarchy of human needs as 
subject to change over time and according to circumstances.” (Christopher Mitchell in 
John Burton, 1970, p.164) The understanding here is the notion that human beings have 
the ability to prioritize their needs by giving preference to other things more pressing to 
them. While this may not reflect a permanent character in human beings, it however 
shows that needs can be dynamic in nature in accordance with what circumstances the 
human being find themselves. 
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 The foregoing discussion also finds expression in the interplay of basic human 
needs and culture. Culture is dynamic in nature just in the same way as basic human 
needs are. However, there are aspects of culture that can be perpetuated from generation 
to generation just as the basic tenets of human needs are static in nature. In the case of the 
conflict being researched, culture and human needs come face to face with one another. 
The people of this region are very culturally oriented. Their culture is who they are and as 
such, the need to preserve it and identify with it takes precedence over many other needs. 
The need for example to preserve this piece of land as a place for ancestral worship 
delves very deeply into identity needs. If the place of worship is given away to the 
adversary, then something about their culture has been affected and so the conflict 
persists as a way of defending the need to uphold culture. It is in this way that basic 
human needs and culture intertwine in some instances. As Maslow explains below, 
people want to be happy and they pursue their needs in accordance with what will 
enhance the circumstances of their state. 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (1970) 
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is often used to summarize the belief system of 
humanistic psychology. The basic premise behind this hierarchy is that we are born with 
certain needs. Without meeting these initial needs, we will not be able to continue our life 
and move upward on hierarchy. This first level consists of our physiological or basic 
needs for survival.  Without food, water, sleep, and oxygen, nothing else in life matters. 
Once these needs are met, we can move to the next level, which consists of our 
need for safety and security. Here we look seek out safety through other people and strive 
to find a world that will protect us and keep us free from harm. Without these goals being 
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met, it is extremely difficult to think about higher-level needs and therefore we cannot 
continue to grow. When we feel safe and secure in our world, we begin to seek out 
friendships to feel a sense of belonging.  Maslow's third level, the need for belonging and 
love, focuses on our desire to be accepted, to fit in, and to feel like we have a place in the 
world. Having these needs met propels us closer to the top of this pyramid and into the 
fourth level called esteem needs. At this level we focus our energy on self-respect, 
respect from others, and feeling that we have made accomplishments in our life. We 
strive to move upward in careers, to gain knowledge about the world, and to work toward 
a sense of high self-worth. 
 Maslow noted the following versions of esteem needs:     
 The lower version is the need for the respect of others, the need for status, fame, 
glory, 
 recognition, attention, reputation, appreciation, dignity, and even dominance.  
 The higher version involves the need for self-respect, including feelings of 
confidence, competence, achievement, mastery, independence, and freedom. Note 
that this is the “higher” form because, unlike the respect of others, once you have 
self-respect, it is a lot harder to lose. 
 The negative version is low self-esteem and inferiority complexes. Maslow shares 
Adler’s plan that these lie at the root of many, if not most, human psychological 
problems.(Maslow, 1970). 
The final level in the hierarchy is called the need for self-actualization. According to 
Maslow, many people may be at this level but very few, if anybody, ever masters it. Self-
actualization refers to a complete understanding of the self. To be self-actualized means 
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that the person knows whom they are, where they belong in the greater society, and feels 
as if they have accomplished everything that they set out to do. It means that they no 
longer feel shame or guilt, or even hate, but accept the world and see human nature as 
inherently good. 
 The Balikumbat and Bafanji conflict is better understood when viewing it through 
the lenses of human needs theory. Both parties have unmet needs and hence the 
motivation to war against one another is expected. Past attempts at resolution may not 
have completely taken into account the varying needs of each village. It is my contention 
that a more rigorous application of this theory to the study of this conflict will facilitate a 
better understanding of both parties and, perhaps, assist in breaking the gridlock that has 
prevented the resolution of this conflict. 
 In my discussion of this theory, John Burton has featured as an authoritative voice 
in understanding the underpinnings of the theory. However, in exploring more about the 
relationship between culture and basic human needs (BHNs), it suffices to note that John 
Burton’s theory is limited in this regard as he did not discuss more about how culture 
affects or changes basic human needs. This is highlighted by Abu- Nimer who contends 
that “when reviewing Burton’s volumes on BHN theory (1990) or the analytical problem-
solving manual(1987), it is clear that Burton assumed that the majority of diplomats and 
politicians belonged to the same cultural heritage or orientation.” (N. Abu Namir in 
Avruch and Mitchell, p. 175), 
Post-Colonial Theory 
Post-colonial theory is not easy to define or articulate. With several caveats, this 
body of theory is an amalgamation of several underpinnings that try to make sense of the 
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colonial legacy.  For Gandhi (1998), “post colonialism can be seen as a theoretical 
resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath.” (p. 4). One can 
understand post-colonial theory as a post-modern intellectual activity, which hinges on 
unraveling and analyzing some of the cultural footprints of the colonial enterprise. EWB 
argues that, “We use the term post-colonial to cover all the culture affected by the 
imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day. This is because 
there is a continuity of preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by 
European imperial aggression” (p. 2). Viewed from this perspective, one will be right in a 
hermeneutic of post-colonial theory to involve some of the work depicted in philosophy, 
literature, feminism, religious studies, film, or political science. All of these disciplines 
present a culture affected by a phenomenon so radical that its landscape has been 
significantly altered.  
The rationale of this theory is the attempt to learn how to transcend this period 
with a hope of creating an atmosphere of mutual respect. Accordingly, “the colonial past 
is not simply a reservoir of ‘raw’ political experiences and practices to be theorized from 
the detached and enlightened perspective of the present. It is also the scene of intense 
discursive and conceptual activity, characterized by a profusion of thought and writing 
about the cultural and political identities of colonized subjects.’ (Gandhi, 1998, p. 5) It is 
clear that the post-colonial is more than a historical narrative with no bearing on the 
present or the future.  
 Because colonialism in Cameroon may have some inherent differences as 
compared to other places, it is difficult to arrive at an all-inclusive understanding of the 
theory from one perspective. That is why some scholars are exercising caution by 
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intimating that, "post-colonialism, we have stressed, is not a homogenous category, 
whether across all post-colonial societies or even within a single one. Rather, it refers to a 
typical configuration, which is always in the process of change, never consistent with 
itself (Mishra and Hodge, 1999, p. 289).  The manner in which the theory attempts to deal 
with past memories and to forge a way for the future will differ from community to 
community. 
Of utmost importance to post-colonial theorists is giving voice to those who have 
been battered into submission by the colonial regime. However, disagreement abounds 
among scholars in relation to different characteristics of the various colonialisms as well 
as the period in history, which occupies the post-colonial narrative. For instance, one 
school of thought believes that, “post-colonial, in other words, is applicable not to all of 
the post-colonial period, but only to that period after colonialism when, among other 
things, a forgetting of its effects has begun to set in.” This understanding and its resultant 
theory is a good fit with the land and boundary disputes in Balikumbat and Bafanji. 
Electing to use the post-colonial theory in its generic form could be a daunting 
and confusing task because of the various schools of thought embedded in that one 
theory. To this effect, I have settled on utilizing the strand of post-colonial discourse 
highlighted by Edward Said called cultural particularism. To this kind of post-colonial 
understanding, he said, 
Along with armed resistance in places as diverse as nineteenth century Algeria, 
Ireland and Indonesia, there also went considerable efforts in cultural resistance 
almost everywhere, the assertions of nationalistic identities, and, in the political 
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realm, the creation of associations and parties whose common goal was self-
determination and national independence (Said 1993, p. xii) 
A clash in cultures could have sparked the inability of the colonial regime to attend to 
land disputes. Paying close attention to cultural particularism as discussed within the 
greater scope of post-colonial theorizing will help uncover some of the deeper issues that 
have fueled the Balikumbat and Bafanji conflict to date. 
The merit of this theory rests in its attempt to highlight a narrative of survival for 
the millions of people who endured the difficulties associated with colonialism. While 
creating meaning out of this experience, this theory encourages empowerment and 
capability for this population. However, the major pitfall of this theory is that it is too 
general, does not attempt to delve into the history of individual communities, and does 
nothing to unravel the struggles endured under colonialism. Without an individual 
narrative, every community affected by colonialism will find it difficult to put their past 
behind them. Instead, they will continue to see themselves as part of a universal 
discourse, which pays no attention to their unique condition.  This research project 
is therefore designed to understand the effects of colonialism and the unique 
circumstances in the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages. According to Nandy (1983),  
This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces 
within colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all. In the 
process, it helps to generalize that concept of the modern West from a 
geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now 
everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds” (p. xi). 
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This means that the process of colonialism contained within it a system carefully 
created to change not only the geographical space of the colonized but also the mindset in 
a manner that will align with the aspirations of the West. This explains why the people of 
Balikumbat and Bafanji are caught in a dilemma as to whether to hold on to the 
traditional heritage of their ancestors or to embrace the changes being enacted by the 
colonial masters. Furthermore, the end of colonialism does not reverse this process 
because a human being is more sophisticated. Therefore, post-colonial reflection is about 
understanding what is now unfolding in the minds of those who have had to deal with the 
confusion introduced by the colonial enterprise.  
One cannot dissociate the foundational principles of this theory from the conflict 
under investigation. In fact, the theory explains very eloquently and lends unparalleled 
insight to the key issues found in this conflict. Balikumbat and Bafanji are tied in a 
deadly clash over a piece of land. Both villages seem to be unable to overcome the 
burdens imposed on them by the policies of the colonial regimes. While land was 
construed by these communities as intrinsically tied to their identity and way of life, the 
colonial masters saw it as a political and economic tool to be employed to their 
advantage. It is therefore reasonable to state that post-colonial theory has enabled me to 
see past the mere rhetoric of blaming the colonial masters for all the problems of 
colonized societies. Moreover, the theory has allowed me to appreciate the struggles of 
communities that have had to deal with varying interpretations of how they seek access to 
or ownership of their own land. The theory brings in focus the reality issues experienced 
by the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji. It challenges me to see their struggles as people 
in need of solutions to the causes of their seemingly endless conflict. Furthermore, post-
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colonial theory highlights the notion that the wrongs that were done to the people of 
Balikumbat and Bafanji did not end because colonialism ended. Instead, they persist. The 
need to address these wrongs in a restorative manner is ever so urgent. 
This theory is not without its limitation. Because it focuses on many other areas 
that are of importance to the post-colonial discourse, it only allows a little room to tie in 
the land problems that are tackled by this research. The theory is therefore concerned 
with too much while accomplishing less. Additionally, post-colonial theory tends to be 
more ideological than practical. The critical reflection about the damages of colonialism 
is not translated into concrete suggestions of what can be done to repair the damage of the 
colonial past or to reconstruct affected communities.  
In short, the above theories provide a clear and concise way through which we can 
understand and analyze the Balikumbat and Bafanji land dispute. The insight gathered 
from the foregoing discussion reveals that many factors are at work in the initiation, 
emergence, and unfolding of this conflict. These communities are constantly in search of 
basic needs that will safeguard posterity and the wellbeing of its people. Land is at the 
epicenter of these needs. Furthermore, post-colonial theory helps our understanding of 
the driving force behind the behaviors depicted by the people of these two communities. 
The intervention by the colonial regimes did not only alter the peculiar characteristics of 
this indigenous way of life, but also left a chaotic system in place, which was destined to 
disenfranchise these communities and set the pace for recurrent conflict. While there are 
other causes at play in these conflicts, post-colonial theory allows us to understand the 
role that the colonial regime played in these conflicts. These theories collectively 
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constitute a body of knowledge that channel our thoughts about this conflict in the right 
direction. 
Empirical Framework (Studies) 
Considerable work has been done to explore land and boundary conflicts around 
the world. These efforts have all been intended to uncover underlying reasons for such 
conflicts and make recommendations for their mitigation. The literature has increased our 
understanding of land and boundary conflicts, but more exploration and research in the 
field is warranted. The gap left in existing literature rests in the domain of how European 
ideas and colonial policies on land tenure triggered land disputes in colonized countries. 
The literature in this area is lacking, or in some cases, not existent. Therefore, this study 
set out to highlight the scope of the completed work in this area while discussing the 
merits and demerits of the research. The review incorporates land and boundary disputes 
at the international and local levels. This provides a panoramic view of the state of the 
issue while assisting in the evaluation of how it pertains to the discussion of the 
Balikumbat and Bafanji Land dispute.  
Land and boundary disputes tend to persist for long periods, thus qualifying them 
for designation as intractable conflicts. Intractable conflicts are construed as “ones that 
are highly resistant to resolution; they do not respond to traditional or alternative dispute 
resolution processes” (Burgess, 1997, p. 156). The African continent contains many 
situations that mirror the conflict under review. Some of these cases include land disputes 
in Kenya and Zimbabwe, Babanki Tungo and Bambili, and the Bali-Nyonga and 
Widikum land disputes in Cameroon. 
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Kenya is a compelling case that provides insight about land and boundary 
disputes. In 2007, 1,300 people lost their lives and over 600,000 people were displaced 
because of land disputes. According to Veit (2011), “Kenya has endured a long history of 
land conflicts, dating back to its colonial period when first the Germans and then the 
British promulgated policies and practices that alienated people from their customary 
land and pitted one ethnic group against the other” (p.1). Violence occurred because 
Kenyans were tired of not seeing tangible land policies develop that were different from 
the colonial era. As Veit (2011) holds, “Much of the violence was linked to long-standing 
land disputes” (p. 1). This violence happened after the Presidential elections of 2007 
because Kenyans wanted to send a message that these enduring land disputes are a very 
serious matter, which requires immediate attention.  
Land-based conflicts in Kenya date back to the colonial administration. As the 
British embarked on their policies of development in Kenya, they did not consider 
indigenous land tenure practices conducive to development. According to Veit (2011), 
“the British considered the customary tenure arrangements practiced by the majority of 
Africans to be inconsistent with development and modernization, and colonial policy 
envisioned the eventual disappearance of traditional systems” (p. 3). The British wanted 
to replace the indigenous system, which, in turn, sowed the seeds of the present day land 
conflicts. They began “by declaring all land to be Crown Land (and) the land rights of 
Africans became highly tenuous. Land was easily alienated from customary systems, 
usually without compensation” (2011, p. 3). In Kenya, the ethnic groups lost most of their 
land to the white settlers, which left much resentment in the hearts of the natives.  This 
bitterness has spanned many generations. The Kikuyus, Masais, Kalenjin, and other tribes 
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were displaced endlessly as a way of distancing them from their lands. The end result was 
that, “by 1943, the 30,000 white settlers in the Protectorate - less than 0.25% of the total 
population controlled about a third of the arable land” (p. 3). Such a takeover policy and 
the undermining of the human needs of the owners of the land led to resentment, 
alienation, and conflict. 
Land disputes in Kenya depict root causes. Over time, the narrative becomes 
increasingly complicated. Hopes of restoring these communities to their pre-colonial 
boundaries become more remote. The experience of Kenya with the colonial 
administration is relevant to the situation of the conflict between Balikumbat and Bafanji 
because, under the administration of colonial officials, land was treated as an acquirable 
commodity rather than a communal heritage.  
Another case of land disputes worthy of exploration is the Zimbabwe situation.  
Anderson (1999) notes that “land issues have been a dominant theme in Zimbabwe’s 
history as the white minority controls the best land.” Available literature points to the fact 
that there has been a long historical grievance related to land and earlier colonial policies 
that have resulted in conflicts. According to Green, “in 1888, white colonists under the 
auspices of the British South Africa Company, led by Cecil Rhodes, expropriated the 
country’s best agricultural lands and began colonial rule (2004).” The land issues in 
Zimbabwe have been perceived by many as a colonial legacy, which must be corrected 
by land redistribution and reform. The current president of Zimbabwe has made headlines 
by seizing land from rich white farmers and giving it to the poor natives. This has not 
gone without its own criticisms. For instance, Moyo (2013) explains, “land reform was 
meant to redress historical settler-colonial land disposition and the related racial and 
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foreign domination, as well as the class-based agrarian inequalities which minority rule 
promoted (p. 29).” There was mass displacement of the natives to accommodate the 
white settlers and allow them to open their plantations. The concentration of power was 
in the hands of the minority who freely used it to amass millions of hectares of land. 
Land, as an economic tool, only increased the power of those who had access to it in 
Zimbabwe, which, in turn, led to further disenfranchisement and alienation of those who 
actually owned the land. 
The independence of Zimbabwe was seen by the majority, as an opportunity to 
regain all that was lost during the colonial era. However, little progress occurred even 
though land remains at the epicenter of any meaningful discourse in the post-colonial era 
in Zimbabwe. This problem remains because, in the 1950’s, the black majority in 
Zimbabwe began to assemble a resistance movement with the purpose of reclaiming their 
land. “The war for liberation began in 1968 and lasted through 1979. At independence in 
1980, around two fifths of the total land area was occupied by the minority white 
commercial farmers, while the majority black peasants remained in less arable 
commercial areas (Skalnes, 1995, p. 154).” 
The case of Zimbabwe has implications to our understanding of post-colonial land 
disputes. While the winds of change were blowing across Africa in the 1960s and some 
of the colonial powers were willingly relinquishing their colonies, Zimbabwe took a 
while to be liberated. The white colonial masters did not want give up the land. They had 
occupied most of the rich and fertile parcels of land and developed huge enterprises out 
of it. Giving up this land was synonymous to relinquishing their power and economic 
strength.  
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The similarities between the experience of Zimbabwe and the Balikumbat and 
Bafanji land dispute are evident. In Zimbabwe, the colonizers were also occupied the 
land, while in Balikumbat and Bafanji, the attitude towards the inhabitants of the land and 
the policies warrant more exploration. The common denominator is land and how it is 
perceived by both the colonial administration and the indigenous population. While land 
was necessary for commerce and industry for the colonial regime, to the locals, it also 
represented the familiarity and contentment of home where generations of family grew 
roots, lived, and worked. This clash in understanding can be perceived as a cause of 
conflict.  
On a local level in Cameroon, land and boundary disputes abound. One effort, 
ostensibly designed to reduce conflict, is nicely parceled under the broader theme of land 
management systems and mostly run by local and state governments in Cameroon. 
Rather than helping to resolve the problem created by colonialism, it has triggered violent 
conflicts. Within this new system, indigenous people’s rights to their land are discarded. 
Their lands are forcibly allocated to other projects. Most of the time, these new projects 
do not benefit the local people.  Accordingly, pastoralists, gatherers, and even hunters are 
evicted from their land with no compensation because the grand scheme of the 
government has decided to conserve the land for other uses (Schmidt – Soltau,  2003; 
Chapin,  2004; IWGIA, 2003,  2004, 2005, and 2006).   
It is not surprising that such an initiative sparks recurrent trends of violence. The 
land, which is the livelihood for these indigenous people, has been appropriated and 
tampered with.  The natural response to this infringement is for the indigenous people to 
mount some type of resistance against the government. The case between Bambili and 
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Babanki Tungo serves as a good example. According to Mbah (2008), “this dispute, 
which dates back to the colonial era, was relatively latent until the 1990s when violent 
confrontations commenced between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo” (p. 235). Two violent 
confrontations have been recorded between these two communities over disputed land 
and boundaries. In March 25, 1991, a confrontation led to the death of four people and 
the destruction of property. Another violent confrontation occurred between February and 
March 1996, resulting in the death of 16 people and the wounding of over 50 more. 
Again, there was loss of property and displacement of people (Mbah, 2008).   
 In this conflict, there was a piece of land that both villages could not agree on the 
boundary because of the action of the colonial administration. Mbah (2008) recounts that, 
"a colonial appeal court in suit No. 23/53 of July 1956 had given much of the contested 
land to Babanki Tungo, but Bambili refused to acknowledge it (p.193).” As time 
unfolded, it was quickly realized that these two villages continued to have mixed feelings 
and, without a resolution, war would occur. As a result, the British Colonial 
administration decided to resolve the issue. The administrator at the time was a man 
named Westmacott (2008). In a bid to resolve this issue, “the boundary demarcated by 
Westmacott left the highland on the Bambili side, while the valley was shared equally 
between Bambili and Babanki Tungo” (p.193). This decision was agreed upon and 
ratified by both parties on July 25, 1973 (Mbah, 2008).  
Because of the nature in which land and boundary disputes occurred during 
colonial times, such agreements aimed at putting an end to land disputes were fleeting 
and almost powerless. In this conflict, the agreement lasted for a while but tensions began 
to increase. Cheo (1996) captures this mindset when he argued that, “the Westmacott 
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Decision was observed and peace reigned between the two villages until 1990 when, as a 
result of generalized chaos in the Northwest Province, the dispute resurfaced; this time 
the problem was over interpretation of the boundary” (p.38). The logic behind some of 
the agreements that were made in resolving these land disputes is questionable. Tracing 
the root causes of the tension and involving both parties in the decision was not 
considered or accomplished. Since the indigenes knew what constituted their boundaries 
before they were distorted by the colonial masters, any solution that did not rehabilitate 
them only exacerbated the conflict. Therefore, resolving the Bambili-Babanki Tungo 
conflict resulted in this response,  
We are not ready to accept a boundary imposed on us. A boundary fabricatedin 
Yaoundé by so-called experts. We find it extremely objectionable and futile to be 
party to an exercise that is at best a masquerade, which can only intensify the 
conflict between our people and cause them to continue to destroy themselves and 
their property (Ewi, May 4-7, 1995, p. 3).   
This stance adopted by the people of Babanki clearly suggests that they were not part of 
the boundary decision process. 
In another area of Cameroon, conflict between Bali-Nyonga and Widikum 
villages is an example of a local land and boundary conflict that resembles that of 
Balikumbat and Bafanji. According to Mbah (2008),  
After a settlement reached by British Colonial authorities in 1954, relativepeace 
ensued between the two ethnic groups, until the late 1960s whenthe Widikums 
began petitioning the government for more land from Balinyonga on grounds of 
land shortage, and as original landlords of the land inhabited by the latter (p. 199). 
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The authorities accepted this request from the Widikum people with a cautionary 
note advising them that no further requests would be honored. In response, the people of 
Balinyonga vehemently refused to relinquish any land to Widikum (Mbah, 2008). As a 
result, conflict began to grow. According to Mbah (2008), “from 1997, the dispute has 
been marked by recurrent hostilities between the two groups” (p. 200). 
This conflict came to a head in the 1950s when Balinyonga and Widikum 
engaged in violent confrontations about ownership of an extended area of land. They both 
claimed legitimate ownership of the land and that the colonial administration had been 
biased in the way it allocated the land. The people of Widikum claimed that, without their 
consent, the colonial authorities had given some of their land to Balinyonga as a way of 
brokering a peace deal. In their view, the deal was illegitimate and the land belonged to 
them. Since the conflict continued for a protracted period and the government tried to 
resolve it, the people of Balinyonga gave their condition for peace. Thus, “in a letter to 
the Governor of the province, dated April 25, 1995, Balinyonga requested the authorities 
to retain its boundary with Widikum village as it existed in 1954, noting that only through 
such action would there be lasting peace in the area” (p. 200). This is the colonial 
decision where some land was taken from the people of Widikum and given to 
Balinyonga to which Widikum expressed dissatisfaction. Although there were two 
additional decrees, one in 1977 and the other in 1982, that validated the colonial land 
partition, conflict continued between the two villages because of Widikum's refusal to 
view these land demarcations as authentic.  
This literature establishes the basis of the conflict between Widikum and 
Balinyonga over land and access to it. It also illustrates instances in which government 
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authorities make efforts to resolve conflict albeit with little success. However, without 
multiple accounts of these disputes, this literature is rendered weak. The availability of 
more literature will help to enrich the narrative and provide various ways of 
understanding it. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter highlighted a review of relevant literature to the present study. The 
chapter was divided into three major sections, the Conceptual, Theoretical, and Empirical 
frameworks of the study. 
 In the conceptual framework, the chapter discussed the indigenous conception of 
land as a sacred gift of nature with economic and spiritual ramifications. The Cameroon 
land tenure system was then highlighted from the pre-colonial, through the German and 
Anglo-French colonial periods and finally the post-colonial period within the present 
Cameroon government. Discourse on land tenure was closely followed with a review of 
causes of land and boundary disputes. Systemic and proximate causes were highlighted in 
this endeavor. 
 In the theoretical framework, two theories were highlighted as being relevant to 
the present study. Human needs theory and post-colonial theory were chosen for this 
study. In relation to the human needs theory, conflict can arise as people try to satisfy 
their personal needs. The basic needs of food and shelter are fundamental to all human 
beings and these are guaranteed by the possession of land. Hence, with an increase in 
population, a scarcity of land resources and conflict may arise. The need to safeguard 
land as a source of self-esteem for ancestral and sacrificial ceremonies equally falls 
within human needs theory as explained in the chapter. Post-colonial theory expresses 
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people’s feelings and the hazards caused by the colonial period. It finds its explanation in 
the fact that the colonial masters did not respect the indigenous conception of land and 
land tenure systems in their demarcation and allocation of land, which is one of the 
primary causes of frequent land disputes. The chapter concludes with empirical studies 
that have been carried out in Cameroon and beyond that are relevant to the present study. 
  
82 
 
 
Chapter Three  
Research Methodology 
 Case study analysis is the main vehicle through which this research is conducted. 
This methodology is characterized as a qualitative method of data collection. This chapter 
explains the process of data collection via the purposeful convenient sampling technique. 
A snowball approach was used with key informants until a saturation point was reached. 
Interviews with different stakeholders were undertaken through open-ended questions of 
government officials like the Divisional Officer of the sub-division and the Mayor of the 
Municipal Council. The traditional and religious authorities of both villages were 
interviewed.  
Non-participant observation was used to gain additional knowledge of the land 
and boundary disputes between Balikumbat and Bafanji. Reviewed documents enhanced 
the documentation of shifts that occurred during the study. For data administration, the 
analysis was completed following the systematic process of thematic and content 
analysis. Validation strategies entailed peer briefing, researcher reflexivity, and the 
development of rich descriptions.   
Research Design 
The study of land disputes in the Northwest Region of Cameroon was conducted 
via the qualitative method and a case study design. Qualitative research refers to, “an 
inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry 
that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, 
analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural 
setting" (Creswell, 1998, p.15). In qualitative analysis, the aim of the researcher is to 
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learn to understand the various meanings of words, actions, behaviors, attitudes, and 
symbols of the actors under study in their natural environment (Morrow & Smith, 2000). 
This inquiry-based methodology allows the researcher to collect data in the field and use 
it as the basis of analysis. According to Creswell, “the best studies have a strong inquiry 
procedure” (1998, p. 27). According to Schwandt, “qualitative inquiry aims at 
understanding what others are doing and saying” (1999, p. 451). Qualitative 
methodology, as a scientific method of inquiry, is subdivided into various categories or 
systems of analysis, which are designed to provide the researcher with a plurality of ways 
of collecting data. In this study, the case study approach was used.  
 Yin (1997) refers to the case study approach as, “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1997, Vol. 3, 
Number 3). According to Creswell, “case study research involves the study of an issue 
explored through one or more cases within a bounded system.” (1998, p. 73). This 
approach was a good fit in my inquiry of the Bafanji-Balikumbat land and boundary 
dispute because it gave me the opportunity to investigate the peculiar characteristics of 
this conflict via personal observations, interviews, and group discussions. In this way, I 
was able to unveil any complex underlying issues that do not readily have a current 
answer. This is in line with Yin who explains that the case study approach will lead to the 
best outcome where the subject of inquiry is about the “hows” and "whys” of a 
phenomenon (Yin, Supra, p. 13).   
 As the principle investigator, I was concerned with uncovering the various 
dynamics of the conflict in both villages by observing, conducting interviews, and 
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holding group discussions with a variety of available participants. Detailed field notes 
were taken throughout data collection.  Questions posed emanated from a previously 
prepared interview guide. Instead of using hard and fast questions more characteristic of a 
quantitative survey instrument, an interview guide includes ideas, gut reactions, feelings, 
and possibilities about where to look next in the search for rich data. This study 
investigated a real life situation namely, the conflict between the two villages and the fear 
that, if lasting solutions are not enacted, further conflict could resurface.  
Area of Study 
Balikumbat and Bafanji are two of the villages that make up Ngoketunjia 
Division. This division is made up of 13 villages. Most interesting is that the names of all 
13 villages begin with the letters ‘Ba’. History holds that it was derived from the times of 
the Germans who colonized the area and “Ba” denotes ‘people of’. For example, 
Bamunka means ‘the people of Munka’. Each of the 13 villages has its own unique 
language, tradition, and traditional authority, so it is classified as a Fondom with its 
traditional ruler named the Fon (Monji, 2014). 
The following villages make up the Ngoketunjia division:Baba I, Babungo, 
Balinganshin, Babessi, Bamunkumbit, Baligashu, Bamunka, Bamali, Bangolan, 
Balikumbat, Bamessing, Bambalang, and Bafanji. All the villages that make up the 
Ngoketunjia division are surrounded by hills with the Ngoketunjia plain elevated. 
Therefore, the climatic conditions are more moderate here than in other regions in 
Cameroon (Monji, 2014). 
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The division is further divided into 3 subdivisions, the Ndop central, Babessi, and 
Balikumbat subdivisions. Each government authority is present with representative 
delegations. Each of the subdivisions has a municipal council (Monji,  2014). 
Balikumbat is located about 15 kms west of Ndop, capital of the Ngoketunjia 
Division of the Northwest Province of Cameroon. It is bounded on the East by the 
villages of Bamali and Bambalang, on the West by Bafanji, on the South by 
Bamumkumbit and on the North by BabankiTungo and Awing. The population is about 
16,000 inhabitants who are predominantly peasant farmers. There is also a small 
population of Bororo herdsmen occupying the hills where they tend their cattle. The 
population is mostly young with the female population outnumbering the male. 
Balikumbat has the status of a Sub-Division, which also includes four other neighboring 
villages. It also has Rural Council (Monji,  2014). 
Bafanji (Fiehlunglue-Mangie) is one of the 13 villages of the Ngoketunjia 
Division and one of the five villages made up of the Balikumbat Sub Division of the 
Northwest Region of Cameroon. It is located between 5°and 13°N and 10°and 55°E of 
latitude and longitude respectively and found at about 2289m above sea level. It is 
bounded in the north by Bambalang, Bali-Gashu, and Bamunkumbit in the south, 
Balikumbat in the South-West and in the East by the Bamboutous division of the West 
Region. Bafanji (Fiehlunglue-Mangie) is made up of relatively level land and many 
swamps around the village. It has a very rich ecosystem covering a surface area of an 
estimated 115.5km² with a hardworking estimated population of 22,000 inhabitants. 
Bafanji (Fiehlunglue-Mangie) is lying peacefully in Ndop plain with land surrounded by 
watersheds comprising the Bamindjim dam that replenishes the Song-Loulou Electricity 
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Dam, several springs, rivers, and streams. Bafanji village (FiehLungLué-Mangieh) is a 
crossroad for agro-businesses, cultural heritage of Ndop plain, and a museum of different 
ethnic or tribal origins (Monji, 2014). 
Sources of Information 
 Sources of information for this study consist of experienced experts, traditional 
rulers, government officials, and religious authorities of both Balikumbat and Bafanji 
villages. Target interviewees supply firsthand information about the causes, 
consequences, and the way forward of the land dispute. Experienced experts were men, 
women, and youth from both villages who were eyewitnesses of the land dispute between 
the two villages. Traditional rulers were quarter heads, sub-chiefs, chiefs, and Fons of 
both villages who possessed a firm knowledge of the laws and customs of the people and 
who had a firm knowledge of the land dispute. The religious authorities were composed 
of priests, pastors, catechists, members of a mission, and pastoral councils of both 
villages. The government officials included the Divisional Officer, the Mayor, and other 
government workers of these two offices. 
Sample Population 
 Based on the target population, this study consisted of four major protocols that 
satisfied the purpose of obtaining firsthand information concerning the causes, course, 
consequences, and possible solutions to the land dispute. These protocols included: 
 Traditional rulers of both villages 
 Experienced experts of both villages 
 Church authorities of both villages 
 Government officials 
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Based on the above, 16 traditional authorities were sampled for the study, eight 
from Bafanji and eight from Balikumbat. Sixteen experienced experts were equally 
sampled for the study, eight from each village. Eight religious authorities were sampled, 
four from each village. Lastly, eight government officials were sampled for the study. 
The total sample size was 48. This sample size is justified by the inductive and qualitative 
nature of the study, with the use of interviews as primary technique of data collection. 
Table 4.1 clearly illustrates the sample size of the study. 
Table 1  
Sample Size of the Study 
S/N PROTOCOLS BAFANJI 
VILLAGES 
BALIKUMBAT 
VILLAGE 
TOTAL 
1 Traditional Rulers 8 8 16 
2 Experienced Experts 8 8 16 
3 Religious Authorities 6 6 12 
4 Government Officials 8 8 
TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE 48 
Sampling Technique and Method of Data Collection 
Preliminary Tasks 
 Prior to engaging in field studies in Cameroon, it was prudent to conduct a more in-
depth review of land and boundary disputes to provide better insight about this kind of 
conflict. The tentative plan was travel to Cameroon in July or August 2015 to begin data 
collection in earnest.  
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Before making the trip to Cameroon, I consulted with a Catholic priest who was working 
in the conflict area in 1995. Since he was trusted by both villages, this priest acted as my 
gatekeeper, confidant, and informant. Through his introductions, access to key 
participants and historians was made easier. This enabled me to record first-hand 
accounts of what happened. It was anticipated that data collection would take 
approximately six weeks. However, data collection continued in earnest until the point of 
saturation where collected data became repetitive and no new themes were forthcoming.  
Data Collection 
 Soon after data collection began, it became obvious that individual interviews 
would serve better than group discussions since order was nearly impossible to maintain 
in a group setting. In short, everyone wanted to state their opinions simultaneously which 
led to loud shouting matches over differing views. To avoid initiating conflict, group 
discussions were suspended in favour of interviews. Data collection then proceeded with 
a purposeful convenience sampling technique. A snowball approach was used with key 
informants until a saturation point was reached. According to Creswell, “case study 
research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system 
over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection and involving multiple sources of 
information (observations, interviews, audio/visual material, documents, reports) and a 
case description and case-based themes” (2007, p. 73). An interview guide was carefully 
formulated to help in exploring the most fruitful methods of data collection. Key data 
collection tools were interviews, document reviews, and a reflective journal of field 
notes. After permissions were granted, tape recorders were used to increase the accuracy 
of and to store data.  
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 A gatekeeper was utilized to gain access to the most important participants after a 
determination was made that they were the correct candidates for the research. In other 
words, the recruited participants spoke to the core issues surrounding the research 
endeavor. To determine that the participants met scrupulous standards of resourceful 
informants, the following criteria were used to identify our match: 
1. Participant is an adult who has first-hand experience with the conflict 
2. Participant is currently or has been involved in one way or another with 
developing a narrative of what caused this land and boundary dispute 
3. Participant has lived in one of the disputing villages for at least the past 20 
years 
4. Participant was a member of the government when the conflict happened 
5. Participant is the Fon or an authority in one of the villages. 
 A participant who met one or more of these criteria was a viable candidate to be 
approached by a gatekeeper and recruited to participate in the interviews. 
Interviews 
Interviews constituted a very critical component of my data collection process. 
Different stakeholders were identified and interviewed in accordance with their 
awareness of the crux of the matter in this conflict. Open-ended interviews were 
conducted with government officials such as the Divisional Officer and Mayor for the 
subdivision. As the government representative in the region, this officer provided detailed 
information about the evolution of this conflict. All available religious leaders who were 
ministering in these two villages were approached for open-ended interviews. Since the 
church is an integral part of the lives of the people in this region, it helped enormously in 
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gaining access to key actors. Traditional rulers of both villages were invited to participate 
via open-ended interviews and/or group discussions. Their own perspectives pertaining to 
this conflict were valuable since they were very powerful among their constituents. 
Currently, they are considered the de facto custodians of the traditions of the village. As 
the authoritative historians of the village, these rulers should know everything that has 
gone before them. Moreover, the traditional ruler who receives the appellation of the Fon 
is charged with the duties of safeguarding the well-being of his people. Both Balikumbat 
and Bafanji have their Fons and, through a gatekeeper, I interviewed both of them. This is 
important because of the magnanimous role that these rulers play in the villages. Fons are 
not elected through a democratic process. This inherited office is retained for a long time. 
Because of the longevity of their tenure, they have unparalleled knowledge of the land 
and boundary dispute.  
Participants from both villages who had direct experience, were involved or have 
knowledge of the events of the conflicts were verbally approached for open-ended 
interviews. These interviews occurred in a relaxed and familiar space within their natural 
setting. 
All interview participants received a consent form advising them that they may 
withdraw from the study at any point. They were also constantly reminded of the need to 
take breaks if needed so that there was no appearance of coercion to attain information. In 
the course of the interview, I utilized audio recorders to capture the opinions and vocal 
nuances of the participants. I also took field notes, which highlighted some of the critical 
shifts and movements during each interview. During the interview process, I used a 
learner-centered approach suggestive of the fact that I was there to gain knowledge from 
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the participants. Creswell exhorts the researcher to assume a position as one, “wanting to 
listen to the participants we are studying and shaping the questions after we “explore” 
and we refrain from assuming the role of the expert researcher with the “best” questions” 
(2007, p. 43). In this way, the voices of the participants reverberated throughout the 
course of the study. 
The interview protocol was designed in a comprehensive fashion. It was a form of 
about four or five pages in length, with approximately 17 open-ended questions and 
ample space between the questions to write responses to the interviewee’s comments 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 133).  Four interview protocols were developed. The first protocol 
consisted of 17 open-ended questions for the government officials. It asked questions 
about the role of government in resolving these conflicts their position concerning the 
causes of the conflict. The second interview protocol of 11 open-ended questions was 
prepared for the Church authorities.  Questions ranged from their role in the resolution of 
the conflict to their perspectives on what they feel fuels the reoccurrence of these land 
and boundary disputes. The third interview protocol of approximately 17 open-ended 
questions was prepared for the traditional rulers of both villages. Questions ranged from 
the indigenous conception of land to their involvement in the land and boundary disputes 
and their historical narrative of the evolution and course of this conflict. Perspectives on 
the causes of conflict, their perceptions of the colonial policies on land tenure, steps being 
taken to resolve conflict, and why it remains were discussed. The fourth interview 
protocol of 13 open-ended questions was prepared for participants drawn from both 
villages who had experience in this conflict. Questions ranged from their feelings and 
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perceptions about the conflict, the colonial regime in general, and current land tenure 
laws.  
In these protocols, sensitivity to cultural norms and respect for local traditions 
were honored at all times. Confidentiality was repeatedly assured. The forms also 
included demographic information about the time, date, and place of the interview, who 
was interviewed, the position of the person interviewed, and a brief description of the 
research project.  At the conclusion of each interview, I thanked the participant and again 
assured them of their confidentiality. 
Non-Participant Observation 
The technique of non-participant observation was used to gain additional 
knowledge of the land and boundary disputes between Balikumbat and Bafanji. It took a 
lot of time to first observe the area under dispute. My intention was to consider the 
borderlines that were claimed by the villages, the main economic and traditional activity 
carried out in the disputed area, the amount of property casualties that were suffered by 
both villages in the disputed area, and which village occupied the disputed area more than 
the other. In total, non-participant observation took approximately three weeks. 
My second aspect of observation included the social interaction amongst the two 
villages. I was particularly concerned with free movements and the level of friendliness 
between the Balikumbat and Bafanji people during major traditional, religious, civil, 
economic, and social gatherings. Events such as death celebrations, market days, political 
rallies, and religious feast days that required the presence of both villages formed crucial 
aspects of observation.  
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Documents Review 
An extensive document review was conducted as part of this research project. A 
visit to the Northwest Region archives was undertaken to gain access to documents that 
pertain to this conflict. The Buea archives were consulted since it was the seat of the 
West Cameroon court, which passed judgment on the boundaries of the contested 
territory during the colonial administration. Permission was granted to copy pertinent 
documents after which all originals were returned to their storage space. Important 
documents were equally provided by the Divisional Officer. Documents that were 
especially relevant to the boundary dispute were sampled for close perusal while others 
were simply browsed.  
Reflective Journal 
Throughout data collection, keeping a reflective journal was of paramount 
importance. These journals gave me the opportunity to document my own feelings and 
different shifts that occurred during the study. This is in congruence to the mindset of 
Morrow and Smith (2000) who contended that using a reflective journal adds rigor to 
qualitative inquiry as the researcher is able to record his or her reactions, assumptions, 
expectations, and biases about the research endeavor.  As an additional data collection 
exercise, these field notes were entered on a consistent basis as I encountered various 
data collection instruments. Although keeping a reflective journal was challenging, its 
ability to add veracity to data collection was valuable. 
Data Analysis 
 The analysis of data was done following the systematic process of thematic and 
content analysis (Weber, 1990; Ellen & Renner, 2003, Nana, 2012) and narrative analysis 
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(Propp, 1968).The first stage involved deciding on the level of analysis for both interview 
and document review data. At this level, single words, clauses and sets of words or 
phrases were coded. I decided on how many different concepts to code. This involved 
developing pre-defined or interactive sets of concepts categories. I had a code list earlier 
developed based on the major indicators of the study. The primary documents of textual 
data were coded for existence and for frequency of concepts by coding for every single 
positive or negative word or phrase that appeared. Relevant categories not included in the 
initial code list were added during the in vivo coding process. Introducing this coding 
flexibility allowed for new, important material to be incorporated into the coding process 
that could have significant bearings on results. 
During coding, it was assumed that any idea that emerged at least once from the 
data was relevant. The ideas are therefore considered more important than frequency. 
However, the frequency also reflects how many times a concept emerges and is a major 
indicator of emphasis. I coded ideas relating to a concept in comments discriminatively 
for neutral, positive, or a negative sense. 
After taking the generalization of concepts into consideration, I created translation 
rules that allowed the streamlining and organisation of the coding process. This occurred 
so that what was being coded, was what was intended to be coded. This stage enabled me 
to determine the meaning of words and what they stood for so as to know where to code 
each statement. 
Validation Strategies 
 Like any elaborate research design in the social sciences, there were challenges in 
validating the data and conclusions.  In this study, strategies that were proven to add 
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value to a study and ensure credibility and rigor were utilized (Creswell and Miller, 
2000). These strategies included triangulation, peer debriefing, researcher reflexivity, and 
developing rich descriptions.  
Triangulation 
The concept of triangulation is best understood as a phenomenon through which 
many sources are used in pursuit of the validity of data. The gist of this tool is the quest 
for certitude and an enhancement of confidence in research findings. According to Web 
et al., “once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement 
processes, the uncertainty of its interpretations is greatly reduced. The most persuasive 
evidence comes through a triangulation of measurement processes” (1966, p. 3). This 
notion was relevant to this study because I depended on a myriad of sources to draw 
consensus on the certitude of information that I acquired. Data from interviews and 
document searches were triangulated.  
Stake’s Critique Checklist 
 To increase the solidity of my work, Stake’s critique checklist of twenty criteria 
items, which must be crosschecked to ensure quality research, was utilized (Stake, 1995, 
p. 131). The checklist is as follows: 
1. Is the report easy to read? 
2. Does it fit together, each sentence contributing to the whole? 
3. Does the researcher have a conceptual structure (for example, themes, or 
issues?) 
4. Are its issues developed in a serious and scholarly way? 
5. Is the case adequately defined? 
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6. Is there a sense of story in the presentation? 
7. Is the reader provided with some vicarious experience? 
8. Have quotations been used effectively? 
9. Are headings, figures, artifacts, appendixes, and indexes used effectively? 
10. Was it edited well, then again, with a last minute polish? 
11. Has the writer made sound assertions, neither over-nor under-interpreting? 
12. Has adequate attention been paid to various contexts? 
13. Were sufficient raw data presented? 
14. Were the data resources well-chosen and in sufficient number? 
15. Do observations and interpretations appear to have been triangulated? 
16. Are the role and point of view of the researcher nicely apparent? 
17. Is the nature of intended audience apparent? 
18. Is empathy shown for all sides? 
19. Are personal intentions examined? 
20. Does it appear that individuals were put at risk? 
Compliance with this checklist resulted in a verifiably strong research project. 
Ethical Considerations 
 Ethics in qualitative research are important. This study of land and boundary 
disputes adhered to stringent ethical standards as set for by the guidelines of the 
American Psychological Association (APA) as well as Nova South Eastern University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  To recruit my participants, I informed them of the 
reason for the research and asked them if they would like to volunteer. I did not pay any 
gatekeeper or informant money for information. This is in line with Miller et al., (2008) 
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who contended that “accessing potential participants not only requires providing 
information about the research, but also that individuals are in a position to exercise 
choice around whether or not to give their consent to participate” (pp. 54-55).  
 No participant in this study was coerced into answering questions with which they 
were uncomfortable. All participants had the opportunity to make an informed consent as 
to whether they wanted to participate. To make it more appropriate, I subscribed to the 
contentions of Miller et al., who claimed that “consent should be ongoing and 
renegotiated between researcher and researched throughout the research process” (2008, 
p. 51). This allowed the participants the flexibility to decide when enough was enough. 
All participants were advised and reassured that their identities would remain confidential 
to eliminate any fear of retribution should the research findings be published. 
 Summarily, this chapter examined the research methodology. Following the 
research design, it explained that the qualitative method of data collection is the 
instrument of the research. This was followed by the description of the area of research, 
sample population, and sample technique. This chapter explained that data collection 
proceeded by means of purposeful convenient sampling technique. A snowball approach 
was used with key informants until a saturation point was attained. Interviews of different 
stakeholders passed through open-ended questions of government officials like the 
Divisional Officer of the sub-division and the Mayor of the municipal Council. 
Traditional and religious authorities of both villages were interviewed.  Expert 
participants were interviewed based on their experience on the conflict. 
 To complement interview information, this chapter explained that a non-
participant observation approach was exploited to gain additional knowledge of the land 
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and boundary disputes between Balikumbat and Bafanji. The review of documents was 
meant to ensure the documentation of shifts that occurred during the study. For data 
administration, the analysis followed the systematic process of thematic and content 
analysis. This chapter described the validation strategies of the instrument through peer 
briefing, researcher reflexivity, and the development of rich descriptions. A critique 
checklist verified all the examined components. 
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Chapter Four 
Data Analysis and Presentation of Findings 
This chapter presents findings from interviews with traditional authorities, 
religious leaders, experienced experts, and government officials of both villages. An 
analysis of all documents has also been undertaken. We shall begin our analysis by 
considering a sample chart of the study. From the sample flow chart, findings will be 
presented following the five objectives of the study. These findings can be articulated in 
the following points in relation to the research objectives. The first objective will examine 
the pre-colonial indigenous perception of land and its importance. The second objective 
will present the causes, history, and recurrence of the land dispute. The third objective 
will present findings on the colonial land policy and its role in the land dispute. The 
fourth objective will center on the role of the present government in the solution of the 
dispute. Lastly, solutions to the current dispute will be presented as the fifth objective. 
Table 2 
Sample Population Flow for each Village 
S/N PROTOCOLS BALIKUMBAT VILLAGE BAFANJI VILLAGE 
Target Accessible Percentage Target Accessible Percentage 
1 Traditional 
Authorities 
8 6 75% 8 6 75% 
2 Religious 
Authorities 
4 2 50% 4 2 50% 
3 Experienced 
Experts 
8 6 75% 8 6 75% 
table continues 
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4 Government 
Officials 
TARGET ACCESSIBLE PERCENTAGE 
8 6 75% 
Accordingly, four protocols were chosen for each interview. The sample flow 
chart above indicates that the two villages were given equal opportunities as far as the 
target and accessible populations of traditional authorities, religious authorities and 
experienced experts were concerned. The sample of government officials did not depend 
on the village of origin since government officials were seen as workers of the Divisional 
Office and Municipal council, which embodies both villages. From the percentages, it 
can be concluded that the return rate was positive enough to permit qualitative analysis. 
Table 3 
Sample Flow Chart of the Whole Study 
TOTAL TARGET TOTAL ACCESSIBLE PERCENTAGE 
48 34 70.83% 
Accordingly, the total target of the study was 48 and 34 people were actually 
accessible for interviews. This leaves a positive return rate of 70.83%, which is 
convenient enough for qualitative analysis.  
Data analysis of interviews is presented in relation to the specific objectives of the 
study. 
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Research Objective One 
The Pre-colonial Indigenous Perception of Land and its Importance 
This objective was analyzed based on the interview responses of the traditional 
authorities of both villages. This analysis is completed for each village after which a 
comparison of the findings of both villages is made illuminate major differences and 
similarities. 
Data Analysis of Balikumbat Respondents 
Findings are based on interview responses of the six traditional authorities. The 
following table summarizes the findings from the Balikumbat respondents: 
Table 4 
Findings to research objective 1 – Balikumbat Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Source of Life 
Sustenance  
Food cultivation 
and shelter 
6 
“Land is very important for us 
Africans because it is from land that 
we can have food and shelter. Land 
could be used to tap palm wine to 
sustain a living. Land provided 
material to construct houses like 
grass.”“Land is important for us in 
three practical ways. It is used of 
cultivation of crops; it is used for 
construction.”“Land serves as a 
table continues 
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means of subsistence: that is food 
cultivation and shelter.” 
Traditional 
Sacrifices 
Land provides 
shrines for 
traditional 
sacrifices 
3 
“Land is equally very important 
when it comes to traditional 
sacrifices like the said land which is 
under dispute between Bali and 
Bafanji. It is a place where sacrifices 
are offered.” “Traditionally, land is 
used to offer sacrifices to the gods. 
There are traditional shrines and any 
village will always want to protect 
these places from foreign invaders.” 
Pride  
The dignity of 
the person who 
possesses land 
2 
“Land used to be a source of pride to 
the person who possesses land.” 
“Land is the pride of those who 
possess much of it.” 
 
 
Monetary 
value 
Land is a source 
of wealth 
1 
“Land was like money. You could sell 
to those who do not have to make 
money.” 
 
Land Land was 3 “We acquired land through 
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Acquisition  acquired 
through 
inheritance 
inheritance. Parents handed land 
over to their children. We cultivate 
from the place that our great 
grandparents cultivated.” “Land was 
only acquired through inheritance 
from parents in the past. It was never 
bought or sold, but in recent times it 
can now be bought.” “We acquired 
land through ancestral heritage”  
Selfishness 
leads to non-
acquisition of 
land 
1 
“Through selfishness some people 
could not acquire land.” 
Landlessness 
Non-possession 
of land makes 
one a beggar 
2 
“Some families are rich and others 
are poor. When you do not have land 
you are like a beggar.” “When you 
do not have land you are like a 
beggar.” 
Non-possession 
of land makes 
one a stranger 
1 
“A man without land is like a 
stranger in his own home town.” 
Retribution   
Dead penalty 
for unethical 
3 
“If you take land that does not belong 
to you, it could be punishable by 
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possession of 
land 
death in accordance with the customs 
of the people.”“Yes. If you take land 
that does not belong to you, it could 
be punishable by death or illness.” 
Strange 
deceases as 
punishment for 
unethical 
possession of 
land 
3 
“The gods of the land can strike you 
with some strange decease or even 
death.” “Yes. If you take land that 
does not belong to you, it could be 
punishable by death or illness.” 
According to findings from Balikumbat respondents, source of life sustenance, 
traditional sacrifices, pride, monetary value, land acquisition, landlessness, and 
retribution were highlighted as important codes on the indigenous perception of land and 
its importance. Nevertheless, more emphasis was laid on land as a source of sustenance 
for food cultivation and shelter with a grounding score of 6/6 of the respondents. 
Data Analysis of Bafanji Respondents 
The findings are based on the interview responses of the six traditional 
authorities. The following table summarizes the findings from the Bafanji respondents: 
Table 5 
Findings to research objective 1 – Bafanji Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
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Source of Life 
Sustenance  
Food cultivation 
and shelter 
3 
“Land is used for several reasons 
like cultivation, building, shelter, 
burial, and offering of sacrifices. 
You can even see the half houses 
which we constructed and they 
have destroyed.”  “Land is used 
for several reasons like cultivation, 
building, shelter, burial, and 
offering of sacrifices. The land 
under dispute is where some five 
villages go to offer sacrifices.” 
 
 
Burial Ground  
Land provides a 
place where 
people are 
buried 
6 
“Land is used for several reasons 
like cultivation, building, shelter, 
burial, and offering of sacrifices. 
You can even see the half houses 
which we constructed and they 
have destroyed.” “The present 
land Njah, which is under dispute, 
is a place where we offer sacrifices 
and there are a lot of our people 
that have been buried there. We 
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cannot just allow it to go” “Land 
is used for several reasons like 
cultivation, building, shelter, 
burial and offering of sacrifices. 
The land under dispute is where 
some five villages go to offer 
sacrifices.” “The only place where 
can bury people is on land.”  
Traditional 
Sacrifices 
Land provides 
shrines for 
traditional 
sacrifices 
6 
“Land is used for several reasons 
like cultivation, building, shelter, 
burial, and offering of sacrifices. 
You can even see the half houses 
which we constructed and they 
have destroyed.” “The present 
land Njah, which is under dispute, 
is a place where we offer sacrifices 
and there are a lot of our people 
that have been buried there. We 
cannot just allow it to go.” “There 
is a place of worship that all the 
five villages go and do their 
sacrifices. How can the Bali claim 
that all land should be abandoned 
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and given to them”? “Land is used 
for several reasons like cultivation, 
building, shelter, burial, and 
offering of sacrifices. The land 
under dispute is where some five 
villages go to offer sacrifices.” 
“The most important value of land 
that is leading to conflict is the 
traditional use of land for 
sacrifices and settlement issues.” 
Land 
Acquisition 
Land was 
acquired through 
inheritance 
2 
“We acquired land through 
inheritance.” 
 
Landlessness 
Non-acquisition 
of land leads to 
lack of respect 
2 
“If you do not possess land then 
you not to be respected in the 
society. Some of our people 
possess land only in the disputed 
area.” 
Retribution   
Dead penalty for 
unethical 
possession of 
land 
2 
“Death can be the result of anyone 
who claims land that does not 
belong to him or her.” 
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With respect to findings from the Bafanji respondents, source of life sustenance, 
burial ground, traditional sacrifices, land acquisition, landlessness and retribution, were 
indicated as important codes on the indigenous perception of land and its importance. It 
must be noted that the people attached more value to traditional sacrifices and burial 
grounds as the main importance of land for them with a grounding score of 6/6 for both 
codes. 
Comparison the Balikumbat and Bafanji Findings on the Indigenous Conception of 
Land and its Importance 
According to the findings, there were multiple and striking similarities on the how 
each village perceives land and its importance. The same codes were highlighted though 
with different emphasis by both villages. It was only the code of ‘burial ground’ that was 
peculiar to the Bafanji respondents. 
Nonetheless, we must note the striking disparity in emphasis. While the 
Balikumbat were more concerned with the use of land for sustenance (cultivation and 
shelter), the Bafanji were more concerned with the use of land for traditional sacrifices 
and that appears to account for one reason why each village would like to cling to the 
disputed land. 
Research Objective Two 
The Causes, History and Reoccurrence the Land Dispute 
This objective was analyzed based on the interview responses of the traditional 
authorities, religious authorities, and experienced participants of both villages. Analysis 
shall be done for each village after which a comparison of the findings of both villages 
shall be made to illuminate major differences and similarities 
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Government officials were considered to be impartial and neutral. Their views are 
analyzed separately but comparisons are made between them and the village authorities. 
Data Analysis of Balikumbat Respondents 
The findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities, 
two religious authorities, and six experienced participants. Fourteen respondents are 
included in this objective. The following table illuminates the key issues:  
Table 6 
Findings to research objective 2 – Balikumbat Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Murder 
Killing of 
Balikumbat son 
of the soil in 
Bafanji Land  
13 
“Around June 1995, in the 
afternoon. One Bafanji rice farmer 
man had a friend in Bali. He 
carried this man from Bali to go 
look at his farm. On coming back, 
he was killed in cool blood. He was 
killed in Bafanji. This was the 
immediate cause of the land dispute 
over the Njah area.” “The Bali had 
had a market in that place for a 
long time. But during a certain war 
at the 1930s under the leadership of 
S.T Muna, West Cameroon 
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administration, the Bali people 
were driven away and part of the 
land was given to Bafanji, with new 
borders.” “The immediate cause of 
the war was the killing of Bali man 
by the Bafanjians in cool blood.” 
“In 1995, a Bali Kumbat man was 
killed by the Bafanji in their area, 
so we had no other option than to 
go to war to defend ourselves. The 
war was bloody on both sides.” 
Displacement 
The destruction 
of the 
Balikumbat 
market at the 
disputed area 
10 
“Around 1978/79 Bali had a 
market at this area. The army came 
and scattered people, and burnt the 
whole market. The Fonwas carried 
to prison. This was the remote 
cause of the war.” “I will like to 
state that around in 1979, the Bali 
had a market in the said disputed 
area, but we were brutally removed 
from this market by the Gendarmes 
who were in support of the Bafanji. 
Our buildings were destroyed and 
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we were stopped from farming in 
the area.” “Around 1978/79. The 
gendarmes and the Bafanji drove us 
away from the market and my store 
was destroyed.” “There were three 
of us who build houses in that area. 
Our houses and the market were 
brutally burnt. I am an eyewitness 
because I was actively involved in 
the fighting. But later I escaped for 
my dear life.” 
Disunity  
Lack of cordial 
relationship 
between the 
villagers 
2 
“Since the beginning of the dispute, 
we are not in cordial relationship 
with the Bafanji people.” 
Government 
Injunction 
Non-respect of 
the injunction on 
disputed area by 
Bafanji people 
9 
“The government made the place 
an injuncted area. We of the Bali 
do not use the place, but the people 
of Bafanji use the place. There is 
even a GBHS Bafanji that has been 
built in an injuncted area.”  
“Furthermore, the government 
made the place an injuncted area. 
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We of the Bali do not use the place, 
but the people of Bafanji use the 
place.” “Furthermore, the 
government made the place an 
injuncted area. We of the Bali do 
not use the place, but the people of 
Bafanji use the place. There is even 
a GBHS Bafanji that has been built 
in an injuncted area.” “Presently, 
there is a government injunction in 
the area. That is why I cannot farm 
there but the Bafanji have violated 
this injunction and they keep on 
farming there. The government has 
done nothing to them. They have 
even build a school in the 
injunction area.” 
Casualties 
Loss of life and 
property 
3 
“There has been loss of life and 
property in the said disputed area, 
in 1995 and 1998 wars.” 
Constant 
Attacks 
Attacks from the 
Bafanji people 
3 
“Our women have witnessed 
constant attacks especially during 
the farming and harvesting 
113 
 
 
season.” “There have been 
constant attacks from the Bafanji 
people.” “This was closely 
followed by the 1998 war. This was 
because some of us who remained 
and stayed in the disputed area 
were attacked in the night by the 
Bafanji people. This then lead to 
another war.” 
Borderline 
Removal of 
boundary pillars 
by Bafanji people 
5 
“Pillars demarcating the borders 
have been removed and until they 
are planted, there is bound to be 
conflict.” 
Inconsistency in 
boundaries 
between the 
colonial powers, 
as well as former 
West Cameroon 
13 
“The two villages cannot agree as 
to the real boundaries of the place. 
The Bali seems to claim a border 
line drawn by the Germans while 
the Bafanji stand on the borders 
drawn by the British.” “It is based 
on the fact that the former west 
Cameroon government under S. T. 
Muna arbitrarily drew a border 
line that was not in accordance 
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with the former boundary. That of 
the Germans.” “It is based on the 
fact that they only came and 
showed us another boundary that 
we did not even know that it 
existed. The actual boundary is 
where the school is found. Before 
the market.” 
Non-respect of 
the colonial 
boundaries 
6 
“It keeps on coming because the 
boundaries of the colonial masters 
are being disrespected.” “The 
borderline is not clear. There is 
bound to be conflict. The boundary 
has not been put.” 
Planting Season 
Scramble for land 
during the 
planting season  
1 
“We have had serious wars in 1995 
and 1998. These always come 
around the planting season and 
each village begins to claim 
ownership of the land.” 
Poor 
Government 
Policy 
Laxity of the 
government in 
establishing a 
new border 
14 
“The laxity of the government in 
solving the problem. Our border is 
after the previously destroyed 
market but we have been pushed in 
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land by the bafanji people, who lay 
claim to a different borderline.” 
Primary 
Settlers 
The problem of 
which village 
first settled in the 
whole locality 
2 
“The first thing I want to state is 
that the Bafanji people are small to 
us. We are the people who brought 
them to that area and gave them 
some piece of land. The boundary 
was there right at Gashu. I myself I 
can go there and show you.”“First, 
I will like to state that before I was 
even born, it was the Bali people 
that gave land to the Bafanji 
people.” 
According to these findings, murder, displacement, non-respect of government 
injunction, poor boundary pillars and poor government policies were among the major 
reasons that accounted for the causes, history, and reoccurrence of the border dispute. 
Poor government policy was mentioned by all 14 respondents (their comments have been 
reserved for the analysis of objective four). The removal, inconsistency, and non-respect 
of the borderline formed a major source of conflict according to the Balikumbat 
respondents. 
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Data Analysis of Bafanji Respondents 
Findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities, two 
religious authorities, and six experienced participants. Fourteen respondents are included 
in this objective. The following table presents key issues: 
Table 7 
Findings to research objective 2 – Bafanji Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Borderline 
Removal of 
boundary pillars 
by the Bali 
people 
8 
“In 1939 the border was drawn by 
the British colonial master, but 
around 1992 the Bali people came 
and removed the pillars. That is 
how this whole conflict started.” 
“The remote cause of the conflict 
was the removal of pillars by the 
Bali people. The government 
intervened and asked each village 
to contribute 400,000 frs each for 
the replacement of pillars. The Bali 
people did not give so the Bafanji 
people gave all the 800,000 frs. 
That was in 1992.” “Around 1992 
the Bali people came and removed 
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the pillars put by the British in 
1939. That is how this whole 
conflict started.” 
Disrespect of 
colonial 
boundaries 
3 
“It keeps on coming because the 
boundaries of the colonial masters 
are not being respected.” 
Poor 
Government 
Policy 
Inability of 
government to 
sanction 
defaulters 
4 
“We really want to know why the 
gov’t herself should put on pillars 
and some people or a village 
decides to remove, yet no sanctions 
have been levied on these people. 
Or was the gov’t who instructed 
them to come and remove the 
pillars”? “It is the gov’t trying to 
delay and justice delayed is justice 
denied. Because the DO, SDO and 
Governor know very well that 
pillars were planted and these 
pillars were off rooted and they 
know those who off rooted the 
pillars.” “Each time we complain, 
government will tell us to identify 
the individuals and summon them 
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as individuals, but this is very 
difficult. How can we get into Bali 
to get these culprits”? 
Inability of 
government to 
establish a new 
border 
5 
“We have begged on the gov’t to 
replace the pillars but till now 
nothing has been done.” “The 
government has taken no action as 
far as this is concerned.” “Weak 
government policy is actually the 
reason why this land problem is 
still going.” “It keeps on coming 
because the government has 
deliberately refused to demarcate a 
clean and clear boundary. The real 
issue is the boundary and it needs 
to be demarcated.” “If government 
does not clearly define the borders, 
then the problem will never end.” 
Threats 
Threats on 
government 
officials by the 
Bali people 
1 
“One of the greatest problems is 
that when a new DO comes, the 
Bali people will threaten him. He 
lives in Bali and when he says 
anything contrary to the bali, they 
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will threaten his life. Weak 
government policy is actually the 
reason why this land problem is 
still going.” 
Casualties 
 
Loss of life and 
property 
 
10 
“The immediate cause of the war 
was in 1995, when the Bali people 
came and burnt all the places and 
even threatened to reach the 
palace area.” “We have had 
serious wars in 1995 and 1998. 
There was destruction of houses, 
plants, property, animals and even 
uncountable of life. This always 
begins with the beating of women 
in farms and then it escalates to 
war. Especially in 1995, we were 
well beating and lost a lot of life, 
when I think of it, I feel as to cry.” 
“In 1998 the Bali people came 
again and burnt places. Even my 
own house has been destroyed 
twice. Now I am sure that if I die, I 
will be buried in the bush because 
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of I have no permanent residence.” 
“We have had serious wars in 
1995 and 1998. There was 
destruction of houses, plants, 
property, animals and even 
uncountable of life.” “I remember 
in those olden days the 1995. There 
was fire booming all over the 
place, which took down close to 
495 houses. There were prominent 
magnificent houses that took 
decades to be constructed. Lives 
were lost and many hospitalized 
with bullets in them.” “The Bali 
came successively in 1978 and 
1979 and destroyed the property of 
the bafanji people. So many people 
died.” 
Provocation 
Willful acts by 
the Bali that can 
lead to 
retaliation   
7 
“When the Bafanji women work in 
the place the Bali will come and 
harvest and even take away their 
wholes. The DO has been there for 
more than three times, but no 
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solution. May be when you people 
will talk like researchers, the gov’t 
may give a listening and bring a 
solution.” “The Bafanji has never 
crossed the boundary to destroy in 
Bali but I do not understand why 
the Bali will burn our places right 
to the palace area. We have never 
burnt any house in Bali even those 
that are around the border.” 
Exercise of 
Power 
Invasion of 
Bafanji land by 
the Fon Doh of 
Bali 
2 
“Around 1978/79. It should be 
noted that when the then former 
west Cameroon gov’t planted 
pillars in the presence of the 
former Fon of Bali, there was no 
problem. It was only when this last 
Fon (Fon Doh) took over that 
disputes started. In his father’s 
reign people lived together with no 
problems. We use to attain cry dies 
and other meetings together.” 
“The Fon of Bali wanted to make 
Bafanji to be under him, so that he 
122 
 
 
can rule the whole of this area. He 
came to capture people through 
boundary issue. The removal of 
pillars and the attack on the 
bafanji people was the immediate 
cause of the wars.” 
Constant 
Attacks 
Attacks from the 
Bali people 
5 
“The dispute continuous because 
each time we cultivate, the Bali 
people will come and destroy. At 
times they do the harvesting.”“We 
have been attacked on several 
occasions and our farming tools 
seized.” 
Planting 
Season 
Scramble for 
land during the 
planting season 
1 
“So this is an ongoing conflict and 
it usually comes up during the 
planting and harvesting seasons.” 
Primary 
Settlers 
 
The problem of 
which village 
first settled in 
the whole 
locality 
 
1 
“It should be worthy of note that 
the Bali people only settled in this 
land after the Bafanji. The place 
where they even have their palace 
was formerly the place of 
Bamukumbit. They tricked the 
Bamukumbit and took over the 
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place. That is why the Bali cannot 
even cut and eat trees in their 
palace because they do not own the 
place.” 
According to these findings, the borderline, poor government policy, threats, 
casualties, provocation, exercise of power, constant attacks, planting season, and primary 
settlers were identified as reasons for the causes, history, and reoccurrence of the dispute. 
Nevertheless, the poor borderline demarcation, poor government policy, and casualties 
were most prominent according to the respondents. 
Comparison the Balikumbat and Bafanji on the Causes, History and Reoccurrence 
of the Land Dispute 
Accordingly, the borderline and poor government policies were identified by both 
villages as the major sources of conflict. Nevertheless, while the Balikumbat considered 
murder as the immediate cause of war, the Bafanji laid claim to the removal of the 
boundary pillars by the Balikumbat. We can equally note that, unlike the Balikumbat, the 
Bafanji were very sensitive about the amount of casualties suffered. Both villages 
claimed constant attacks from the other and both equally claimed to have been the first to 
settle in the land, although this factor was not the primary cause of conflict. The issue of 
government injunction was problematic to the Balikumbat, while the Bafanji did not see 
this as major problem. Other issues like provocation, threats on government officials, and 
the exercise of power by the Bali Fon were peculiar to the Bafanji respondents. 
Government injunction, displacement, disunity, and murder were key issues raised only 
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by the Balikumbat. Conclusively, both villages agreed to the fact these conflicts often 
arise during the farming season. 
Data Analysis of Government Officials 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six government officials. 
The following table presents key issues: 
Table 8 
Findings to research objective 2 – Government Officials Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Documentation 
Conflicting 
dates and 
decisions in 
available 
documents 
1 
“It is a long history with so many 
conflicting dates and documents. 
You will see in some of the 
documents yourself.” 
Population  
The problem of 
dynamic 
population and 
static land 
2 
“The issue is that land does not 
expand but the population grows 
every day. Land is static but the 
population is dynamic. With 
population explosion, there is 
bound to be pressure on land.” 
“There is equally the issue of the 
growing population. It is because 
the population is growing that 
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there is continuous scramble for 
land.” 
Borderline 
Poor 
demarcation of 
inter-village 
boundaries 
6 
“Administrative units are clearly 
calved out but within the sub 
division we have a headache that 
these boundaries are not clearly 
defined.” “I have maps as the one 
you can see, but these are just 
imaginary. The government have 
not come up with clear maps 
should the boundaries amongst 
the villages within a unit.” “It 
keeps on coming because there is 
no clear cut boundary between the 
two villages.” 
Multiple 
colonial and 
post-colonial 
maps 
4 
“They trace the history of their 
various villages to colonial times. 
They both have different colonial 
maps.” “The remote cause is the 
fact there is no clear boundary 
between these two villages. There 
are a series of maps. Colonial 
maps, postcolonial maps. The 
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problem now is which one is the 
correct map. Each village has its 
own map that it believes is the 
correct map.” 
Land Tenure 
System 
Poor 
interpretation of 
land tenure 
system 
1 
“There is equally the issue of 
poor interpretation of the land 
tenure system. A land certificate 
can only be issued for 
customary/individual ownership 
of land if it goes back to pre-1974 
ordinance regulating land tenure 
in Cameroon. Any other claim to 
land can only be given by 
government based on grant.” 
Conflict 
between civil 
and traditional 
authorities on 
land custody 
1 
“The government has been a 
failure in this respect. 
Furthermore, there is even a 
conflict between the government 
and the traditional authorities on 
who actually is the real custodian 
of land.” 
Deception 
Traditional 
authorities 
1 
“The traditional authorities have 
misled the civil authorities. They 
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mislead the civil 
authorities  
are members of the land 
commission and when they give 
wrong information, there is bound 
to be conflict. They are the only 
people who know the history of 
the land and when their 
information is wrong we are 
bound to have wrong decisions.” 
Casualties 
 
Loss of life and 
property 
 
6 
“The casualties were both human 
and property. I have a document 
which I will give you to exploit 
because the claim of the Bafanji 
people was going up to an amount 
of two billion frs.” 
Poor 
Government 
Policy 
Incompletion of 
task 
1 
“Commissions were set but they 
did not finish their work because 
they started to trace the 
boundaries but ended somewhere 
without completing their 
mission.” 
Conflicts 
amongst 
government 
1 
The problem is even aggravated 
by poor administrative policies 
whereby Divisional Officers take 
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officials delight in one way or the other for 
some private reasons, in 
counteracting decisions that were 
already taken by their 
predecessors. Hence, there are 
bound to multiple government 
decisions on the same piece of 
land. 
Laxity in 
decision taking 
6 
“There are always conflicts but 
how timely they are managed is 
the problem. During the last 
conflict it even took close to three 
days before the forces of law and 
order could arrive at the scene, 
when there were already a lot of 
casualties.” “The government has 
been so slow in decision taking. If 
they are incompetent, then they 
should resign their duties. Why 
should this matter still continue 
since 1979?” 
Responsibility 
Conflict as to 
who is 
3 
“The government said that 
individuals should be held 
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responsible. The 
individual or the 
whole village 
responsible while the bafanji 
claimed that it was the community 
of Bali that destroyed. Thus the 
problem of who to pay.” “There 
have been wars in 1995 and 1998. 
These conflicts usually begin 
during the farming season. The 
disputes will normally start at the 
individual level and then will 
escalate to the village level.” 
 
Impartiality  
Government 
officials must 
remain impartial 
6 
“I am the Divisional Officer. All I 
can tell you is that my role is 
impartial.” “Yes. First as 
counselor, I am caught up in the 
middle. I am from Bali Kumbat 
but I cannot take sides because of 
my political position. Bafanji is 
part of our municipality. 
Furthermore, my wife is even 
from Bafanji. So the dispute 
highly affects me as political 
figure and family person.” 
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Government 
injunction 
Non-respect of 
injunction 
1 
“Non-respect of government 
injunction” 
 
Transportation 
Difficulties in 
movement 
2 
“It was difficult to move from one 
village to another.” “It was 
difficult for a team to leave Bali 
and go to Bafanji. Even revenue 
collection in Bafanji came to a 
standstill.” 
According to the government officials, conflicting documentation, population 
growth, the borderline, the land tenure system, deception, casualties, poor government 
policy, responsibility, impartiality, transportation, and government injunction constituted 
their major concerns in relation to the conflict. It should be noted that issues like 
borderline, poor government policy were of top priority to the government officials. 
Comparatively, these two issues equally dominated minds of the traditional, religious 
authorities and experienced participants. Nonetheless, the government officials raised 
other issues like population growth, the land tenure system, deception, and conflict 
between civil and traditional authorities that were not mentioned by the other 
respondents. 
Research Objective Three 
Colonial Land Policy and its Role in the Land Dispute 
This objective was analyzed based on the interview responses of the traditional 
authorities and experienced participants of both villages. Analysis shall be conducted for 
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each village after which a comparison of the findings of both villages shall be made to 
identify major differences and similarities 
Government officials were considered impartial and neutral. Their views are 
analyzed separately but comparisons are made between them and the village authorities. 
Data Analysis of Balikumbat Respondents 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities 
and six experienced participants. Twelve respondents are included in this objective. The 
following table presents key issues: 
Table 9 
Findings to research objective 3 – Balikumbat Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Boundary 
Pillars 
Use of pillars to 
demarcate 
boundaries 
2 
“The colonial masters were of 
help. They demarcated the 
boundaries with pillars and we 
did not have problems.” 
Geographical 
Features 
Neglect of 
geographical 
features in 
boundary 
demarcation 
3 
“During the colonial period 
there was no geographical 
feature for borders. What were 
built were the pillars.” “I know 
that most boundaries are often 
demarcated by a geographical 
feature. I do not understand why 
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in our own case only movable 
pillars were used. This has 
caused a lot of problems.” 
Mutability of 
Pillars  
Pillars can be 
changed or 
removed 
2 
“Some of these pillars have been 
removed and put in water. We 
can still see them there because 
they are too heavy to be 
removed.” 
Multiple 
Colonial 
Masters 
Inconsistency in 
the administrative 
policies of 
Germany and 
Britain as 
colonial masters.  
4 
“We did not have problems since 
the coming of the Germans and 
British because they did well, 
but this posed a future problem 
after they left because of 
inconsistency in their 
administration.” “The only thing 
I can say here is that there were 
two colonial masters, (Germany 
and Britain). Unfortunately, we 
equally have two colonial maps 
of the area. Each map leads to 
the favour and disfavor of one 
village.” 
Multiple Inconsistency in 5 “We have the Germans and 
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Colonial Maps colonial 
boundaries 
British colonial masters who 
brought out the boundary. In 
their reign we have no problems 
but after them, there is a 
problem, may be because there 
are two colonial maps and the 
government is unable to decide 
which one is correct.” “The only 
thing I can say here is that there 
were two colonial masters, 
(Germany and Britain). 
Unfortunately, we equally have 
two colonial maps of the area. 
Each map leads to the favour 
and disfavor of one village.” 
“But we cannot deny the fact 
that they created two colonial 
maps, which today poses a 
serious conflict between two 
villages.” 
Colonial Rule 
Firm and strong 
colonial 
administration.  
5 
“I believe they had a strong 
colonial rule and did well, that is 
why we did not have problems 
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during their reign.” “They were 
firm with their administration 
and that is why we did not have 
problems. But we cannot deny 
the fact that they created two 
colonial maps, which today 
poses is serious conflict between 
two villages.” 
Indigenous 
Beliefs and 
Customs 
Neglect of 
indigenous 
beliefs and 
customs in 
boundary 
demarcation 
3 
“They had their positive and 
negative points. Positively, the 
tried to calve out boundaries 
amongst the villages and made 
sure it was respected. 
Negatively, most of these 
borders did not respect our 
tradition. They separated 
families and even traditional 
sacrificial shrines like the Njah 
disputed area.” 
Administrative 
Handover 
Poor handover of 
power from one 
administration to 
another 
2 
“We a victim of so many foreign 
conflicting powers. First, the 
Germans poorly handed things 
to the British who inturn poorly 
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handed over to West Cameroon. 
Now the present La Republique 
is behaving as if they are 
another colonial master to us. So 
the colonial masters have part of 
the blame.” 
According to these findings, most of the respondents were happy with the firm 
colonial administrations, which demarcated between the two villages and maintained 
peace and order until their departure. Nevertheless, a number of significant limitations 
were highlighted in relation to the colonial period. These included the fact that pillars 
rather than geographical features were used as borderlines. The respondents highlighted 
the mutability of these pillars. The presence of two inconsistent colonial administrations 
and multiple conflicting colonial maps were equally highlighted. Moreover, the fact that 
colonial masters did not respect the indigenous beliefs and customs of the people and the 
issue of poor administrative handover constituted some of the factors that marred the role 
of the colonial regimes in handling land issues. 
Data Analysis of Bafanji Respondents 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities 
and six experienced participants. Twelve respondents are included in this objective. The 
following table presents key issues: 
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Table 10 
Findings to research objective 3 – Bafanji Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Primary Settlers 
Bafanji does not 
share a colonial 
boundary with 
Balikumbat 
4 
“Before the putting of the 
boundary the Bali were not even 
there. Our boundary was with 
Bamukumbit. The Bali only 
came in and started to cause 
problems.” “At the time of the 
colonial rule there were no Bali 
people in this area. They only 
came in during the post-colonial 
period.” “I think if we follow 
strictly the history of this area 
then our border line is even with 
the Bamukumbet people and not 
even with the Bali Kumbat.” 
“We first arrived here before 
the Bali and by history we are 
not even supposed to have a 
border dispute with them.” 
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Mutability of 
Pillars  
Pillars can be 
changed or 
removed 
2 
“It was the British colonial 
master that demarcated the 
boundary in 1939. There were 
no problems until these pillars 
were removed.” 
Multiple 
Colonial 
Masters 
Inconsistency in 
the administrative 
policies of 
Germany and 
Britain as colonial 
masters.  
3 
“I will like to state here that 
having two colonial masters 
created a lot of difficulties 
which were left unresolved. 
They were able to calm down 
land disputes at their time but as 
soon as they left these problems 
started to resurface. The 
problem of land is not only 
limited to Bali and Bafanji. In 
Bui division we have similar 
problems.” 
Multiple 
Colonial Maps 
Inconsistency in 
colonial 
boundaries 
2 
 “The problem between the Bali 
and Bafanji is a difficult one, 
because there is the German 
border line which favours the 
Bali and the British border line 
which favours the Bafanji.” 
138 
 
 
Colonial Rule 
Firm and strong 
colonial 
administration.  
3 
“We first arrived here before 
the Bali and by history we are 
not even supposed to have a 
border dispute with them. They 
are the aggressors; the colonial 
masters are not to blame.” “If 
we were still under the colonial 
government we should have had 
no problems.” 
Indigenous 
Beliefs and 
Customs 
Neglect of 
indigenous beliefs 
and customs in 
boundary 
demarcation 
3 
“What I wish to state here is 
that these colonial masters did 
not take into consideration the 
indigenous beliefs and customs, 
else they would not have set 
boundaries on sensitive areas 
like the Njah where close to five 
villages use as land for 
traditional sacrifices.” “It is 
true they may have made 
mistakes in demarcating villages 
and even separating families 
that were supposed to be 
united.” 
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Administrative 
Handover 
Poor handover of 
power from one 
administration to 
another 
1 
“But the greatest problem is 
that there was no effective hand 
from the Germans to the British 
and then to west Cameroon 
government and now the 
republic of Cameroon.” 
According to these findings, the Bafanji respondents made a serious claim that 
they did not have a colonial boundary with the Balikumbat village. Instead, they share a 
boundary with the Bamukumit people. The respondents were, however, happy with the 
firm colonial administrations, which demarcated between the two villages and maintained 
peace and order until their departure. Nevertheless, a number of significant limitations 
were highlighted in relation to the colonial period. These included the presence of two 
inconsistent colonial administrations and multiple conflicting colonial maps. 
Furthermore, the fact that the colonial masters did not respect the indigenous beliefs and 
customs of the people and the issue of poor administrative handover constituted some of 
the negative factors to the role of the colonial regimes in handling land issues. 
Comparison the Balikumbat and Bafanji on the Colonial Land Policy and its role in 
the Land Dispute 
With different grounding scores and emphasis, the two village respondents were 
quite similar in their evaluation of the colonial land policy. They both appreciated the 
firm colonial rule that had kept them from any disputes in the colonial era. Nevertheless, 
they frown at the inconsistencies in colonial administrations, multiple colonial maps, the 
non-respect of indigenous values, and poor administrative handover. There were 
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contrasting views. While the Balikumbat highlighted neglect in the use of geographical 
pillars, this issue was completely ignored by the Bafanji. Instead, the Bafanji were firm in 
claiming that they did not even share any colonial boundary with the Balikumbat.   
Data Analysis of Government Officials 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six government officials. 
The following table presents key issues: 
Table 11 
Findings to research objective 3 – Government Officials Respondents 
Code Code Description Grounding Quotations 
Multiple Colonial 
Maps 
Inconsistency in 
colonial boundaries 
4 “There are so many 
maps. In fact, it is a 
whole litany of 
problems. You can 
have time to exploit 
the documents 
yourself, but the 
documents are 
confidential. You 
cannot take them 
out of this 
office.”“There have 
been two colonial 
masters with 
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different colonial 
maps. Each village 
clings to the map 
that is in their 
favour.” 
Indigenous Beliefs 
and Customs 
Neglect of 
indigenous beliefs 
and customs in 
boundary 
demarcation 
2 “My blame goes 
more to the 
government for 
failing to respect 
the colonial 
boundary and 
bringing a solution 
to this conflict. 
Nevertheless, the 
colonial masters 
are to blame for 
arbitral division of 
families.” 
Mutability of 
Pillars  
Pillars can be 
changed or 
removed 
4 “During the 
colonial period 
there was a 
boundary. But 
people went round 
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when the conflict 
started an off 
rooted these 
pillars.” 
The government officials were keen to mention the limitations of the colonial 
rule. Multiple colonial maps, neglect of indigenous values, mutability of pillars, and the 
neglect of geographical features in demarcating boundaries were identified. These codes 
were similar to those already highlighted by the respondents of both villages. 
Research Objective Four: 
Role of the Present Government in the Solution of the Dispute 
This objective was analyzed based on the interview responses of the traditional 
authorities and experienced participants of both villages. Analysis was completed for 
each village after which a comparison of the findings of both villages was made to 
identify major differences and similarities 
Government officials were considered impartial and neutral. Their views are 
analyzed separately but comparisons are made between them and the village authorities. 
Data Analysis of Balikumbat Respondents 
The findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities and 
six experienced participants. Twelve respondents are included in this objective. The 
following table presents key issues: 
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Table 12 
Findings to research objective 4 – Balikumbat Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Decision 
Making 
Government is 
indecisive 
5 
“The present government is not 
doing well because they cannot 
take a decision, as to whether they 
want to maintain the boundary of 
the colonial masters or to define a 
new one. It is the ministry of 
territorial administration to define 
the border and everybody will have 
to respect. They can even divide us 
at the middle since everyone is 
claiming ownership.” “The 
present government is not doing 
well; there is no clear cut 
boundary. No decision has been 
taken, despite the fact that we have 
written so many letters calling on 
the government to solve this 
problem. I don’t understand how 
the government cannot demarcate 
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a simple boundary for more than 
30 years now.” “The present land 
policy is not definite. There is need 
for justice.” “The government has 
not done well. They have failed to 
produce a borderline. The present 
Bafanji GBHS is in our soil. Our 
farms have been taken by the 
Bafanji people.” 
Sanctions 
Government 
inability to 
identify and 
sanction culprits  
4 
“There is an injunction on the 
land, but the Bafanji people work 
there without any punishment. But 
when we go there they say we have 
brought war.” “The government 
has put an injunction on the land 
yet it allows the Bafanji to 
continue to use the land.” 
Laxity 
Untimely 
intervention of 
government 
3 
“The present government is 
hesitant to define the boundaries 
since 1979. Thus, the problem has 
not been solved. This makes people 
to suffer. Some families used to 
rely on that land.” “This 
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government is well noted for her 
laxity in handling this matter. I do 
not understand why they cannot 
put a simple boundary between 
two villages.” 
Government 
injunction 
Injunction is a 
temporal not a 
permanent 
solution  
2 
“The injunction move should just 
be a temporary thing and not 
permanent. I have been deprived of 
my farming land for long and this 
is causing poverty in my family. 
This government is thrash.” 
No positive comments were received by the present government on this land 
issue. The respondents all mentioned the indecisiveness of government in decision-
making, their failure to rain sanctions on defaulters, their carelessness in timely 
intervention, and their misconception of an injunction as a permanent solution to the 
boundary problem. 
Data Analysis of Bafanji Respondents 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities 
and six experienced participants. Twelve respondents are included in this objective. The 
following table presents key issues: 
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Table 13 
Findings to research objective 4 – Bafanji Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Decision 
Making 
Lack of 
government 
decision 
5 
“The Government has taken no 
action. We have written letters 
upon letters to no avail. We live in 
fear. Wholes and crops are stolen 
and the Bali quarter head claim 
that he is not responsible for this 
theft.” “There has been no 
concrete action, despite the 
constant requests and pleas. This 
has made the Bafanji to live in 
constant fear because the Bali 
come with bags of stones and seize 
holes from the Bafanji women 
when they are working. We farm 
at times and they come and 
harvest.” 
Sanctions 
Government 
inability to 
identify and 
 
“There is an injunction on the 
land, but the Bafanji people work 
there without any punishment. But 
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sanction culprits  when we go there they say we have 
brought war.” “The government 
has put an injunction on the land 
yet it allows the Bafanji to 
continue to use the land.” 
Laxity 
Untimely 
intervention of 
government 
4 
“Cameroon government is not 
taken quick action to solve this 
problem.” “Cameroon 
government is not taken quick 
action to solve this problem and I 
am terribly disappointed in them.” 
Government 
injunction 
Injunction is not 
a solution 
2 
“This government is nonsense. We 
are suffering and dying and all 
they can do is give an injunction 
on the land. Where do they want 
us to cultivate? How do they 
expect us to live? If I do not go to 
farm, my family will die of 
starvation. The government should 
show us another place to farm and 
live. Our population is fast 
growing.” 
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The Bafanji respondents frowned at government attempts to solve the problem. 
The government’s lack of a concrete decision-making, their inability to sanction 
defaulters, their laxity in timely interventions, and the fact that an injunction is not a 
solution to land disputes emerged strongly from the disappointed respondents.  
Comparison of the Balikumbat and Bafanji on the Role of Present Government on 
the Dispute 
The respondents of both villages unanimously condemned government action 
with the same areas of concern, like poor decision-making, their inability to sanction 
culprits, and general laxity. The government injunction was not considered a solution by 
both villages. However, the emphases were slightly different. While the Balikumbat were 
milled in their condemnation (e.g. indecisive), the Bafanji were very emphatic (complete 
lack of decision). While the Balikumbat considered the government injunction a 
temporary solution, the Bafanji did not believe it was a solution at all.  
Data Analysis of Government Officials 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six government officials. 
The following table presents key issues: 
Table 14 
Findings to research objective 4 – Government Officials Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
Land Tenure 
System 
Well Defined 
Land Tenure 
System 
2 
“The present land tenure system 
states that a land certificate can 
only be issued for 
149 
 
 
customary/individual ownership 
of land if it goes back to pre-
1974 ordinance regulating land 
tenure in Cameroon. Any other 
claim to land can only be given 
by government based on grant.” 
Inconsistency 
Government 
officials take 
inconsistent 
decisions 
3 
“The problem is even aggravated 
by poor administrative policies 
whereby Divisional Officers take 
delight in one way or the other 
for some private reasons, in 
counteracting decisions that 
were already taken by their 
predecessors. Hence, there are 
bound to multiple government 
decisions on the same piece of 
land.” 
 
Administrative 
Bottlenecks  
Poor 
communication 
and circulation of 
information. 
4 
Government decision is very 
slow. I am just a small DO sitting 
here and I can only tell you what 
is happening around me. I do not 
know what is happening at the 
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level of SDO, Governor and 
minister. If government decisions 
are followed byaction, then this 
problem can be solved.  
 
Laxity 
Untimely 
intervention of 
government 
5 
“The government equally have 
been very slow and laxed in the 
solution of the problem.” “I am 
deeply unsatisfied. The two 
communities have written letters 
to the government pleading for a 
border demarcation but nothing 
has been done.” “Of recent in 
2011, the Lord Mayor led a 
powerful delegation to the 
Ministry of Territorial 
administration to plead on 
border demarcation. Promises 
were made but none have been 
fulfilled.” “There are always 
conflicts but how timely they are 
managed is the problem. During 
the last conflict it even took close 
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to three days before the forces of 
law and order could arrive at the 
scene, when there were already a 
lot of casualties.” “The 
government has been so slow in 
decision taking. If they are 
incompetent, then they should 
resign their duties. Why should 
this matter still continue since 
1979?” 
Conflict in 
Authority 
Conflict between 
the civil and 
traditional 
authorities over 
land custody  
2 
“The government has been a 
failure in this respect. 
Furthermore, there is even a 
conflict between the government 
and the traditional authorities on 
who actually is the real 
custodian of land.” 
With the exception of a well-defined land tenure system, the local government 
officials of the subdivision and municipality were dissatisfied with government action 
towards a solution to the land dispute. This same dissatisfaction was expressed by the 
respondents of  both villages. 
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Research Objective Five:  
Solutions to the Current Dispute 
This objective was analyzed based on the interview responses of the traditional 
authorities, religious authorities, and experienced participants of both villages. Analysis 
was undertaken for each village after which a comparison of both villages was made to 
identify major differences and similarities 
Government officials were considered impartial and neutral. Their views are 
analyzed separately but comparisons are made between them and the village authorities. 
Data Analysis of Balikumbat Respondents 
The findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities, 
two religious authorities, and six experienced participants. Fourteen respondents are 
included in this objective. The following table presents key issues: 
Table 15 
Findings to research objective 5 – Balikumbat Respondents 
Code Code Description Grounding Quotations 
Dialogue 
Dialogue between 
traditional 
authorities 
8 
“The two Fons and their 
traditional councils should meet 
and discuss”  
“There should be dialogue 
between the two villages” 
Dialogue between 
civil authorities 
8 
“The Governor should invite all 
stake holders for a talk.” 
Dialogue between 8 “The DO and SDO should call 
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traditional and 
civil authorities 
the two Fons and talk to them.” 
Construction 
of Borderline 
Demarcation of 
Borderline 
14 
“The ministry of territorial 
administration should draw up 
the border.” “Government 
should take a simple decision 
and replant the pillars at the 
borders and call on all to obey. If 
they do this, then we shall obey 
even if it is to our disadvantage.” 
“The government should bring a 
final boundary in this area.” 
Sensitization 
Education of 
people on current 
state of affairs 
6 
“The Fons should sensitize the 
people on the discussions and the 
decisions taken so that no one 
should disrespect them.” 
Tolerance 
Stop the 
provocation of 
others 
5 
“We should stop provocation of 
neighbours at the borders. 
Everything should pass through 
the land commission.” “People 
should stop provoking each other 
at the border.” 
Decision Decision by both 7 “Since the government has 
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Making government and 
traditional 
authorities  
declared that she is the sole 
owner of land, the government 
should take a decision with the 
help of the local traditional 
authorities so that both villages 
should respect the borders.” 
The Church 
Role of the church 
and religious 
authorities 
5 
“The priests spoke with the 
women of Bafanji and Bali and 
preached unity for the two 
villages to meet for church 
activities.” “The priests all the 
way has preached peace.” “I 
had the opportunity to go to 
Bafanji and preach myself. At 
first I was not received well, but 
when I explained that I came 
under the parish, the people were 
willing to listen to me.” “The 
church has been preaching for 
peace but it does not have the 
right to take a decision. The 
church can only convince the 
people and tell them the bad side 
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of war. The church has done her 
best to help bring peace.” 
Research 
Communication of 
Research findings 
to the civil, 
traditional 
authorities.  
4 
“The researchers like you can 
form a big solution to the 
problem. Since, nobody had 
come to ask us anything. Now 
that you people have come. We 
believe that the truth shall 
resurface.” 
Respect 
Respect of 
eventual 
government 
decision 
10 
“Since government is claims they 
are the owners of land. The 
solution lies in them. Ours is to 
respect them.” 
Unity 
Unity between the 
two villages 
3 
“We need to come together with 
the Bafanji people as one.” 
While hoping for a possible solution, the Balikumbat respondents highlighted 
dialogue, the construction of a borderline, sensitization, tolerance, decision-making, the 
Church, unity, respect, and research findings as major ways by which a solution can be 
brokered between the two villages. 
Data Analysis of Bafanji Respondents 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six traditional authorities, 
two religious authorities, and six experienced participants. Fourteen respondents are 
included in this objective. The following table presents key issues: 
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Table 16 
Findings to research objective 5 – Bafanji Respondents 
Code Code Description Grounding Quotations 
Sanctions 
Punishment of 
defaulters 
10 
“The government claim that only 
individual culprits should be 
punished cannot work. I think that 
when the quarter head is captured 
and tortured, he will reveal the 
people behind the constant 
attacks.” “The government 
should be able to punish all those 
who keep on removing pillars. 
The government should not just 
be quite.” “Individuals should be 
identified and punished. These 
should be produced by the 
quarter head.” 
 
Research 
Communication 
through the press 
3 
“As researchers, I think you 
people should go to the CRTV and 
talk. The government is too lax 
and people are dying. If you 
people talk at the CRTV I think 
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the government will listen to our 
cry.” 
 
Construction of 
Borderline 
Demarcation of 
boundary 
14 
“I think there is no other solution 
to this matter than that 
government should replant the 
pillars to define the boundary. I 
do not understand what is so 
difficult in doing this.” “The 
government should replant the 
pillars to show the boundary.” 
Collaboration 
Dialogue between 
government 
officials 
8 
“There should be collaboration 
amongst the government officials 
so as to reach a solution. 
Government action should be 
quick and fast.” 
Responsibility 
Quarter heads 
should be 
responsible for 
acts of attacks 
committed by their 
people 
6 
“The quarter heads of Bali should 
claim responsibility of the 
destruction and constant farm 
raids from its people. They should 
be able to identify these people 
and bring them up for 
punishment.” 
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The Church 
Role of the church 
and religious 
authorities 
8 
“There is justice and peace. The 
priests have been preaching 
against violence and have 
reminded the people that we are 
one parish and we should live 
together.” “When the priest says 
this, the Bali man will accept in 
church but will go out and then 
begin to act differently. “The 
church has been preaching for 
peace but it does not have the 
right to take a decision. The 
church can only convince the 
people and tell them the bad side 
of war. The church has done her 
best to help bring peace.” 
Justice 
Government action 
should be fast and 
just 
3 
“Simple. The government should 
act fast, justly and wisely” 
These respondents believed and hoped for a possible solution. They highlighted 
strategies including sanctions, research, borderline construction, collaboration, the 
church, justice, and responsibility as major ways by which a solution can be realized. 
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Comparison of the Balikumbat and Bafanji on Solutions to the Current Dispute 
The first striking similarity is that both villages were amenable to a peaceful 
solution to the border dispute. The construction of a borderline, collaboration, dialogue, 
and the findings of research were highlighted as possible tools to peace. Nevertheless, 
while the Balikumbat called for immediate unity, the Bafanji were more emphatic on the 
aspect of sanctions and justice. 
Data Analysis of Government Officials 
These findings are based on the interview responses of six government officials. 
The following table presents key issues: 
Table 17 
Findings to research objective 5 – Government Officials Respondents 
Code 
Code 
Description 
Grounding Quotations 
National 
Commission 
Commission 
should complete 
task on 
demarcation of 
boundary  
1 
“The national commission should 
act fast on their assignment.” 
“There is already a national 
commission working on the issue. 
A small DO like me cannot go and 
undercut this commission. We can 
only wait for that commission to 
complete the job it started.” 
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Construction of 
Borderline 
Implantation of 
pillars 
6 
“The major suggestion is that the 
government should take it as a 
matter of emergency and plant the 
pillars even if it means one village 
giving up the whole of that area.” 
“The land belongs to the state and 
so the state should act promptly.” 
 
 
Friendliness 
Traditional 
authorities of 
both villages 
should be more 
friendly 
3 
“The Fons of the tribes should be 
friendlier and even have their 
coordination meetings so that they 
can meet and discuss to evade 
conflict.” 
Forgiveness 
Focus on 
solutions rather 
than causes 
3 
“We should not focus on the causes 
but rather seek for solutions. We 
want a situation where there is free 
movement within the 
municipality.” 
Sensitization 
Constant 
meetings to 
educate people 
on current affairs 
4 
“Sensitization in meetings and 
villages by the Mayor and D.O” 
“Meetings with traditional 
councils” “We have doing a lot of 
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sensitization on the ills of war and 
division.” 
Individual 
Responsibility 
Dispute at 
individual rather 
than village level 
2 
“Dispute on land should be handled 
at family level and not at the level 
of the village.” 
The government officials highlighted the national commission, the construction of 
a borderline, friendliness, forgiveness, sensitization, and individual responsibility as 
possible solutions to the dispute. Apart from the comment about the national commission, 
most of the other strategies mentioned by the government officials were equally 
highlighted by the village respondents. 
Researcher Observations 
Observations were carried out as an important part of this research effort. The 
researcher spent approximately three hours on each of the market days which occurred on 
every Thursday of November, 2015. During these observation sessions, the overall 
objective was to determine if the land conflict still played a role in the social interactions 
among the people of both villages. Confirming the identities of the people from both 
villages was assisted by a gatekeeper. Detailed field notes were recorded. 
In the course of the observations, some fascinating notations were made. The 
market square has traditionally been a meeting place for buyers and sellers of both 
villages. On a typical market day, people from both villages will convene in the market 
square to buy, sell, or simply make new acquaintances. My observations revealed that, 
among the younger population, interactions of a free-spirited and positive nature 
prevailed. Young people from Bafanji and Balikumbat mingled with ease as they played, 
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socialized, gossiped and bought and sold goods without any noticeable animosity. In fact, 
as I observed and listened, I could hear some young people from both villages planning to 
meet more often and to play sports together. Additionally, I noticed that motorbike riders, 
who provide an important means of transportation, were transporting people 
indiscriminately. It appears that, for younger people at least, while they may be fully 
aware of the land dispute, they do not allow it to affect their mutual social interactions.  
Conversely, my observations clearly revealed that the older population, from 
about 40 years of age and up, did not share the same kind of social interaction. Rather 
than mingle among people of both villages, older villagers tended to only associate with 
others from their own village. This appeared to be a clear indication that the land dispute 
had etched a persistent scar on the older people of both villages. More detailed 
observations revealed that, even in small social gatherings, where the older people met to 
relax and drink their palm wine, there was no mixture. The Bafanji people stayed in their 
own areas as did the Balikumbat people. While past conflicts may not have been the most 
prominent issue on the minds of elders from both villages, nothing had been forgotten. It 
seemed that conflict over the land dispute was on their minds enough to prevent inter-
village social interaction of any kind. To further buttress this divide, it was startling to 
observe one elderly person from Balikumbat trying to initiate a conversation with another 
man from Bafanji. Even though the conversation did not develop, the attempt was 
quickly greeted with scorn as some elderly people from Balikumbat aggressively asked 
him why he felt the need to speak with that person.  
From these observational sessions, it appears conclusive that, although open 
conflict is not manifestly unfolding on the battlefield, there are still social implications to 
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the land dispute. The younger generation seems to give hope to a burning desire to put 
this conflict permanently behind them. However, the older generation of both villages 
remains adamant that their own view of the land dispute is the correct one, so much so, 
that even a simple conversation between two elders (one from each village) is 
aggressively frowned upon. In fact, similar examples of this occasional socially enforced 
non-interaction appeared to occur within a dark cloud of suspicion. It appeared that, at the 
smallest provocation along the disputed area, full-blown conflict would again erupt. 
Document Review 
This researcher carried out a review of some documents at the office of the Senior 
Divisional Officer. I was informed by the desk officer that some of the documents were 
destroyed during a war and the surviving documents were mostly of letters and petitions 
from both villages. As I reviewed these letters, I noticed that most of the information 
consisted of court summonses and formal complaints to the authorities. In one letter, the 
chief of Bafanji complained that he felt marginalized by the authorities as decisions that 
were made by the colonial authorities were not being respected by the current officials. In 
another letter, the chief of Bafanji threated to take action if the people of Balikumbat did 
not desist from farming around the disputed area. Yet in another letter, the chief of 
Bafanji exercised his authority by insisting that his village will fight to the end to defend 
their heritage and to take possession of their ancestral land. 
In these documents, very little usable data was discovered in the letters and 
petitions from the Balikumbat people. They mostly consisted of reported attacks that 
were initiated against Bafanji by the Balikumbat people.   
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The reviewed documents tended to indicate that, throughout these land conflicts, 
the Balikumbat people have maintained a superior position and, in some instances, even 
failed to adhere to the injunctions laid out by the authorities. In contrast, the Bafanji 
people have been very resilient and determined to keep fighting for this piece of land, 
which they are convinced belongs to them. 
Chapter Summary of Presentation of Findings 
This general summary of the findings is articulated with the following points in 
relation to the research objectives. 
Objective One: The pre-colonial indigenous perception of land and its importance 
Both villages were similar in their perception of land and its importance. While 
the Bafanji placed more emphasis on the traditional value of land that provides shrines 
for sacrifices, the Balikumbat were more concerned with land as a source of life 
sustenance via cultivation and shelter.  
Objective Two: The Causes, History and Reoccurrence the Land Dispute 
There are striking differences concerning remote and immediate causes and the 
historical development of the war. Nonetheless, all respondents agreed that the lack of a 
clear borderline, in conjunction with the laxity of the present Cameroonian government to 
provide one, is the predominant reason for the reoccurring border dispute. 
Objective Three: Colonial land policy and its role in the land dispute 
The respondents acknowledge the firm rule of the colonial masters in demarcating 
boundaries and maintaining peace during their era. However, respondents from both 
villages highlighted major flaws during the colonial reign that orchestrated this land 
dispute. 
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Objective Four: Role of present government in the solution of the dispute 
All respondents were dissatisfied with the lack of satisfactory government action 
towards the solution of the dispute. Only the presence of the land tenure system was 
mentioned as a positive point. 
Objective Five: Solutions to the current dispute 
Despite the small differences in the strategies for a solution to the conflict, all 
respondents stood for a peaceful solution. The vast majority of respondents placed their 
hopes on the government to construct a final borderline between the two villages. 
In Sum, this chapter presented the findings of this research and how these findings 
reflect the information gathered in the field. It gives the reader an idea of the various 
factors that influenced the conclusions that have been arrived at by the researcher. The 
next chapter focuses on a discussion of the findings and their ramification for the field of 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution. 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion of Results, Implications and Recommendations 
The boundary conflict between the two neighbouring villages of Balikumbat and 
Bafanji has had long lasting ramifications. These difficulties have adversely affected the 
socio-economic, cultural, and political lives of the people of both villages. This chapter 
focuses on the discussion of the results, implications, and recommendations that have 
emerged from this study. This discussion will include the pre-colonial indigenous 
perception of land and its importance, the causes, history, and recurrences of the land 
dispute, the colonial land policy, and its role in the land dispute, the role of government 
policy towards the solution of the dispute, and solutions to the current dispute. 
Reasonable interpretations and implications of the conflict are presented. A critical 
examination probes the efforts extended by the administrative, traditional, and religious 
bodies and non-profit organizations to resolve the conflict and reasons for its recurrence. 
These implications are examined under the socio-economic and political rubrics and 
followed by possible recommendations arising from the study.  
Discussion of Results 
This subsection will discuss the results in relation to the five objectives and 
research questions set in the study. These results include, first, the pre-colonial 
indigenous perception of land and its importance, second, the causes, history, and 
recurrence of the land dispute, third, the colonial land policy and its role in the land 
dispute, fourth, the role of the present government in the solution of the dispute, and last, 
solutions to the current dispute. 
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The Importance of Pre-Colonial Indigenous Perception of Land 
An understanding of the indigenous perception of land in Africa, but more 
specifically in the Balikumbat and Bafanji Fondoms, is imperative for a proper analysis 
and critique of the boundary land conflict between the two tribes. The results of this study 
will be discussed based on interview responses of the traditional authorities of both 
villages. A comparison of the perceptions of both villages clarifies the objectives that 
enable people to fight and die for a piece of land. 
First, the importance of land for the people of Balikumbat cannot be 
overemphasized. From interview responses of traditional authorities, land is perceived as 
a source of life and sustenance. This value is prominent because land is used for the 
cultivation of crops, settlement, and the construction of shelter. The value given to land 
explains why the people of Balikumbat cannot renounce the contested land of Njah 
around Bangang. To emphasize the importance of land, one of the traditional authorities 
explained: Land is very important for us Africans because it is from land that we can 
have food and shelter. Land could be used to tap palm wine to sustain a living. Land 
provided material to construct houses like grass…it is important for us in three practical 
ways…cultivation of crops, it is used for construction, as a means of subsistence, that is 
food, cultivation and shelter. 
This perception of land is corroborated by arguments advanced by (Sobseh, 2011) 
that explain the causes of land conflict in the North West Region. In his view, disputes 
over land are related to farming, which is the most common usage of the contested land. 
Farming is critically related to land disputes because farming and sowing claim certain 
pieces of land (2011, p. 140). With the value of using land to cultivate crops, farming 
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seasons are apparently periods of sporadic eruption of violence in the Balikumbat sub-
division. A traditional authority in Bafanji confirms this fact when she observes that land 
conflicts arise principally during the periods of cultivation in view of the planting season 
(Interview with Traditional Authority, Bafanji, Age 48, 5
th
 of November, 2015). 
According to Sobseh (2011), times of harvest may account for increased risks of 
land conflict in the Northwest Region, which underscores the value of land for the 
cultivation of crops. The socio-economic value of land is also asserted by (Mbah, 2008) 
and (Dze-Ngwa, 2014). While explaining the most prominent social and economic 
activities of land in the Northwest Region, Mbah states, “The contested piece of land 
between the Balikumbat and the Bafanji posed no problem and threats until the increase 
of the value of land and the fertile soils of the land in question” (2008, p. 188). Dze-
Ngwa celebrates the different socio-economic practices associated with the value of  land 
when he explains the dynamics of the Mbororo and Aghem people of Wum, still in the 
Northwest Region of Cameroon.  
These positions attest to the use of the human needs theory, where land is 
considered a basic need for the satisfaction of other needs. Admitting the place of land in 
the cultivation of crops, Nkwi believes that land is also used for settlement and other 
religious activities like offering sacrifices to the Ancestors (Nkwi, 2011). The religious 
value of land is also elaborated by one of the traditional rulers of Balikumbat by saying, 
Land is equally very important when it comes to traditional sacrifices like the said 
land, which is under dispute between Bali and Bafanji. It is a place where 
sacrifices are offered. Traditionally, land is used to offer sacrifices to the gods. 
There are traditional shrines and any village will always want to protect these 
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places from foreign invaders (Interview with traditional authority in Balikumbat, 
Age 50; August 4, 2015). 
The religious importance of land is not only asserted by the people of Balikumbat. 
The traditional authorities of Bafanji also testify to this value in the following words, 
Land is used for several reasons like cultivation, building, shelter, burial, and 
offering of sacrifices. You can even see the half houses, which we constructed 
and they have destroyed. The present land Njah, which is under dispute, is a place 
where we offer sacrifices and there are a lot of our people that have been buried 
there. We cannot just allow it to go. There is a place of worship that all five 
villages go and do their sacrifices. How can the Bali claim that all land should be 
abandoned and given to them? Land is used for several reasons like cultivation, 
building, shelter, burial, and offering of sacrifices. The land under dispute is 
where some five villages go to offer sacrifices. The most important value of land 
that is leading to conflict is the traditional use of land for sacrifices and settlement 
issues (Interview with traditional authority in Balikumbat, Age 52, 26 /July 2015). 
According to this traditional authority of Bafanji, the religious significance of 
land is very strong. The strength of this value testifies why the people of Bafanji cannot 
give up the fight. In spite of the casualties incurred by these people, they feel that their 
lives are inseparable from this piece of land. It is the burial grounds of their ancestors. It 
will also serve as their own resting place.  
 It is interesting to note that five villages congregate in this area for religious 
practices. To this effect, it is impossible for the people of Bafanji to let this land go 
because it carries the lives of five different groups of people. To portray the difficulty of 
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this Balikumbat and Bafanji land conflict because of the religious significance of that 
piece of land, it is important for us to refer to what Mbah observes about the religious 
concepts of landownership in the Northwest Region.  
Religious concepts of land ownership used in formulating a traditional concept of 
boundary between communities have also resulted in ethno-tribal conflict over 
land in the region. Land in traditional Bamenda societies, as in most African 
societies, was littered with shrines and other sacred places where gods and 
ancestors are worshipped. Graves, wells, waterfalls, forests, hills, and monuments 
could not be separated from a group. Land was a spiritual resting place of 
traditional gods for peace to reign, by communities who shared the frontier. 
Traditional African societies referred to land, as the earth was sacred because it 
had a spiritual value and was home to ancestors. These religious concepts of land 
ownership have introduced conflicts between groups for the purpose of recovering 
land that is believed to have ancestral graves, monuments, and places of sacrifice 
and worship. This is an issue of life or death to some groups in the region who 
blame bad happenings to curses from ancestors who feel abandoned or neglected 
(2008, p. 72). 
The religious perception of land and its value render the conflict persistent and 
recurrent. This is because the party that has any religious affiliation to land, like the case 
of the Bafanji people in this case study, can never give up. For them, this land is their 
blood and it is a matter of do or die. They are ready to die for the land in which their 
ancestors have been buried.  
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 Apart from the religious significance of land, some traditional authorities believe 
that land is a source of pride to the possessor. The possessor of land sees it as wealth 
because it has a potential monetary value.  
Land used to be a source of pride to the person who possesses land. Land is the 
pride of those who possess much of it. Land was like money. You could sell to 
those who do not have to make money. Some families are rich and others are 
poor. When you do not have land, you are like a beggar. A man without land is 
like a stranger in his own hometown (Interview with traditional authorities, Ages, 
48, 52, in Balikumbat, August 3, 2015). 
The different values of land are highlighted in the above citation. These include 
the fact that land is a source of pride and identity. It is a reflection of a person’s wealth. 
The monetary value of land makes reminiscence of the modern aberration of land 
ownership.  
Initially, in the customary land tenure, land ownership was by inheritance. The 
modern land tenure gives latitude to buy and sell land. This latitude explains part of the 
problem associated with land conflict in the North West Region. Fon Solomon Anye 
Angwafor III frowns on the new land tenure system, which permits the buying and 
selling of land. He argues that elites buy vast tracts of land to the detriment of poor 
villagers thus creating scarcity (BOTFON Human Rights Watch, 2007, p. 36). This 
explanation gives insight into the value of land and the reasons for which persons have to 
fight and die for land in the same country. The introduction of the new land tenure is a 
source of the problem. It must be remembered that the new land tenure comes with the 
administration left by the colonial masters. This refers to the fact that the land tenure is 
172 
 
 
colonial and post-colonial, and has colonial roots. In this case, negligence of the 
traditional ownership by inheritance and belonging to a particular community is one of 
the major causes of land conflict in the North West Region. It is precisely the case of 
Balikumbat-Bafanji. 
Beside the valuable perception of land, traditional authorities also presented land 
as a sacred possession that carries retribution. Following their argument, unethical 
possession of land can result in death and illnesses. 
If you take land that does not belong to you, it could be punishable by death in 
accordance with the customs of the people. Yes. If you take land that does not 
belong to you, it could be punishable by death or illness. The gods of the land can 
strike you with some strange disease or even death. Yes. If you take land that does 
not belong to you, it could be punishable by death or illness (Interview with 
traditional authorities from Balikumbat, 48, 52, August 3, 2015). 
Highlighting the above citation, the traditional approach to conflict resolution is 
prominent. Priests can only offer sacrifices in the land where they are sure it is the resting 
place of their ancestors. The problem of land grabbing can be resolved from this 
perspective. With the African belief in retribution, honesty, rather than deception, could 
be attained in the course of resorting to African modes of peace building and conflict 
resolution to the Balikumbat and Bafanji boundary dispute. 
Comparing results from the findings of Balikumbat and Bafanji, there were 
multiple and striking similarities on the how each village perceives land and its 
importance. Themes like source of life sustenance, traditional sacrifices, pride, monetary 
value, land acquisition, landlessness, and retribution were highlighted as important codes 
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on the indigenous perception of land. What is peculiar to the people of Bafanji is their 
emphasis on the use of land for burial. However, the conception of land as the land of 
their ancestors indirectly refers to the use of land for burial. Nonetheless, the striking 
disparity in emphasis must be noted. While the Balikumbat were more concerned with 
the use of land for sustenance (cultivation and shelter), the Bafanji were more concerned 
with the use of land for traditional sacrifices and a burial ground. This disparity definitely 
accounts for why each village would like to cling to the disputed land that is a source of 
the border dispute between these two neighbouring villages. 
Causes, History and Recurrence of the Land Dispute 
The causes of the land dispute carry a certain historicity that warrants examination 
of the internal/external and immediate/distant causes. The results appear following 
explanations provided by traditional authorities, religious authorities and experienced 
participants of both villages. Prominent among the causes of the conflict, is murder, 
which is considered the immediate cause of the boundary land violence that erupted in 
1995. Sources from Balikumbat maintain that the murder of one of their indigenes 
provoked the war.  
Around June 1995, in the afternoon. One Bafanji rice farmer man had a friend in 
Bali. He carried this man from Bali to go look at his farm. On coming back, he 
was killed in cool blood. He was killed in Bafanji. This was the immediate cause 
of the land dispute over the Njah area. The Bali had had a market in that place for 
a long time, but during a certain war at the 1960s under the leadership of S.T 
Muna, West Cameroon administration, the Bali people were driven away and part 
of the land was given to Bafanji, with new borders. The immediate cause of the 
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war was the killing of Bali man by the Bafanjians in cool blood. In 1995, a Bali 
Kumbat man was killed by the Bafanji in their area, so we had no other option 
than to go to war to defend ourselves. The war was bloody on both sides 
(Interview with traditional Authority, Age 52, Balikumbat August 3, 2015). 
In the view of this traditional authority, the immediate cause of this war was the 
killing of one of the inhabitants of Balikumbat. This view about the cause of the war in 
1995 contradicts that of other sources. According to the traditional authorities of Bafanji, 
the removal of pillars from the boundary line by the people of Balikumbat is the primary 
cause of the war. 
In 1939, the border was drawn by the British colonial master, but around 1992, 
the Bali people came and removed the pillars. That is how this whole conflict 
started. The remote cause of the conflict was the removal of pillars by the Bali 
people. The government intervened and asked each village to contribute 
400,000Frs CFA each for the replacement of pillars. The Bali people did not give 
so the Bafanji people gave all the 800,000 Frs CFA. That was in 1992. Around 
1992, the Bali people came and removed the pillars put by the British in 1939. 
That is how this whole conflict started (Interview with the Traditional Authorities, 
Bafanji Ages, 46, 48, August 6, 2015). 
According to Bafanji traditional authorities, the cause of war was the removal of 
the pillars planted by the British colonial masters. From this contradictory stance, the 
removal of the pillars could have caused resentment in the people of Bafanji. While the 
killing of the indigene from Balikumbat served as the immediate cause of the war, it may 
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have been predicated by the resentment the people of Bafanji had against the people of 
Balikumbat. 
Another cause of war, as explained by the sources from Balikumbat, was the 
destruction of the market of the people of Balikumbat in the contested land at Njah. 
Around 1978/79, Bali had a market at this area. The army came, scattered people, 
and burnt the whole market. The Fon was carried to prison. This was the remote 
cause of the war. I will like to state that around in 1979, the Bali had a market in 
the said disputed area, but we were brutally removed from this market by the 
Gendarmes who were in support of the Bafanji. Our buildings were destroyed and 
we were stopped form farming in the area. Around 1978/79, the gendarmes and 
the Bafanji drove us away from the market and my store was destroyed. Three of 
us built houses in that area. Our houses and the market were brutally burnt. I am 
an eyewitness because I was actively involved in the fighting but later I escaped 
for my dear life (Interview with businessman from Balikumbat, 62 years, August 
8, 2015). 
The cause identified here refers to the casualties incurred by the people of 
Balikumbat during the conflict. The frequency of the conflict and casualties entail the 
persistence of war. While the people of Balikumbat trace the root causes of the conflict in 
the malicious activities of the people of Bafanji, those of Bafanji trace the causes in the 
malicious activities of the people of Balikumbat. There are accusations and counter 
accusations. 
 According to the findings, it can be deduced that murder, displacement, non-
respect of government injunction, poor boundary pillars, and poor government policy 
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were amongst the major reasons that accounted for the causes, history, and recurrence of 
the border disputes. The removal, inconsistency, and non-respect of the borderline 
formed a major source of conflict according to the Balikumbat respondents. For the 
people of Bafanji, borderline problems, poor government policy, threats, casualties, 
provocation, exercise of power, constant attacks, planting season, and primary settlers 
were identified as reasons for the causes, history, and recurrence of the dispute. 
Nevertheless, the poor borderline demarcation, poor government policy, and casualties 
were top on the list according to the respondents. 
Comparing responses of persons from the two areas, the borderline and poor 
government policies were identified by both villages as the major sources of conflict. 
Nevertheless, while the Balikumbat considered the murder as the immediate cause of the 
war, the Bafanji laid claim to the removal of the boundary pillars by the Balikumbat. It 
can be equally noted that the Bafanji were very sensitive to the amount of casualties 
suffered, unlike the Balikumbat. Both villages claimed constant attacks from the 
neighbouring village and each village equally claimed to have been the first to settle in 
the land, although this was not the primary cause of conflict. The issue of government 
injunction was problematic to the Balikumbat while the Bafanji did not see this as major 
problem. Other issues like provocation, threats on government officials, and exercise of 
power by the Bali Fon were peculiar to the Bafanji responses. Government injunction, 
displacement, disunity, and murder were key issues raised only by the Balikumbat. 
Conclusively, both villages agreed to the fact these conflicts often arise during the 
farming season. 
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With some of the discrepancies of the causes of the conflict, government officials 
believe that conflicting documentation is a very sensitive cause and recurrence of this 
particular conflict. 
They trace the history of their various villages to colonial times. They both have 
different colonial maps. The remote cause is the fact there is no clear boundary 
between these two villages. There are a series of maps. Colonial maps and post-
colonial maps. The problem now is which one is the correct map. Each village has 
its own map that it believes is the correct map (Interview with D.O Balikumbat 
Sub-Division Mayor of Balikumbat Municipal Council, Ages 51, 48 respectively 
August 6, 2015 and September 5, 2015). 
Aside from the identification of population explosion, poor interpretation of the 
land tenure system, and the absence of a clear borderline as causes of the conflict, this 
government official was very precise in locating the place of deception. He reiterates that, 
The traditional authorities have misled the civil authorities. They are members of 
the land commission and when they give wrong information, there is bound  to be 
conflict. They are the only people who know the history of the land and  when 
their information is wrong, we are bound to have wrong decisions. Moreover, 
casualties incurred due to poor government policy in demarcating villages. This is 
considered a prominent cause of the conflict. Administrative units are clearly 
calved out but within the sub division, we have a headache that these boundaries 
are not clearly defined. I have maps as the one you can see, but these are just 
imaginary. The government have not come up with clear maps should the 
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boundaries amongst the villages within a unit. It keeps on coming because there is 
no clear-cut boundary between the two villages. 
In addition, impartiality, transportation, and government injunction constitute 
major concerns in relation to the conflict. It should be noted that issues like borderlines 
and poor government policy were of top priority to the government officials. 
Comparatively, these two issues equally dominated the minds of the traditional, religious 
authorities and experienced participants. Nonetheless, the government officials raised 
other issues like population growth, land tenure system, deception, and conflict between 
civil and traditional authorities that were not mentioned by the other respondents. 
The Role of Colonial Land Policy in the Land Dispute 
The colonial land policy has had a serious impact on land disputes in Africa. The 
case of Balikumbat and Bafanji people is no different. The results of this study are 
discussed based on the interview responses of the traditional authorities and experienced 
participants of both villages. Information was drawn from the responses of each village 
after which a comparison of the findings of both villages was made to illuminate the 
major differences and similarities. 
The first major problem was the demarcation of the border with the use of pillars, 
which are mutable. The demarcation of boundaries according to African customs and 
tradition is manifested by the use of natural or geographical features like mountains, 
rivers, trees, and streams. These features are used because it is often difficult for persons 
to tamper with them over a short period without being caught. However, with the advent 
of the colonial masters, pillars were used. In the case of Balikumbat-Bafanji boundary 
land dispute, the use of these pillars is a weakness since they are easily uprooted. This has 
179 
 
 
occurred several times to obstruct the process of peace. In the words one traditional 
authority: 
During the colonial period, there was no geographical feature for borders. What 
were built were the pillars. I know that most boundaries are often demarcated by a 
geographical feature. I do not understand why in our own case only movable 
pillars were used. This has caused many problems. Some of these pillars have 
been removed and put in water. We can still see them there because they are too 
heavy to be removed (Interview with traditional authority, Balikumbat Age 54, 4
th
 
August 2015). 
In the opinion of this respondent, the planting of pillars to solve the problem has 
created more problems since these pillars are easily manipulated. In this case, alternative 
ways of handling the matter without depending on the demarcation with pillars are 
required. This problem is aggravated by the fact that two colonial administrations planted 
pillars in different positions.  
We have the Germans and British colonial masters who brought out the boundary. 
In their reign, we have no problems but after them, there is a problem, maybe 
because there are two colonial maps and the government is unable to decide 
which one is correct. The only thing I can say here is that there were two colonial 
masters (Germany and Britain). Unfortunately, we equally have two colonial 
maps of the area. Each map leads to the favour and disfavor of one village. 
However, we cannot deny the fact that they created two colonial maps, which 
today poses a serious conflict between two villages (Interview with Government 
Officials, Mayor, and D’O in Balikumbat, August 7, 2015). 
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The problem created by the conflicting colonial maps is corroborated by (Sobseh, 
2011) when he argues that one of the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Northwest 
Region is the indiscriminate balkanization of territory irrespective of the people’s 
customs and traditions. To buttress this argument, the D’O observed that, 
We are a victim of so many foreign conflicting powers. First, the Germans poorly 
handed things to the British who in turn poorly handed over to West Cameroon. 
Now the present La Republique is behaving as if they are another colonial master 
to us. The colonial masters have part of the blame (Interview with D’O in 
Balikumbat August 7, 2015). 
The findings from Balikumbat testify that firm colonial administration 
demarcated the two villages and maintained peace and order until their departure. 
Nevertheless, a number of significant limitations were highlighted in relation to the 
colonial period. These included the fact that pillars, rather than geographical features, 
were used as borderlines. The responses highlighted the mutability of these pillars. The 
presence of two inconsistent colonial administrations and multiple conflicting colonial 
maps were equally highlighted (Mbah, 2008). Furthermore, the fact that colonial masters 
did not respect the indigenous beliefs and customs of the people and the issue of poor 
administrative handover constituted some of the problems that marred the role of the 
colonial regimes in handling land issues. 
An interesting revelation is offered by one of the traditional authorities of Bafanji 
that has not yet been officially documented. It holds that,  
Before the putting of the boundary, the Bali were not even there. Our boundary 
was with Bamukumbit. The Bali only came in and started to cause problems. At 
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the time of the colonial rule, there were no Bali people in this area. They only 
came in during the post-colonial period. I think if we follow strictly the history of 
this area, then our borderline is even with the Bamukumbit people and not even 
with the Balikumbat. We first arrived here before the Bali and by history we are 
not even supposed to have a border dispute with them (Interview with traditional 
authority, 48years, Bafanji, August 6, 2015). 
This contention clearly contradicts the scenario where colonial masters planted 
pillars to demarcate the boundaries between Balikumbat and Bafanji. If the people of 
Balikumbat were not present during the colonial period, it will be absurd for the colonial 
masters to plant pillars to define the boundary between Bafanji and Balikumbat. If the 
people of Balikumbat were present during the colonial period, then the colonial masters 
needed to define the boundary. Since the colonial masters did define the boundary, the 
people of Balikumbat must have been present during the colonial period. This modus 
tollens argument nullifies the reliability of the information above without necessarily 
passing judgment. 
In another development, the colonial masters are said to be to blame for 
neglecting indigenous customs and traditions in the establishment of boundaries among 
villages. 
What I wish to state here is that these colonial masters did not take into 
consideration the indigenous beliefs and customs, else they would not have set 
boundaries on sensitive areas like the Njah where close to five villages use as land 
for traditional sacrifices. It is true they may have made mistakes in demarcating 
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villages and even separating families that were supposed to be united (Interview 
with traditional authority, 48years, Bafanji, August 9, 2015). 
However, in spite of the fact that the colonial masters created some of these 
problems, they were able to handle some of the conflicts that arose during their reign and 
to settle them amicably. 
I will like to state here that having two colonial masters created many difficulties, 
which were left unresolved. They were able to calm down land disputes at their 
time but as soon as they left these problems started to resurface. The problem of 
land is not only limited to Bali and Bafanji. In Bui division, we have similar 
problems (Interview with traditional authority, 48 years, Bafanji, August 9, 2015). 
According to this response, it was only with the departure of the colonial masters 
that these land conflicts started resurfacing. In fact, the problem between Balikumbat and 
Bafanji only comes up in 1969, during the post-colonial era. Though part of the problem 
can be traced to colonial times, it is seemingly acceptable that they were able to manage 
the crisis. In all probability, they set standards that were convenient for the colonial 
administration rather than the post-colonial administration. 
Summarily, the findings of Bafanji made a serious claim that the Bafanji tribe did 
not even have a colonial boundary with the Balikumbat village. Instead, they share a 
boundary with the Bamukubit people. These responses attest to the fact that the people 
were content with the firm colonial administration, which demarcated the borders 
between the two villages and maintained peace and order until their departure. 
Nevertheless, a number of significant limitations were highlighted in relation to the 
colonial period. These included the presence of two inconsistent colonial administrations 
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and multiple conflicting colonial maps. Furthermore, the fact that the colonial masters did 
not respect the indigenous beliefs and customs of the people and the issue of poor 
administrative handover constituted some of the negative issues of the colonial regimes in 
handling land issues. 
Comparing the Balikumbat and Bafanji responses to the colonial role on land 
dispute, a number of differences and emphases appeared. With different grounding scores 
and emphasis, the two village responses were almost similar in their evaluation of the 
colonial land policy. They both appreciated the firm colonial rule that had kept them from 
any disputes within the colonial era. Nevertheless, they frown on the inconsistencies in 
colonial administrations, multiple colonial maps, non-respect of indigenous values, and 
poor administrative handover (Mbah, 2008). However, there were contrasting views. 
While the Balikumbat highlighted the neglect of the use of geographical pillars, this issue 
was completely absent in the minds of the Bafanji. Instead, the Bafanji were firm in 
claiming that they did not even share any colonial boundary with the Balikumbat. 
Considering the position of the Government Officials on this matter, I must say that they 
were keen in bringing out the limitations of the colonial rule. The identified multiple 
colonial maps, the neglect of indigenous values, the mutability of pillars, and the neglect 
of geographical features in demarcating boundaries.  
There are so many maps. In fact, it is a whole litany of problems. You can have 
time to exploit the documents yourself, but the documents are confidential. You 
cannot take them out of this office. There have been two colonial masters with 
different colonial maps. Each village clings to the map that is in their favour. My 
blame goes more to the government for failing to respect the colonial boundary 
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and bringing a solution to this conflict. Nevertheless, the colonial masters are to 
blame for arbitral division of families. The colonial masters should have used 
geographical features to demarcate the boundary as was done in other places 
(Interview with D’O in Balikumbat August 7, 2015). 
In spite of the limitation to the colonial rule in relation to the Balikumbat-Bafanji 
land dispute, some government officials think that a weak political will towards this 
matter shares the blame (Mbah, 2008). It is the place of the incumbent government to 
undertake a study and determine the right boundary between the two villages. One 
wonders why so much time has taken to resolve this particular conflict by stating clear-
cut definition of boundaries. 
Government Solution to the Dispute 
From the responses given as possible government solutions to the problem, some 
major themes were prominent. These include the indecisiveness of government in 
decision-making, failure to rain sanctions on defaulters, laxity in timely intervention, and 
the misconception of an injunction as a permanent solution to the boundary problem. The 
results are discussed based on the interview responses of the traditional authorities and 
experienced participants of both villages. At the end, findings of both villages will be 
compared to determine the close parallels and sharp distinctions.                                                                    
According to the speakers from Balikumbat, the present government portrays a 
weak political will as far as this boundary conflict is concerned: 
The present government is not doing well because they cannot take a decision, as 
to whether they want to maintain the boundary of the colonial masters or to define 
a new one. It is the ministry of territorial administration to define the border and 
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everybody will have to respect. They can even divide us at the middle since 
everyone is claiming ownership. The present government is not doing well; there 
is no clear-cut boundary. No decision has been taken, despite the fact that we 
have written so many letters calling on the government to solve this problem. I do 
not understand how the government cannot demarcate a simple boundary for 
more than 30 years now. The present land policy is not definite. There is need for 
justice. The government has not done well. They have failed to produce a 
borderline. The present Bafanji GBHS is in our soil. Our farms have been taken 
by the Bafanji people. The present government is hesitant to define the boundaries 
since 1979. Thus, the problem has not been solved. This makes people suffer. 
Some families used to rely on that land. This government is well noted for her 
laxity in handling this matter. I do not understand why they cannot put a simple 
boundary between two villages (Interview with traditional authorities, Age 52, 
Balikumbat August 10, 2015).  
Following this response from Balikumbat, the incumbent government has failed 
to solve the problem. Dissatisfaction in the process of handling the matter is evident. The 
people think that the delay has been too much. John Fru Ndi, a strong opposition leader in 
the country from the Northwest Region, thinks that the conflicts persist because of the 
hesitation of the incumbent government to make a firm decision (Sobseh, 2011). At the 
same time, they give the impression that any government decision on the matter will be 
respected. This is very misleading because the previous decisions made were disrespected 
with the uprooting of the pillars. What is the guarantee that the present decision made by 
the government will be respected? 
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 The reason for the disrespect of government decisions lie in the fact that there is 
no enforcement of law. The rule of law seems to discriminate as far as this conflict is 
concerned. There are individuals and groups of persons who trespass the law and go 
unpunished. 
 There is an injunction on the land, but the Bafanji people work there without any 
punishment. But when we go there, they say we have brought war. The government has 
put an injunction on the land yet it allows the Bafanji to continue to use the land” 
(Interview with traditional Authorities in Balikumbat August 3, 2015). The people of 
Balikumbat simply express their frustration in the face of the problem. From what they 
say, they feel deprived of their land because of ineffective government action. In this 
case, there is a likelihood of a sporadic eruption of conflict in an attempt to retrieve the 
land. “The injunction move should just be a temporary thing and not permanent. I have 
been deprived of my farming land for long and this is causing poverty in my family. This 
government is thrash” (Interview with traditional Authorities in Bafanji August 6, 2015). 
The attitude held by the present government on this land issue is not 
commendable. The responses given by the people of Balikumbat are indicative of the 
indecisiveness of the government in their decision-making, failure to rain sanctions on 
defaulters, laxity in timely intervention, and misconception of an injunction as a 
permanent solution to the boundary problem. In addition, the speakers from Bafanji show 
great contempt towards the negligence of the government about the matter in question. 
These participants feel cheated because the contested land is the only farmland they have 
to sustain their livelihood. The prolonged government injunction, without concrete 
action, is thought of as nonsensical. A logical extension of this sentiment may explain 
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why these participants clandestinely cultivate the land to the disdain and discontent of the 
people of Balikumbat. In the view of these participants,  
The government has taken no action. We have written letters upon letters to no 
avail. We live in fear. Hoes and crops are stolen and the Bali quarter head claim 
that he is not responsible for this theft. There has been no concrete action, despite 
the constant requests and pleas. This has made the Bafanji to live in constant fear 
because the Bali come with bags of stones and seize hoes from the Bafanji 
women when they are working. We farm at times and they come and harvest. 
Cameroon government is not taken quick action to solve this problem and I am 
terribly disappointed in them. This government is nonsense. We are suffering and 
dying and all they can do is give an injunction on the land. Where do they want us 
to cultivate? How do they expect us to live? If I do not go to farm, my family will 
die of starvation. The government should show us another place to farm and live. 
Our population is fast growing (Interview with traditional Authorities in Bafanji, 
Age 48 and 46 August 7, 2015). 
The Bafanji responses frowned at government’s attempt to solve the problem. The 
government’s lack of a concrete decision, inability to sanction defaulters, laxity in timely 
intervention, and the fact that an injunction is not a solution to land disputes intensely 
emerged from the disappointed participants of this study.  
 Comparing the Balikumbat and Bafanji responses on the role of the present 
government on the dispute, it is conclusive that both parties unanimously condemn the 
government’s position. Areas of concern include poor decision-making, their inability to 
sanction culprits, and laxity. The government injunction was not considered as a solution 
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by both villages. Nevertheless, the emphases were slightly different. While the 
Balikumbat were mild in their condemnations (like government indecisiveness), the 
Bafanji were very emphatic (complete lack of decision). In addition, while the 
Balikumbat considered the government injunction as a temporary, but not permanent 
solution, the Bafanji simply saw it as the government’s nonchalant attitude to the conflict.   
 Frequent changes in government personnel and overall administration are 
believed to be a legitimate reason for the lack of a solution to the problem, thereby 
prolonging the conflict between the two villages.  
The problem is even aggravated by poor administrative policies whereby 
Divisional Officers take delight in one way or the other for some private reasons, 
in counteracting decisions that were already taken by their predecessors. Hence, 
they are bound to multiple government decisions on the same piece of land 
(Interview with D’O in Balikumbat August 7, 2015). 
One of the principal reasons for persistent conflict is poor administration. This 
comes because of the changes that are made in the government. It is rather unfortunate 
that there are as many decisions on the same piece of land as there are divisional officers 
changing position in this sub-division. This explanation about why the administration has 
not made a definitive resolution to this conflict is faulty. Perhaps some administrators 
change their decisions because of pressure they receive from the elites who perpetuate 
this land conflicts. As alleged by one of the traditional authorities in Bafanji, some 
officials are bought over to falsify decisions on the matter (Interview with traditional 
Authorities in Bafanji, 6
th
 August 2014). Another problem lies in government bottlenecks 
and a lack of communication in the administrative hierarchy. “Government decision is 
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very slow. I am just a small DO sitting here and I can only tell you what is happening 
around me. I do not know what is happening at the level of SDO, Governor and minister. 
If government decisions are followed with action, then this problem can be solved” 
(Interviews with D’O, Balikumbat Subdivision, February 5, 2015). 
The DO reiterates the complaint expressed by the conflicting villages about the 
nonchalant attitude of the incumbent government administration in handling the conflict. 
He asserts that,  
The government equally has been very slow and laxed in the solution of the 
problem. I am deeply unsatisfied. The two communities have written letters to the 
government pleading for a border demarcation but nothing has been done. Of 
recent in 2011, the Lord Mayor led a powerful delegation to the Ministry of 
Territorial administration to plead on border demarcation. Promises were made 
but none has been fulfilled. There are always conflicts but how timely they are 
managed is the problem. During the last conflict, it even took close to three days 
before the forces of law and order could arrive at the scene, when there were 
already many casualties. The government has been so slow in decision taking. If 
they are incompetent, then they should resign their duties. Why should this matter 
continue since 1979? The government has been a failure in this respect. 
Furthermore, there is even a conflict between the government and the traditional 
authorities on who actually is the real custodian of land (Interviews with D’O, 
Balikumbat Subdivision January 5,  2016). 
With the exception of a well-defined land tenure system, the local government 
officials of the subdivision and municipality were dissatisfied with government action 
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towards a solution of the land dispute. This same dissatisfaction was expressed by the 
responses from the participants consulted in Balikumbat and Bafanji villages. Therefore, 
there is a unanimous observation about government’s inability to resolve the problem.  
Solutions to the Current Dispute 
The results on the solution to the current dispute are discussed based on the 
interview responses of the traditional and religious authorities, and experienced 
participants of both villages. The solutions proposed are presented side by side before 
final comparison of the opinions of the two villages.  
The people of Balikumbat think that the use of dialogue is imperative. In their 
collective view, “The two Fons and their traditional councils should meet and discuss”, 
“There should be dialogue between the two villages”, “The Governor should invite all 
stake holders for a talk,” and “The DO and SDO should call the two Fons and talk to 
them.” Whether this option exists at the level of traditional authorities or government 
officials and traditional rulers, dialogue is seen as a better process towards the resolution 
of this conflict. This aspect comes up very convincingly with the approach used by the 
Justice and Peace Commission of the Roman Catholic Church. According to this 
commission, it is important to bring the conflicting parties to a forum to vent their 
grievances and feelings without necessarily blaming any of the parties.  
Another solution to the problem may be the establishment of a clear definition of 
a boundary line that is presently absent. Whether or not a clear definition of the boundary 
will bring a lasting solution to this conflict is unknown. 
The ministry of territorial administration should draw up the border. Government 
should make a simple decision, and replant the pillars at the borders and call on 
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all to obey. If they do this, then we shall obey even if it is to our disadvantage. 
The government should bring a final boundary in this area. The Fons should 
sensitize the people on the discussions and the decisions taken so that no one 
should disrespect them. We should stop provocation of neighbours at the borders. 
Everything should pass through the land commission. People should stop 
provoking each other at the border (Interview with traditional Authorities in 
Balikumbat August 3, 2015). 
The respondents in this proposal think that the definition of the borderline should 
be accompanied by input from the people it most concerns. This input must be the 
responsibility of the Fons. While the people are encouraged to contribute their opinions 
about the decisions, the Fons should insist that their people desist from provoking other 
parties at the borderline. These needless provocations are one of the causes of this 
persistent conflict since they encourage belligerent tendencies. These hostile actions 
manifest themselves in attacks on indigenes on their farms and in their houses. 
Besides, preaching messages of peace should be encouraged through the church 
and other social activities. One of the religious authorities gave the example where he 
used the church as a means of preaching peace to women of the belligerent tribes. 
The priests spoke with the women of Bafanji and Bali and preached unity for the 
two villages to meet for church activities. The priests all the way have preached 
peace. I had the opportunity to go to Bafanji and preach myself. At first, I was not 
received well, but when I explained that I came under the parish, the people were 
willing to listen to me. The church has been preaching for peace but it does not 
have the right to make a decision. The church can only convince the people and 
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tell them the bad side of war. The church has done her best to help bring peace 
(Interview with religious authorities, ages 40 and 56 Balikumbat Parish, August 4, 
2015). 
Apart from preaching the message of peace, which is a conduit toward 
sensitization, research activities should be encouraged. Through research, it is possible to 
diagnose the root causes of the matter. Knowledge of the cause is already part of the 
solution. One of the limitations of administrative means of solving problems is the 
inability to diagnose the real causes. The government continues giving injunctions to both 
parties without determining if the injunctions are leading to lasting peace. In the 
supportive words of one participant, “Researchers like you can form a big solution to the 
problem, since nobody had come to ask us anything. Now that you people have come, we 
believe that the truth shall resurface” (Interview with traditional Authorities in 
Balikumbat August 4, 2015). 
 For the people of Bafanji, simple research does not produce a solution to the 
problem. When these people demand dissemination of the results of the research, its sole 
purpose is to provoke government action towards solving this problem. In the collective 
view of the Bafanji, “As researchers, you people should go to the CRTV and talk. The 
government is too laxed and people are dying. If you people talk at the CRTV, the 
government will listen to our cry” (Interview with traditional Authorities in Bafanji 6 
August 2015). The people of Bafanji believe that publicity of this problem is necessary to 
provoke government action. 
In addition to publicity, the people of Bafanji demand that legal action should be 
taken against culprits who bypass government action. One of the problems contributing 
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to the severity of this conflict has been the aspect of complacency. There are some 
unscrupulous individuals, like the former Fon of Balikumbat and some elites, who used 
to perpetuate this conflict for their own private interests. No concrete legal actions were 
taken against these persons because of their political affiliations (Sobseh, 2011). At that 
time, the people of Bafanji argued that directly punishing individuals who provoked 
conflict would probably help the situation: 
The government claim that only individual culprits should be punished cannot 
work. I think that when the quarter head is captured and tortured, he will reveal 
the people behind the constant attacks. The government should be able to punish 
all those who keep on removing pillars. The government should not just be quiet. 
Individuals should be identified and punished. These should be produced by the 
quarter head (Interview with traditional Authorities in Bafanji August 6, 2015). 
While it is important to punish those who bypass government laws, the people of 
Bafanji think that those of Balikumbat should acknowledge all the property destroyed. In 
addition, a quick government action is necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace. 
The type of quick action most needed is the replanting of the pillars. 
I think there is no other solution to this matter than that government should 
replant the pillars to define the boundary. I do not understand what is so difficult 
in doing this. The government should replant the pillars to show the boundary. 
The quarter heads of Bali should claim responsibility of the destruction and 
constant farm raids from its people. They should be able to identify these people 
and bring them up for punishment. There should be collaboration amongst the 
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government officials to reach a solution. Government action should be quick and 
fast” (Interview with traditional Authorities in Bafanji, August 6, 2015). 
However, the recommendation for the replanting of pillars remains problematic. 
The people of Bafanji think that planting the pillars for the third time will solve the 
problem. The question of where the pillars should be planted has not changed since each 
village claims the boundary line according to the historicity that works in its favour. The 
boundary standard of the German administration is accepted by Balikumbat while that of 
the British administration is accepted by Bafanji. These discrepancies must be resolved 
before the pillars are planted. What is also interesting in this opinion is the need for 
collaboration amongst government officials. From the people working in the sub-
divisional office to the Ministry of territorial administration, a follow-up should be 
undertaken to determine that a lasting solution was established. 
While hoping for a possible solution, the Balikumbat responses were highlighted 
by dialogue about the construction of a borderline, sensitization, tolerance, decision 
making, the Church, unity, respect, and research findings as major ways by which a 
solution could be established between the two villages. The Bafanji believed and hoped 
for a possible solution by highlighting strategies such as sanctions, research, construction 
of a borderline, collaboration, responsibility, and the Church as major ways by which a 
solution could be realized. 
Comparing the Balikumbat-Bafanji responses on the solutions to the current 
dispute, the first striking similarity is that both villages wanted a peaceful resolution. The 
construction of a borderline, collaboration, dialogue, and the findings of research were 
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highlighted as possible tools to peace. Nevertheless, while the Balikumbat called for 
immediate unity, the Bafanji were more insistent on the aspect of sanctions and justice. 
 On this particular question, government officials observed that: 
The national commission should act fast on their assignment. There is already a 
national commission working on the issue. A small DO like me cannot go and 
undercut this commission. We can only wait for that commission to complete the 
job it started. The major suggestion is that the government should take it as a 
matter of emergency and plant the pillars even if it means one village giving up 
the whole of that area. The land belongs to the state and so the state should act 
promptly (Interview with D’O of Balikumbat Sub-division, Age 50, January 5, 
2016). 
According to a DO of the Balikumbat Sub-division,  
The Fons of the tribes should be friendlier and even have coordination meetings 
to discuss ways to evade conflict. Rather than focusing on causes, seeking 
solutions should  be the aim. We want a situation where there is free 
movement within the municipality. Sensitization in meetings and villages by the 
Mayor and D.O is important. There is a need for meetings with traditional 
councils. There is so much work to be done as far as sensitization on the ills of 
war in the division is concerned. Dispute on land should be handled at family 
level and not at the level of the village (Interview with D’O of Balikumbat Sub-
division, Age 50, January 5, 2016). 
The government officials believed that the national commission, construction of 
borderline, friendliness, forgiveness, sensitization, and individual responsibility as 
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possible solutions to the dispute. Apart from those solutions mentioned in the national 
commission, most of the other strategies mentioned by the government officials were 
equally highlighted by the village respondents. 
To sum up, in the first point, the pre-colonial indigenous perception of land and 
its importance, both villages were similar in their perception of land and its importance. 
While the Bafanji laid more emphasis on the traditional value of land as providing shrines 
for sacrifices, the Balikumbat were more concerned with land as a source of life 
sustenance in relation to cultivation and shelter. For the causes, history and recurrence of 
the land dispute, there are striking differences in relation to remote causes, immediate 
causes, and the historical development of the war. Nonetheless, all respondents agreed on 
the fact that the lack of a clear borderline and the laxity of the present Cameroonian 
government to provide one is the reason why this border dispute keeps recurring. The 
colonial land policy and its role in the land dispute describe how there was a firm rule of 
the colonial masters in demarcating boundaries and maintaining peace during their era. 
However, they highlighted major flaws during the colonial reign that orchestrated this 
land dispute. Following the role of present government in the solution of the dispute, all 
respondents were dissatisfied with government action towards the solution of the dispute. 
Only the presence of the land tenures system was indicated as a positive point. 
Considering solutions to the current dispute, despite the little difference in the strategies 
for a solution to the conflict, all respondents stood for a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
All placed their hopes on the government to construct a final borderline between the two 
villages. 
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The Implications of Balikumbat-Bafanji Boundary Land Conflict 
The interpretation of the consequences and the revelations that accompany the 
conflict provide some insights in the understanding of the problem at stake. In this case, 
these implications are presented after following the socio-economic and political rubrics. 
Social Implications of Balikumbat-Bafanji  Boundary Conflict 
In this subsection, interpretations of the social consequences of the Balikumbat- 
Bafanji boundary land conflicts are presented. These include the increase in the death 
toll, given the violent confrontations, the destruction of property like houses and crops 
culminating in lack of shelter and hunger problems, the increased crime wave, and the 
insecure atmosphere that still exists between the people from both villages. The pictures 
below illustrate these points even more eloquently. 
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Figure 2. Pictures of damange caused by conflict 
The above pictures depict the far-reaching social implications to both 
communities caused by this conflict. First, the conflict resulted to the disenfranchisement 
of both communities with ramifications so deep that future generations are significantly 
impacted. Both villages suffered from a considerable number of deaths during wars and 
other conflicting periods. The causes of each war might have been very trivial, but the 
effects are extensive. Considering the number of people who lost their lives, it is 
important to note that violent confrontations between the people of Balikumbat and those 
of Bafanji started in the 1960s (Mbah, 2008, p. 229). However, it was the first bloody 
confrontation that registered the highest number of major casualties and destruction of 
property ever witnessed in the Northwest region (Mbah, 2008, p.230). During this 
conflict, “eighteen people died from gunshots, spears, cutlasses, poisoned arrows, or 
through beatings from sticks and clubs; sixteen of them were from Bafanji and two from 
Balikumbat” (Interview with Charles Diymba, Governor’s Office Bamenda, October 31, 
1997 in Mbah, 2008, p. 229). Among those who lost their lives are, 
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Oscar Puncho, Bafanji Farmer burnt to death on June 4, Isaac Tepha, Gideon 
Ndeh and Anthony Tielue shot to death; and an eighteen-year-old Bafanji boy, 
who was killed and his genitals removed. The others died in hospital while 
receiving treatment from their wounds. Forty people on both sides were severely 
wounded. They received treatment at the Bamenda provincial Hospital, the Banso 
Baptist Hospital, and the Adlucem Hospital in Mbouda (Mukong, in Mbah 2008, 
p. 229). 
This Balikumbat-Bafanji boundary conflict caused extensive loss of life and 
casualties. This fact illustrates the negative consequences encountered during conflicts 
and wars. The destructive nature of warfare cannot be over-emphasized. The precise 
conflict here is fight of a piece of land where both parties, the people of Balikumbat and 
those of Bafanji, claim ownership. The scarcity of land, the need to farm enough crops to 
sustain the growing population, and artificial definitions of boundaries created during the 
colonial era aggravate the situation.  
 Apart from these causes, some of the actions that accompany confrontations, 
which seemingly have nothing to do with the conflict, are puzzling. For instance, 
removing the genitals of the eighteen-year-old Bafanji boy after shooting him to death is 
illogical. This action illuminates the critical view that wars and conflicts are used as 
means to other ends. Kiven (1997) corroborates this fact when he argues that some 
individuals incite and perpetuate rebellion in order to benefit from the situation. One 
might want to question the rationale of this degrading and depersonalizing action of war. 
This situation provokes one to conclude that, if a lasting solution to this problem is not 
developed, the likelihood of other similar behaviors is a probability. Since the use of 
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deadly arms is commonplace in tribal boundary warfare in the Northwest region, 
gruesome acts of violence should be expected.  
Second, a large volume of property such as houses, cattle, crops, farms, and other 
fixed assets were damaged. This destruction rendered men, women and children 
homeless and, in some cases, without families. Some people were attacked and maimed 
so seriously that they will remain inactive for the rest of their lives. Mbah (2008) states 
that looting and destruction of property was rampant in this war, especially when the 
Balikumbat warriors made it a point to either loot or destroy all valuable property 
belonging to the Bafanji people. Later, the Bafanji market was burned down. This market 
is precariously situated on the contested land. Social facilities like the Bafanji Health 
Centre, the Cooperative Society building, the government primary school, a coffee 
factory owned by Ali Nekenbeng, and the Bafanji settlement at Njuanang were looted 
and destroyed. Reliable sources say that by the time violence ceased, 453 Bafanji houses 
had been destroyed. In the Post Newspaper no.0062 of April 20, 1998, the headline reads, 
“Balikumbat warriors wipe out Bafanji.” Following that press release, Chris Mbunwe in 
Bafanji stated, 
A beloved village that was flowing with milk and honey has been deprived of 
everything a human being would need to survive on earth. The villagers have 
escaped their land in Bafanji to neighbouring areas. Some as far as West Province 
and others to Bamenda, because they are homeless. There is nothing left of this 
village. No schools functioning. After two successive onslaughts of organized 
destruction by the Balikumbats, over 300 hundred houses were burnt and pulled 
down. Coffee farms and banana plantations were also extensively damaged, 
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though casualties were registered by both villages at war. The protracted land 
dispute has damaged the Bafanjis. They have usually been the oppressed. 
(Mbunwe, 1998, p. 1). 
It is interesting to note that the services of these destroyed institutions like schools, 
hospitals, and plantations hardly benefit some persons to the relative neglect of others. 
These social institutions are lasting investments of the state and private individuals to 
ensure the well-being of all people in the sub-division. It is difficult to understand the 
need to destroy these facilities, which provide the basic needs of the people in the context 
of a land conflict. However, conflicting warriors do not think of social welfare. This 
justifies the negative repercussions of inter-ethnic conflicts irrespective of the causes. The 
society loses. The same persons destroying social facilities are the same beneficiaries of 
these institutions. Therefore, all efforts have to be put in place to ensure a long lasting 
solution and peace building in the Balikumbat sub-division. 
Third, the destruction of social facilities and private property is aligned with 
criminal activities during periods of conflict. There are individuals who take advantage of 
the belligerent atmosphere to loot property and settle scores. Most combatants are crass 
profiteers motivated by self-interest. Asset stripping is the primary objective of some 
unscrupulous individuals who engage in this tribal conflict. Motivated by profit and 
plunder, these persons take advantage of situations of conflict to mobilize and terrorize 
villagers. A letter of complaint filed against some of these persons provides insight into 
this aspect of the conflict: 
On this 23
rd
 day of April 2011, we wish to complain to you that this morning a 
group of people from Bafanji led by these above mentioned persons, launched 
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two attacks, they attacked Boba Leon and Ndifor Derrick Sangu at Nyangi Joguru 
Balikumbat got them well beaten using rods and chains, seized their hoes and 
seed groundnuts. On their way back to the inner part of Bafanji around Kumbo 
Joguru quarter Balikumbat, they fired and wounded Nyali Alexanda Ayuba. 
These two men were rushed to the hospital, Boba Leon was treated in the 
Balikumbat hospital, and Nyali Alexanda was sent to the Ndop District Hospital. 
We are therefore appealing that justice should take its course on the vandals who 
want to destroy peace reigning in this sub-division (A Letter of complaint from 
the Quarter Head Joguru, Balikumbat Village to The Divisional Officer 
Balikumbat sub-division, Ngoketunjia, April 23, 2011). 
The availability of modern weaponry, including guns, cutlasses, and spears, 
aggravate the situation. The inability to check this situation allows conflict to increase. 
As the economic rationale of war changes, additional social problems become a reality. 
Since war can be profitable for some businesses, entrepreneurs may calculate what they 
gain from prolonged conflict rather than what can be obtained from prolonged peace. The 
use of weapons, threat of lives, theft, and the destruction of houses by the people of 
Bafanji village reveal major aspects of the conflict. Some people benefit from the cost of 
violence. They have developed immunity to violent practices. For instance, during a time 
of conflict, a person who was suspected of committing adultery was murdered. The 
murderer used the time of conflict to settle a score with this individual. 
Fourth, when the conflict crystallized into warfare in the 1990s, the overall 
destruction caused approximately 3,000 people of Bafanji to flee to Bamenda, Ngalim, 
and the West Province. During this forced migration, 50 children were reported missing. 
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The health, shelter, and food supply of these migrants was severely threatened. 
According to Mbah (2008), “A health department finding concluded that, out of the 3,000 
Bafanji refugees, 582 of them contracted malaria and/or typhoid, 162 suffered from 
dysentery and/or diarrhea, 196 from various skin diseases, and an undisclosed number 
had bullets stuck in their bodies but lacked funds to undergo surgery” (Mbah 2008, p. 
231). 
By 1996, more than 1,000 people from Bafanji were still living as refugees either 
in or around the village, with more than twenty people living in a single room. These 
people lacked food, healthcare facilities, and portable drinking water. The negative 
implications of the conflict resulted in the fact that many people were rendered homeless. 
A pandemic arose among the refugees. The state of war turned into a state of grief, 
confusion, theft, destruction, malice, and suffering. It is not a pleasant experience for 
either group because one party is either destroying or being destroyed. In this context, 
conflict resolution must emerge on diplomatic and cordial terms to address the problems 
and minimize these devastating consequences (Nkwi, 2011,  p. 118). 
Fifth, the lack of security has a major social implication in this boundary conflict. 
The war between the two villages has caused much material damage and the loss of life. 
The crisis of June 2, 1995 caused tension and insecurity to develop throughout Bafanji, 
Balikumbat, and the surrounding areas. The farming season was interrupted as an 
atmosphere of uncertainty enveloped the contested land. Farmers could no longer 
cultivate new farms or harvest crops. As a result, hunger and starvation shrouded both 
villages, although the people of Bafanji appeared to suffer this social problem more 
(Interview with Joshua Kwasi, Bamenda, October 27, 1997 in Mbah, 2008). 
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 This atmosphere of insecurity was heightened by the blockade of roads by 
Balikumbat armed-men along the Balikumbat-Bafanji highway. On Monday July 10, 
1995, the Bafanji market day, these armed-men harassed traders on their way to the 
market (Ewi, 1995). Most of the harassed traders were from the neighbouring regions and 
had nothing to do with the conflict. These were simply traders going to Bafanji market to 
sell their goods. In this scenario, conflict between the two villages prevented a smooth 
communication network (Mbah, 2008).  
 October 22, 1995 was another Bafanji market day. Roadblocks were intensified 
and traders were prevented from attending the market. It seemed to have been a 
calculated strategy of the Balikumbat to disrupt the economic activities in Bafanji. This 
approach was successful because the economic life of Bafanji was suspended when 
traders could no longer come to the market to sell their goods. From this perspective, the 
security repercussions of the conflict had a telling influence on the economic life of the 
people in Bafanji. The economic costs of the criminal acts of disrupting economic 
activities is beyond measure. 
 In spite of the calm atmosphere that reigned by the end of 1996, the inhabitants 
still lived in fear. From then until the present time, there are continuous threats of another 
Balikumbat invasion. A tense climate exists between both parties. On Monday July 
101996, the Balikumbat erected a fence near the Bafanji settlement at Njuanang, and then 
threatened to blowup the bridge linking Bafanji to the contested territory of Bangang. 
Movement along the Balikumbat-Bafanji access road was completely interrupted. This 
led to a longer, more expensive route when travelling to and from the two villages within 
the same subdivision. For instance, anyone travelling from Bafanji to the divisional 
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capital at Ndop had to board a vehicle through the west region, then to Bamenda before 
proceeding to Ndop, instead of using the usual shorter road through Balikumbat.  
The economic implication of this interruption cost approximately 5000 FRS Cfa 
for the people of Bafanji instead of the usual 700 FRS Cfa. Some daring travelers who 
decided to go to Ndop through Balikumbat were thoroughly rousted by armed 
Balikumbat men in order to ascertain that they were not Bafanji subjects. Mbah (2008) 
described the case of a Cameroon Post reporter named Charly Ndi Chia, who was 
permitted to proceed through the checkpoint to Ndop on foot only after it was established 
that he was not a Bafanji subject.  
This problem of insecurity also influenced education. Most parents from Bafanji 
withdrew their children from the lone Government Secondary School in the sub-division 
since it was based in Balikumbat. The parents were unsure of the safety of their children. 
The new road passing through Bambalang to Ndop was created thanks to the atmosphere 
of insecurity that loomed around the area. 
 Moreover, it is regrettable that this atmosphere of insecurity hampered peace 
initiatives aimed at resolving conflict. On October 14, 1995, a six-man technical team 
that was organized by the Cameroon government to examine the dispute and redemarcate 
a boundary between the two contestants was attacked while at work. The team quickly 
dispersed as they were chased and shot at by armed Balikumbat men who later 
confiscated the tractor and their work equipment (Abanda, 1995 in Mbah, 2008). This 
action from the people of Balikumbat has been responsible for the snail pace in 
establishing peace in the sub-division. 
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In sum, this subsection set out to interpret the consequences of the Balikumbat-
Bafanji boundary land conflict. The increased death toll, violent confrontations, and 
destruction of property created problems such as lack of shelter, hunger, an increased 
crime wave, and the insecure atmosphere that still exists today. These negative factors 
expose the negative consequences of war. 
Economic Implications of the Conflict 
The violent inter-tribal conflicts between the people of Balikumbat and those of 
Bafanji had major economic implications to the people of the sub-division, division, 
region, and the nation as a whole. The destruction of crops was a serious blow to the 
economy of the people. This was witnessed by resultant high prices in foodstuffs. The 
financial cost that was incurred in the litigation of the aftermath of war also affected the 
economy of the people. The payment of fines and a lawsuit in the High Court constituted 
a financial expenditure that had a negative impact on the national economy. Agricultural 
activities were interrupted because farms became insecure and unsafe environments. 
Blocking the transportation network created problems in the exportation and importation 
of goods for trade in this sub-division.  
 With the looting and destruction of houses and property, this conflict registered 
enormous economic implications to the people of Balikumbat subdivision, to the 
Northwest region, and to the nation as a whole. First, the assessment of the destruction of 
crops and property by the commission set up by the Governor of the North West Region 
was 720.000.000 FRS CFA. The destruction of crops and animals was estimated at 
205.000.000 FRS CFA. These estimates do not include the cost of damaged crops and 
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property incurred in the clashes between the Bafanji and Balikumbat in February, April, 
and June 1996 and July 1997.  
 For instance, on February 24 1996, Balikumbat subjects chased off Bafanji 
farmers at Bangang and destroyed their crops. In April 1996, Bafanji houses that were 
being reconstructed at Bangang were again destroyed together with some crops. A few 
homes were looted and cattle were slaughtered discriminately. In June 1996, the houses 
of the Sarili Tandia and Zechariah Soh that were under reconstruction were destroyed. In 
July 1997, the windows and doors of some newly reconstructed houses in Bangang were 
destroyed in nightly raids. All zinc was carried away. This continual destruction deterred 
Bafanji subjects from reconstructing their damaged houses in Bangang. 
Second, financial costs were also incurred in the litigation that emerged in the 
aftermath of the violence. The first of many lawsuits was filed at the Bamenda High 
Court by Peter Ngufor, a Bafanji executive, against chief Doh Gah Gwayin of 
Balikumbat and five others. In the suit, Ngufor claimed 550.000.000 FRS CFA from the 
defendants for the unjustified invasion of the Bafanji village, trespassing onto the 
plaintiff’s land, and the wanton destruction and looting of the plaintiff’s houses and other 
properties. With the eight case adjournments, the cost of maintaining this case was high. 
Although judgment was eventually delivered in 1997, the legal accommodation and 
transportation costs incurred by the both the plaintiffs and defendants had skyrocketed. In 
court, the defendants were ordered to pay Ngufor 111 million FRS CFA as compensation 
for damages. The defendants appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court since it 
became evident that they were not be able to pay the fine. 
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Third, another financial implication lies in the lawsuit filed at Bamenda High 
Court. In this case, the chief of Bafanji sued the Gendarmes of Ngoketunjia claiming 
150.000.000 FRS CFA in damages. He accused the Gendarmes of entering the palace to 
harass and torture some occupants without a warrant. In a parallel development, about 
300 Bafanjis also threatened court action against the chief of Balikumbat for the 
destruction that occurred on June 2 1996 (Mbah, 2008, p. 233). Prosecuting many cases 
of this nature result in considerable financial expenditure for both the community as well 
as the state. These violent clashes between the two villages began in the 1960s soon after 
the land in the boundary between Balikumbat and Bafanji was surveyed and inspected. 
The cost was supposed to be borne by both villages, each contributing a total of 138.000 
FRS. The Buea federal court of Justice heard the action in 1970. Balikumbat lost its 
claims. They were asked to pay a fine of 50.000 FRS CFA. 
Fourth, one of the major economic implications of this conflict was that it 
interrupted agricultural activities. This sub-division is principally characterized by 
agricultural activities. The people of Balikumbat and those of Bafanji rely on agriculture 
for their livelihood. Therefore, land is of ultimate economic importance to these people. 
Land is of capital importance because it provides for the basic needs of the population. 
With the halt in agricultural activities, production of vegetables and other farm products 
that are sold to traders coming from the cities like Bamenda and Bafoussam was halted. 
The contested land has fertile soil, which is very instrumental for agriculture. With the 
absence of agricultural activities in this area, scarcity of some farms products like 
vegetables was experienced in both the sub-division and the region. This scarcity caused 
high prices and definite economic hardship for the farmers. 
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 Fifth, the blocking of roads and the destruction of bridges linking the two villages 
prevented the smooth transportation of goods for trade. With the difficulties of having 
access to the city and to other villages, both parties suffered from scarcity and hardship. 
The absence of cordiality between the conflicting parties prevented the possibility of 
trade. The people from Bafanji did not visit the Balikumbat market, although some 
Balikumbat people visit the Bafanji market. With the tense atmosphere between these 
two villages, tourism is also greatly affected. The economic implication is that the 
conflict compromises prospects of rendering this site a touristic area. This can improve 
on the economy of the sub-division, division, region, and nation as a whole. Where there 
is no security, tourism is not possible. People only want to visit places where their 
security is ensured (Nkwi, 2011). 
Briefly, the violent inter-tribal conflict between the people of Balikumbat and 
those of Bafanji had major economic implications to the people of the sub-division, 
division, region, and the nation as a whole. The destruction of crops was a serious blow 
to the economy of the people. This was witnessed by high prices in foodstuffs. The 
financial costs that were incurred in the litigation of the aftermath of war also affected the 
economy of the people. The payment of fines, the lawsuit in the High Court constituted 
financial expenditure that carried a negative impact on national economy. Agricultural 
activities were interrupted because farms became insecure grounds. Lastly, the blocking 
destruction of the transportation network created problems in the exportation and 
importation of goods for trade in this sub-division. These factors detail how conflict 
destroyed a country’s economy.  
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Political Implications of the Conflict 
The political implications of the Balikumbat-Bafanji boundary land conflict 
portray outstanding revelations that help understand the question at stake. This conflict 
reveals some serious ills that came along with colonialism and continue to exist in post-
colonial Africa. This exists because the conflict in question is rooted in the activities of 
the colonial era. Apart from that, it can also be argued that the post-colonial 
administration shares the blame for being incapable of handling the conflict. With these 
dialectical views, it can be argued that the incumbent administration is a continuation of 
the colonial administration.  
Principally, the main research question hinges on the political cause of the 
conflict. This part of the research is sensitive because the socio-economic implications 
are rooted in political implications. Questioning whether the advent of colonialism is 
responsible for most inter-tribal conflicts in this region is important. By extension, this 
makes the Balikumbat-Bafanji land conflict a crucial political issue. One of the major 
criticisms of colonialism in Africa is the indiscriminate balkanization of African territory, 
irrespective of the roots and practices of the indigenous people. Have the political 
authorities been able to resolve the conflict? What is the reason for the recurrence of this 
conflict? 
The boundary conflict reveals one of the major ills that came along with 
colonialism in Africa. This problem is traced back to the conditions of this land in pre-
colonial Cameroon, colonial Cameroon, and post-colonial Cameroon. Prior to the advent 
of the colonial masters, resident people were settlers in this area. They enjoyed the state 
of peace probably because there was no population explosion and nature could still 
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satisfy the needs of the people. When the Germans colonized Cameroon in 1884, they 
managed the territory and demarcated it according to their means of administration. To 
establish boundaries and borderlines, they planted pillars, which would define different 
villages and solve problems of tribal conflict over land, especially in the Northwest 
region. This is what happened in the Balikumbat and Bafanji boundary situation. 
However, after Germany was defeated in WWI, a turning point occurred in the history of 
the lives of the people in Cameroon. Cameroon ceased being a German territory. Instead, 
it was placed under the rule of Britain and France as a mandated territory of the League 
of Nations. With Britain and France in charge, the British took control of the English 
speaking part of Cameroon, like the Northwest region, where Balikumbat and Bafanji 
constitute a sub-division. With the British administration of indirect rule, the local chiefs 
were used to govern the people. With the advent of inter-tribal conflicts over land, the 
British defined the tribes based on the information obtained from the chiefs and their own 
judgments. This is precisely what happened to the boundary between Balikumbat and 
Bafanji. The British administration introduced new boundaries that defied those that the 
Germans had established between the two tribes. These different boundary markings may 
have been established because of the British cultivating conflicting information from 
different chiefs.  
The result was two boundary definitions between the two tribes, one German and 
the other British. The Cameroon administration was left with the problem of resolving the 
obvious conflict that immediately arose and has perpetuated from these two boundaries. 
While Balikumbat claims that the German administration defined the boundary correctly, 
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the Bafanji do not agree. In their view, the British definition is correct. This controversy 
has been responsible for the persistent and recurrent conflicts in the contested land. 
The pictures below represent the pillar demarcation mechanism used by both the 
colonial and current administration. This stands in opposition to the natural marks used 
by the customary system. The problem is that these pillars are removable. In contrast, the 
natural features of the landscape, that were known and accepted as legitimate by the 
indigenous people prior to the coming of the colonial masters, are stationary. With the 
pillar system, any party that decided to be belligerent simply removed the pillars and 
disputed the boundary. This resulted in instant conflict, whereas boundary disagreements 
were rare when the natural boundary system was used. 
 
Figure 3. Picture of a removable pillar of colonial origin 
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Figure 4. Picture where a pillar has been removed, thereby sparking conflict 
 
Figure 5. Picture of geographical boundary demarcation prior to colonization 
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Figure 6. Picture of geographical boundary demarcation prior to colonization 
 
Figure 7. Picture of geographical boundary demarcation prior to colonization 
The post-colonial administration has the task of solving this problem. The failure 
of the government authorities to handle this matter has been responsible for the frequent 
clashes in the contested land. Knowledge of the principal cause of the problem is part of 
215 
 
 
its solution. Therefore, tracing the roots of the problem to colonial indiscriminate 
definitions of the boundaries, irrespective of the indigenous practices, is a way forward. 
The argument here is that natural signs like rivers and trees constitute boundary 
definitions in indigenous beliefs and practices. By ignoring natural marks of defining 
boundaries and introducing artificial means, like easily moved pillars, is a major 
weakness. Trees and rivers that demarcate boundaries between villages in Africa are 
never tampered with. There are particular beliefs and customs that surround these natural 
features. Therefore, it may be imperative to reconsider the traditional means of defining 
boundaries to resolve the deadly conflicts that abound, especially the Balikumbat-Bafanji 
boundary dispute. 
This boundary dispute exposes the weaknesses of the incumbent government in 
their problem solving ability. According to Mbah (2008), measures taken by 
administrative officers to resolve disputes are implemented “piece meal” and “not based 
on facts, but on the bargaining power of the belligerents.”(p. 91)This is an unjustified and 
unfair approach towards problem solving. Additionally, it has been suggested that, within 
the incumbent government in Cameroon, sympathizers of the ruling party are most often 
favored in the resolution of a problem. This happens to be relevant to the Balikumbat-
Bafanji boundary dispute. The former Fon of Balikumbat, Fon Doh, enjoyed full support 
from the incumbent government in managing the conflict. He performed many malicious 
actions against the people of Bafanji and went unpunished because of his allegiance to 
the incumbent government. Naturally embittered, the people of Bafanji has persistently 
fought to restore their dignity and integrity. With the accession of Fon Doh Gah Gwanyin 
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to the Balikumbat throne, the crisis about the boundary dispute resurfaced. According to 
Mbah (2008),  
In 1995, taking advantage of the political disorder that reigned in the Northwest 
Province at the time, the chief, and the people of Balikumbat decided to ignore all 
previous decisions concerning the dispute; they unearthed pillars that had been 
planted in 1969. The Northwest Provincial administration took no legal action 
against the open defiance of the law. Instead, the Land Consultative Board set up 
a commission, headed by the D.O for Ngoketunjia Division, to replant the pillars. 
The commission received no cooperation from Balikumbat and its subjects 
immediately unearthed the newly planted pillars. Twice Balikumbat had 
nonchalantly defied state law and no action was taken against them. Because the 
government had failed to becalm Balikumbat, they took yet another bold step, this 
time occupying the contested territory of Bangang. This marked the beginning of 
Balikumbat- Bafanji disturbances of 1995, which ensued in severe atrocities and 
casualties (1996, p. 2. in Mbah 2008, pp. 190-191). 
As a result, the people of Balikumbat adopted a dishonorable attitude towards 
compromising the peace building process in the boundary conflict. With the political 
upheavals in the country during the 1990s, the people of Balikumbat exploited the 
situation to transgress the rulings concerning this boundary dispute. The daring attitude of 
unearthing the planted pillars is indicative of rebellion and lack of respect for the rule of 
law. At the same time, the inability of the authorities to sanction such defiance, which is 
twice repeated, betrays the fact that the incumbent government and the authorities in 
place are seemingly accomplices to the abuses.  There is no justification for 
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permitting the people of Balikumbat to operate above legal norms. Since they constitute 
one of the belligerent parties, they must respect the state laws and injunction. Refusal to 
respect the planted pillars indicates their refusal to cooperate towards peace building in 
the sub-division. In this case, the people of Balikumbat are responsible for the 1995 
disturbances in the sub-division. This situation arose because of the inability of the state 
to handle the matter appropriately. The incumbent administration is a product of the 
colonial rule. It fails to solve the problem because of the historicity of the matter and the 
negligence of the history and roots of those concerned. 
Mbah (2008) identifies the difficulty in resolving the problem because there is no 
successive follow up and administrators are changed in the division and the sub-division.  
Even when a judicious decision is taken by one administrator, his successor may 
scrap it away. Moreover, many a post-colonial administrative officer posted to the 
region is French speaking. These uniformed officers lack the knowledge and 
mastery of the history of the numerous disputes, and make no serious attempt to 
acquaint themselves with these. This explains why they easily resort to punitive 
methods of conflict management (pp. 187-188). 
The frequent appointments and changing of the administrators in the regions, 
divisions, and sub-divisions have also been responsible for the inability of the state to 
handle the conflict. The fact that there is a communication barrier between some of the 
administrators and the indigenous people accounts for some of the misunderstanding, 
deception, and wrong judgments. It is well known that communication plays a key role in 
conflict management. If the arbitrator cannot communicate appropriately with the 
belligerent parties, their terms of operation may be guilty of gross ambiguity, and 
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subsequently, wrong judgments. Negligence of the history and the roots of the people in 
the course of resolving the matter fuels wrong judgments. It must be noted that both 
conflicting parties were migrants, though each claim ownership of the contested territory. 
The basis of the argument of the two parties is that it gave land to the other party to settle. 
The question is whether the chronological priority of settlement in an area determines 
one’s ownership of the land. What is stipulated in the land tenure system? Failure to 
answer these questions and return to the roots of these people only perpetuates the 
conflict. 
Furthermore, Mbah (2008) blames the failure of the government to resolve this 
boundary dispute on the absence of a critical and unbiased approach to the problem: 
The government has failed in its efforts to settle the dispute; as of 1997, peace had 
not returned to the area. Meanwhile the political connections of the chief of 
Balikumbat have continued to annoy Bafanji subjects, who as of 1997, refused to 
cooperate with government in its efforts to seek concord between the parties. 
Bafanji has refused to attend peace talks convened in Balikumbat, the sub-
divisional headquarters. Yet again, any attempt to talk peace may not yield fruits 
if the views of the chief of Balikumbat are not taken into consideration. Mutual 
reconciliation and resolution of this conflict can only be attained if government, 
acting with good faith, reexamines the conflict from its merits, and not from a 
political standpoint. Government has the means to manage the conflict and 
maintain peace. It can utilize its executive, judicial, and legislative power to 
enforce its will on the opposing parties, forcing them to respect decisions. It can 
use the economic weapon of compensation to coerce one of the parties to 
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withdraw from the dispute. Abrogating official decisions by one or both parties 
can only lead to renewed hostilities (…), which is a bad precedent to set because 
villages with similar disputes are watching keenly for what course of action is 
pursued (pp. 192-193). 
The failure of the government strongly suggests that a weak political will 
surrounds the efforts towards solving the dispute. This weak political will is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that the chief of Balikumbat refuses to cooperate with the 
government to make peace, yet he is not sanctioned or forced to face the rule of law 
because of his political affiliations. Since the people of Bafanji are aware of the political 
immunity enjoyed by the chief of Balikumbat, it is impossible for them to compromise 
their rights in favour of the people of Balikumbat. In addition, the fact that the political 
headquarters of this sub-division is in Balikumbat informally grants political authority to 
the people of this area over those of Bafanji. Since the chief of Balikumbat and many of 
his subjects are sympathizers of the ruling CPDM party, government support is supplied, 
even in issues where they are wrong. With this easy access to the administration, their 
voice reigns loudly over their Bafanji counterparts.  
 It should be noted that, because of the conflict, the people of Bafanji sympathize 
with the most popular opposition party. This renders them vulnerable in the presence of 
the incumbent government. With conflicting political opinions, conflict among these 
people is inevitable, especially when elections draw near. This is because people take 
refuge in political differences to settle scores on the issue of the boundary conflict. 
To sum up, it must be understood that the political implications of this conflict 
produce outstanding revelations that are important for the justification or rejection of the 
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main research question. The conflict reveals that colonialism originated the serious ills 
that continue to exist in post-colonial Africa. This is precisely because the conflict in 
question is rooted in the activities of the colonial era. Apart from that, it can also be 
argued that the post-colonial administration must share the blame for being incapable of 
handling the conflict. With these dialectical views, the incumbent administration is a 
continuation of the colonial administration. Therefore, the administration put in place by 
the colonial rule fails to administer appropriately. Despite the fact that not all the blame 
can be shouldered by the colonial masters, the political implications provide some insight 
into understanding the main research question. 
Recommendations from the Study 
To resolve the Balikumbat-Bafanji boundary line dispute, efforts towards 
participation and consensus building must be put in place. Meaningful participation is 
essential for solutions to be sustainable. People must be taught the skills they need to 
participate in decisions and design solutions that affect their lives. Where there are gaps 
preventing cooperation between government, civil society, and the private sector, 
platforms for constructive dialogue at the individual, local community and national levels 
must be built. Three important participation processes exist to ensure peace building in 
the communities. These include cooperative advocacy, cooperative planning, and 
consensus facilitation. From these three components, the following recommendations 
have been made for the Balikumbat and Bafanji boundary conflict. 
Community-based Approaches to Transitional Justice in Balikumbat Subdivision 
From these participation processes, the first prominent strategy is the community-
based approach to transitional justice in Balikumbat Subdivision. This strategy supports 
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local reconciliation processes through community-based approaches that explore the 
intersections between informal, traditional, and formal justice mechanisms. Projects are 
established that help the natives resolve grievances during the challenging transitional 
period. Grievances in this boundary line conflict range from abuses of power by some 
chiefs, passing partial judgments by some government officials, criminal acts by some 
military men under the regime, and the politicization of the conflict. Through local 
reconciliation mechanisms, these projects may ensure that the grievances of both parties, 
Balikumbat-Bafanji people, local tribal and religious leaders, women, and youth are 
heard and redressed. To succeed, the government and NGOs must the means for 
supportive relationships with the peace and justice commission of the Roman Catholic 
Church of the archdiocese of Bamenda. This commission empowers some projects that 
handle reconciliation and resolution grievances in a culturally appropriate and sustainable 
way. 
Another perspective to be used in this context is mentoring a cadre of inspiring 
local community facilitators skilled in mediation and reconciliation skills. They should be 
trained to conduct facilitations, community outreach campaigns, and conflict sensitive 
development planning. These community facilitators will be adept at encouraging broad 
civic participation, while attracting a traditionally marginalized population like women 
and youths to participate in the governance of the affairs of the state. To reach out to 
individual communities to convey transitional principles of justice, the facilitators and 
female leaders will raise general public awareness of the national transitional justice 
process in Cameroon. They will promote dialogue amongst the belligerent tribes and 
build public confidence in transitional justice authority. 
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Make Young People the Medium of Peacemaking 
The second strategy is to make young people the vehicle of peacemaking in tribal 
conflicts. Young men and women in Balikumbat and Bafanji must realize their potential 
as conflict mediators, advocates, and community leaders and an indispensable factor of 
the peace building process. The justification of this approach is that young people 
constitute two-thirds of the population in the area. These young people could be used to 
determine whether the Balikumbat sub-division spirals deeper into conflict or achieves 
lasting peace. In the previous tribal conflicts, administrative and modern methods were 
used in settling disputes. These methods have failed while wasting a lot of money. The 
failure is marked by the recurrence of conflicts and the refusal of one party to abide by 
the rulings of the administration. Methods used by the administrators have only increased 
the risks of tribal conflict and crime involvement for the youths, who often bear the 
burden of violence while facing pressure to join extremist groups. 
In this context, a pilot initiative to help youths build peace is imperative. Youth 
peer-to-peer conflicts train young people to resolve and prevent conflict while ultimately 
preparing them to advocate for their causes and influence district councils and tribal 
leadership. It is important to encourage the youths to fully realize the impact of conflict 
on their communities and develop critical leadership skills. This is realized when youths 
are mentored to become tribal peace ambassadors. These peace ambassadors share the 
outcomes of their facilitated discussions with communities in neighbouring districts. 
They gather additional perspectives to share with government leaders as a link between 
communities and the administration. 
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This particular initiative will also empower young women through the 
development of a women-led-youth council that fosters non-violent approaches to build 
peace between the two tribes. This offers an opportunity for young women to contribute 
to peace building as well as recast their role in the society. The involvement of women 
and youth in the peace building processes is a salutary step towards a sustainable conflict 
resolution strategy. 
Organize a Task Force to Enforce the Rule of Law 
The third approach to be employed in resolving the Balikumbat-Bafanji boundary 
land conflict is the organization of a task force to enforce the rule of law. This aspect will 
serve to protect the people and their property from constant raids, looting, and damage. 
The people from the aggressing villages should be incarcerated from the moment they are 
caught attacking their neighbours. Prompt legal action must follow looters who act under 
the refuge of inter-tribal conflict. The reason for this strategy is that some unscrupulous 
chiefs and elites instigate conflict to exact personal gain.  
According to official statistics, Cameroon’s population of approximately 
20,000,000 people encompasses 350 ethnic groups. Sporadic eruption of inter-ethnic 
violence is common in this country, but anthropologist Mbah cautions that there is more 
to ethnic conflict than simple tribal disputes. In his view, “The elites of Cameroon 
instigate or worsen inter-ethnic divisions for personal gain” (2006). In a later 
development, he insists, “the public powers clearly draw advantage for the disorder 
provoked by the elites to the extent that ethnic manipulation has become a business for 
most politicians and senior government officials.” 
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Additionally, the rule of law must be supported to prevent chiefs from instigating 
rebellion against other tribes. “A few neighbouring villages, spurred on by their 
Fon/chief, spent two days burning houses and stealing animals and goods from an entire 
village. The villagers had little to no warning and fled to their Fon’s palace with only 
their clothes on their backs. Their stored foods are gone, their animals are gone, and their 
children now have no money for school.” This is a typical example of what the former 
Fon of Balikumbat did to the people of Bafanji with impunity. These actions continued 
without reasonable sanctions.  
This explains the repetition of these actions because there is no deterrence. The 
Fon of Balikumbat was not sanctioned because of his political affiliations with the 
incumbent government. By supporting the CPDM political party, legal immunity was 
informally granted. In a democratic society where the rule of law binds all citizens, no 
one should be above the law. However, it appears conclusive that sympathizers of the 
CPDM political party are granted this informal immunity. To strengthen a political 
system that is too weak to support the rule of law, a task force should be organized in 
every region of the country to enforce laws on perpetrators of inter-ethnic conflicts. This 
will not only undermine the possibility of conflicts between the Balikumbat and Bafanji, 
but it will limit the eruption of sporadic violence in the region and the nation as a whole. 
Building Capacity of Women in Managing Inter-tribal Conflicts 
The fourth approach that may limit and possibly eliminate inter-ethnic conflict 
between the people of Balikumbat and those of Bafanji is through building the capacity 
of women in managing inter-tribal conflicts. Empowering women leaders in conflict 
zones is a reasonable initiative towards building peace. According to the Peace-Maker 
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Society, women are 74% victims of violence. In this context, this society holds that these 
women have a stronger institutional base than men have and would readily influence 
sustainable peace efforts. This idea is to be realized by means of sensitization at the 
grassroots level to encourage women to use traditional approaches to solve land disputes. 
The women should be trained on how to lobby administrative and traditional authorities 
in conflict areas so that a conciliatory and lasting solution is sought. The purpose of this 
type of training is to instill a culture of peace in an environment of hatred and rancor.  
The importance of women in the establishment of peace cannot be over-
emphasized. In the Northwest region, women have demonstrated their disdain for 
violence and the importance of peace in society. Their demonstrations are aimed at 
punishing those who flout the moral law as well as those who insult womanhood. This 
strategy exists as a strong element of land conflict resolution and peace building. 
Patriarchy and chauvinism have denied women access to formal forums for peace 
negotiations. According to Sobseh (2011),  
During the early 1990s, when political incivility was rife and the Biya 
Government was bent on having the heads of the key political opponents, such as 
John Fru Ndi and his crew, the “Takembeng” women aggregate played a major 
role as peace providers. By using their nudity, a sign of curse in African tradition, 
to chase away pro-government forces that had been provided licenses to kill.They 
marched on the streets of Bamenda, brandishing the nkeng (peace plant) with 
them as a sign of peace (p. 349). 
 The demonstration explained above presented women as “brokers” of peace. This 
particular attitude is demonstrated in other conflicts where women requested peace at all 
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costs. Consider the Fumbuen women protests in Babanki against the Fon and Fulani 
graziers. At their sit-down strike at the office of the District Officer, they exercised 
patience and tolerance until their request was granted. The ultimate pledge women make 
for peace in times of conflict is the risk they take to inter-marry with ex-enemy ethnic 
groups. The women therefore mortgage their security in the process and sacrifice their 
psychological integrity for the sake of peace. This is a strong diplomatic strategy towards 
peace building in the Balikumbat-Bafanji boundary land conflict. One of the interviewees 
from Balikumbat, who works in the municipal council, confirmed that his spouse was 
from Bafanji. Naturally, he does not see the possibility of him raiding or attacking his 
own in-laws. This aspect underlines the place of marriage in the process of assuring 
peace. 
 The role of women in the case of this land conflict between Balikumbat and 
Bafanji must be regarded as a pivotal tool to resolving the conflict. During the field 
research, I realized that one of the Quarter Heads (a leading community role) is occupied 
by a woman which is not common in this culture. This woman in question has 
spearheaded peace efforts to resolve this conflict. If there are many of such women in 
both villages, the chances of resolving this conflict will be heightened. Upon proper 
training, integration into peace efforts and mobilization of different women wings and 
associations, women will certainly be armed to produce positive results towards a 
permanent resolution of this conflict.  
Promote Peace and Governance Program through Civil Societies 
This concept entails supporting civil society leaders, journalists, and local 
government leaders with training and resources to contribute to an empowered citizenry 
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to promote a peace and governance program. Civil societies have the potential of 
developing and strengthening constituencies for peace during and after land conflicts. 
Most of the armed land conflicts in the Northwest region of Cameroon are justified by 
claiming that they represent the popular course. Civil society actors can challenge this by 
asserting that public opinion rejects a military approach to the problem at stake. It is 
through the civil societies that the sensitization and education of the people on alternative 
ways of resolving conflict can be accomplished. Some effective ways of creating a new 
atmosphere are the peace media, art projects, concerts, and other creative methods of 
reaching out to the wider public (Sobseh, 2011). 
In addition, a civil society could be accomplished via a mass protestor by 
demonstrations during conflicts to stand as a voice in favour of peace. This can be 
achieved by reducing violence and organizing zones of peace in the Northwest region. It 
is difficult for people to build peace when they feel threatened or when they are under 
attack. Those who wish to disrupt the peace process tend to escalate violence among 
civilians. Conventional state security forces play a vital role in the peace process. 
However, in the case of Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict, they seem to be part of the land 
problem.  
To address such land problems, peace monitors must be created to act as 
witnesses and mediators (Lederach, 1997). In South Africa, the National Peace Accord 
provided the structure for people to become involved in violence prevention. In this case, 
thousands of peace committees were formed to mediate land disputes, monitor 
demonstrations, and supervise other activities that could possibly become violent 
(Sobseh, 2011). 
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In the case of the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict, the Northwest region has created 
“pragmatic peace” at the local level to handle land conflicts. Peacemaking is far from 
making a political agreement between the conflicting parties. Instead, it is important to 
make peace with one’s neighbours. Therefore, when national-level peace actions are 
stalled or non-existent, local communities can act to address issues that bring forth land 
conflicts and escalate violence. In the Northwest region, civil society groupings like 
Lukmef Cameroon and the Peace and Justice Commission of the Roman Catholic Church 
have used dialogue to resolve ethnic conflicts and build sustainable peace (LUKMEF, 
2008). 
The Civil society groups in the Bamenda Grassfield have also worked diligently 
to prevent land conflicts through the consolidation of peace to prevent the reoccurrence 
of war. Peace building is a process that is infinite and imperfect. Land conflicts cannot 
simply be transformed by agreements. They need a continuous commitment to address 
the problems through political avenues. Public ownership of the process is crucial. When 
the public and organized civil society have been excluded from the process of 
peacemaking and addressing their real needs, expecting them to work towards its 
implementation is questionable. In this case, civil society needs to resume structural 
prevention-encouraging governance, by sensitizing and educating the people, 
reconstruction and development, mediating social land conflicts, promoting human rights, 
and continue other efforts towards the process of peace building (Reychler, 1999). 
Recognize the Place of Religious Bodies in Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
Soliciting assistance from religious bodies in land and conflict prevention can be 
instrumental in the context of the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict. Both tribes fall within the 
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ecclesiastical province of the archdiocese of Bamenda and exist in the same parish with 
the main mission in Balikumbat. The two tribes are particularly managed within the same 
parish and subsequently within the same diocese. This means that the boundary conflict 
causes division in the parish. The Gospel message decries division in the church and this 
makes it imperative for the church to be an actor in the conflict resolution strategies. 
The land conflict approaches that have been used to manage the inter-ethnic land 
conflicts in the Northwest region include avoidance, informal problem solving, 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, litigation, and force. While churches may occasionally 
use some of these methods, avoidance and adjudication tend to be the most prominent. If 
the conflicting parties cannot achieve a collaborative solution and are committed to 
supporting the decision once it is made, it is quite possible that an adjudicatory approach 
will be efficient (Interview with Solomon Che Warah in Sobseh, 2011). Adjudication 
allows the church to control the conflict resolution process. It gives certainty to decisions 
and a precedent for future cases. The limitation of adjudication is that there is likely to be 
emotional and financial costs imposed by the system and reconciliation may be difficult 
when the judgment favours one of the conflicting parties. 
From the interviews conducted with church leaders and conflict resolution 
professionals, a ten-point strategy emerged. This strategy can be effective inland conflict 
resolution, including the Balikumbat-Bafanji case. These strategies   consensus on the 
basics, developing positive attitudes toward land conflict, seeing land conflict as normal, 
educating to manage land differences, emphasizing process as well as substance, 
intervening early, institutionalizing land conflict management systems, developing 
congregational resources, using outside resources, and keeping in touch with the spiritual. 
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Moreover, one cannot overlook the contributions of religious institutions and faith 
based organizations in peace building and land conflict resolution in post-colonial 
Cameroon. In fact, Christians and the churches live by the dictates of God’s word in 
which justice and mercy prevail. Values of integrity, peace, justice, and the veracity of 
creation are essential to their beliefs. These values present Christianity as well as the 
church as peacemakers and agents of reconciliation. This reconciliation has no limitation 
(World Council of Churches, 1997). The need to create an effective system for land 
conflict management requires developing congregational resources, using outside 
resources, and remaining in touch with the spiritual. 
In addition to conflict management systems, the church can educate Christians on 
issues of land conflicts. A typical example is the case of the former Moderator of the 
PCC, Reverend Henry Awasum. He condemned several land conflicts that have left 
several persons wounded and many homeless in the Northwest region. Describing them 
as satanic,Awasum stated, 
The land disputes reflected the absence of fraternity among brothers and sisters of 
the Province (Region). The war he regretted had created an indelible mark of 
agony and shame in the Province and wondered why Christians could easily 
abandon the will of God to take up arms against each other. He lamented the 
failure of the Christians to be the light of the world as instructed in the Holy 
Scriptures and appealed to those directly involved in the land disputes that have 
degenerated into wars to dedicate themselves to God through peace and 
reconciliation (Sunde, 1995, p. 2.) 
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This message of the Moderator, as presented in the Herald newspaper, portrays 
the place of the church in appealing to the consciences of the people to maintain an 
atmosphere of peace. The church plays a major role in bringing peace, especially in the 
defense of the poor and the marginalized. The Justice and Peace Commission of the 
Roman Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Bamenda strives to maintain an 
atmosphere of peace and to bring justice and reconciliation to crisis stricken areas of the 
Northwest region of Cameroon. This region is notorious for the recurrence of inter-
village and inter-tribal conflicts.  
The place of the church in enhancing peace cannot be underestimated. The church 
has to work in lock step with the State. In this case, the State must recognize the help they 
can get from the church in the course of bringing peace in land conflict situations. To be 
successful in this case, one finds the approach of the justice and peace commission 
plausible. This approach provides a forum for the protagonists to meet and vent their 
feelings. This requires the provision of a neutral territory for this conflict resolution 
exercise. According to the Justice and Peace commission,  
One of the first things we do in peace building or conflict resolution is to create 
space where the protagonists in the conflict can meet and vent their feelings. Such 
a space, preferably on neutral territory, enables them to talk first before any action 
is taken to resolve the problem. For example, if the administration steps in with its 
forces of law and order and decides that they are going to demarcate the boundary 
between two villages in conflict, without first creating space for them to talk and 
let out their anger, they will merely be postponing the conflict, which will 
eventually flare up again. I believe the administration is aware of this and that is 
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why they usually stay in the background as much as possible, leaving the way 
clear for us to calm down the tempers, create space for people to talk before 
taking any action. They keep their forces in the background and this eliminates 
the fear people may have to vent out their feelings freely. We thank God that we 
were able to create space for the Bali Nyonga and the Bawok people as well as 
the Oku and Mbessa people to express their feelings openly. Later, they were able 
to shake hands with each other. We hope the same approach is taken in the case of 
the Balikumbat-Bamalang issue but we have to be aware that each case is 
different and should be addressed on its own merit. We must constantly keep in 
mind that peace building is not an achievement but rather a culture, which takes 
into consideration the fact that community relations change according to the 
circumstances. 
What is noticeable in the approach of this church commission is the place of 
dialogue between the belligerent parties in conflict resolution. The resolution of conflict 
by frightening the masses with the forces of law and order is a technical error that merely 
postpones people’s expression of their grievances. Each conflict has its uniqueness. The 
stakeholders in the course of making peace have to diagnose the unique characteristics of 
the conflict to determine the appropriate process to follow. This recommendation 
suggests the inappropriateness of ready-made rules and principles in conflict resolution. 
Flexibility is a commendable characteristic in the course of conflict resolution. The 
stipulated general rules should serve as guides and signposts rather than fixed rules of 
implementation in the course of conflict resolution. 
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In addition, alternative means of resolving conflict definitely reduce the burden 
placed on judges given the numerous inter-tribal conflicts in the Northwest region. 
According to the spokesperson for the Justice and Peace Commission, 
One thing is certain, though. If we have alternative conflict resolution 
mechanisms in place, the workload of the judges will be considerably reduced. 
There are cases that come to court where out-of-court and amicable solutions 
would do. If more structures, like the Justice and Peace Commission, existed, they 
would easily intervene and resolve such conflicts before they go to court.  Our 
aim is to achieve reconciliation at every level; help people to live in peace with 
themselves and with their neighbours. 
The State and the church have the same objective of maintain lasting peace to the 
region. It is therefore imperative for them to work in synergy, especially in the case of 
Balikumbat-Bafanji. The State solicits the intervention of the church quite easily. The 
spokesperson for the Justice and Peace commission recalls a concrete example, 
You are right that the State is the principal police of law and order. However, the 
Church is, in a way, a partner with the State in ensuring that peace, justice and 
reconciliation reign in our land. With that said, let me hasten to add that it was the 
State that came to us to help resolve the said conflicts. In the case of the Bali 
Nyonga and Bawok land dispute, the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) of Mezam 
Division at the time, who was a Catholic and had been a member of the Justice 
and Peace Commission of the Diocese of Nkongsamba, requested permission 
from the Church authority for the Justice and Peace Commission of our 
Archdiocese to work hand in hand with the administration to resolve the recurring 
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conflict between the two villages. That is how our Commission, with the 
permission of the Local Ordinary, came to work with the public authority to 
resolve that conflict. 
The Justice and Peace Commission of the Archdiocese of Bamenda works to 
defend the weak, the poor, and the marginalized because these people are not usually 
aware of their rights and tend to resign themselves to their fate. The principal task of this 
commission, however, is not limited to this class of people alone. Since everything is not 
about material and physical strength, transforming the mindset of people to treat others 
with dignity is an equally important function.  No individual is more human than 
any another one is simply because he or she is stronger or richer. This is one of the 
sensitive issues in the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict. The people of Bafanji feel an 
inferiority complex imposed by the people of Balikumbat. During interviews, one of 
them asserted that probably this atmosphere of inferiority stems from the fact that the 
sub-divisional headquarters, the municipal council, the secondary school, the financial 
institutions, and the main parish church are all situated in Balikumbat. Within the 
confines of the church, the people of Bafanji say they are working towards getting their 
own church autonomy by becoming a full-fledged parish. Whether this approach is the 
appropriate solution to the problem at stake is questionable. However, it does reinforce 
the place the church holds in helping these people understand that they have to live 
together in peace according to the good tidings of the Gospel. 
Encourage Social Dialogue among leaders of Belligerent Tribes 
Social dialogue for Fons in Land Conflict Resolution is a strategy towards peace 
building. Communication is one of the best practices for the prevention and resolution of 
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conflict relating to the belligerent parties. Fons in the Northwest region have very much 
participated in the prevention and resolution of land conflicts. They have cooperated with 
the Land Consultative Board, which is the main government agency in charge of 
preventing and resolving land conflicts. Even though the roles played by the Fons are 
quite impressive in some circumstances, they have been found guilty of provoking other 
land conflicts in the region. The Balikumbat- Bafanji conflict has been resurfacing 
several times because of poor implementation of resolutions inherited from the past. The 
Fon of Bafanji Yenwo Ngwefuni and Peter Njontor Ngufor led a fifteen-man delegation 
to the Prime Minister, Simon Achidi Achu, following the invasion of Bafanji by the 
Balikumbat people. Responding to an interview with the Herald newspaper, Ngufor 
castigated the regime for politicizing traditional institutions. He said “A Fon who led his 
village to commit havoc in a neighbouring village is now said to be the chairman of the 
Fon’s conference” (Interview with Peter Njontor, 51years, businessman, Bamenda, June 
14, 2009 in Sobseh, 2011, p. 258).  
With the nonchalant attitude of the incumbent government to handle the matter, 
the Fon of Balikumbat was sued to court by the people of Bafanji for perpetrating the 
invasion. In this condition, the Fons have to intervene and entertain dialogue among 
themselves. The Fon in the Northwest symbolizes unity in his community and represents 
the link between the present and ancestors of the past. The land symbolizes the “spirit of 
the people” and a ritual link between the people and their ancestors. On June 17, 1995, 
the Fons signed a peace treaty to put an end to inter-ethnic and land conflicts in the 
Northwest region. This was a commendable step                towards peace building in the 
region. The Northwest governor at the time, Bell Luc Rene, urged the Fons and the 
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notables to affix their signatures and thumbprints on a document meant to restore peace. 
According to the Herald newspaper, the content of the document was understood by the 
majority of the signatories.  
This pact was seen as an optimistic step towards revamping land laws and setting 
the pace for internal peace throughout the country, as far as land disputes were 
concerned. When it was requested that “a curse involving point” be included in the land 
conflict resolution, to tie the Fons down to the signed document, the Fons of Mankon and 
Bali turned down the suggestion. This showed the limitation of the document. Most Fons 
signed the pact without any conviction of what they were doing. In African traditional 
beliefs, curses and oaths characterize veritable peace agreements and pacts. The process 
of peace entails the pouring of libation to appease the gods. As chief priest of the land, 
the Fon is expected to pour a ritual libation at least once a year to invoke the ancestors 
and the gods of the land to protect the land and bestow numerous blessings. At the same 
time, each land-owning notable or lineage head is expected to pour libation on his land if 
dispute arises. He prays for the “earth to pass judgment” (Sobseh, 2011, p.354).  
Occasionally, this practice has to do with drinking the Fon’s wine containing a 
speck of earth from the disputed area. This approach is more credible to the people than 
the modern approach of signing signatures. In reality, this African approach falls within 
the understanding of the pedagogy of intimidation and fear, because the people believe 
that one cannot deceive the gods and go unpunished. In this context, honest dealings 
come to play because of the fear of wrath of the gods in the pouring of libation. This is 
one of the problems of modern methods of land conflict resolution in Africa. This method 
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neglects the indigenous approaches to solving problems and employs those that the 
people do not consider asserious.  
In this case, our recommendation is the involvement of the Fons in solving the 
land conflict of Balikumbat and Bafanji through the traditional way. Sobseh (2011) 
argues that relying on the nyuy nsai (god of the earth) to pass judgment is the strength of 
ritual sanctions pertaining to land. Even in the absence of conflicts, notables are still 
expected to pour libations to the ancestors and the gods of the land just before the 
planting and harvesting season. These acts portray ownership of the land, and no notable, 
under customary law will ever pour libation on another’s land. This is because a lineage 
cannot falsely claim another’s lineage land with impunity. Any act of trespass will 
definitely bring about the wrath of the gods and cause the “earth to pass judgment” 
(Sobseh, 2011, p. 355). This is a possible check of unscrupulous land accumulation by 
fraud. Therefore, the performance of a ritual function on the land is a plausible means of 
conflict resolution in the African context. Definitely, this approach is relevant to the 
Balikumbat and Bafanji land conflict. 
Revisit the Traditional Land Tenure and Management Systems 
A reconsideration of the traditional tenure and management systems in the 
acquisition of land is imperative. The legislation of private property rights over the land 
under Cameroon’s modern law has accelerated the erosion of the traditional tenure and 
the traditional means of ownership and meaning of land. In fact, in Africa, no one except 
the Fon of a tribe actually owns the land. The Fons are the free custodians of ancestral 
lands. With the introduction of the modern land tenure and management systems, the 
Fons have become frustrated with ownership of land. To forge their way through, they 
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have embarked on inter-ethnic land conflicts and the abusive sales of ancestral lands. 
This commercialization of land brought about by the modern land tenure system has 
resulted in the expression of anger and mob action over the powerless citizens. 
According to Fon Solomon Anye Angwafor III, it is problematic that modern law 
allows anyone to buy land anywhere. He argues that elites buy vast tracts of land with 
title deeds to farm and rear animals to the detriment of poor villagers, thus creating a 
scarcity. He concludes that elites are responsible for land conflicts in the Northwest 
region. The case of the Balikumbat and Bafanji is not different. Scarcity of land has been 
caused by the private ownership in the land tenure system. This trend has provoked some 
people to search for other fertile grounds to cultivate their crops. In response, the Fon 
recommends that, 
All land boundaries in the Province be demarcated and pillars implanted. If this is 
done, it will not only solve the crisis (…) but it will resolve all land disputes in 
the Northwest Province. I want to make it categorically clear that the conflict 
rocking the Northwest Province weighs much more on the elites than on the Fons. 
I am appealing that the Northwest elites should go back to their villages or land 
and study the custom and tradition of their area. Where they become repugnant to 
natural justice, they can even modify the tradition to suit the test of time (The 
BOTFON Human Rights Watch, 2007, p. 36). 
To the judgment of the Fon, the elites have to stop encouraging land conflicts 
through the abuses of the modern means of acquiring land. Poor villagers are therefore 
disadvantaged by the actions of the elites. However, the Fon insists that boundary lines be 
defined and pillars planted to prevent conflicts. The limitation of this proposal lies in the 
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fact that this pillar approach has been tried with the Balikumbat and Bafanji tribes. The 
people of Balikumbat often defy state laws by uprooting the pillars several times and 
throwing them into the river. This refers to the fact that planting pillars is not sufficient to 
solve the problem. In the same light, John B. Ndeh suggests that the State should “map 
out territorial boundaries of every division, sub-division, village, and quarter in all the ten 
regions of the country” (The BOTFON Human Rights Watch, 2007, p.8).  He recognizes 
the fact that this strategy is not sufficient to bring peace. This explains the clause he adds 
when he contends that the state has to take responsibility to compel the Fons to be law 
abiding. It is imperative for the administration to act swiftly in case of any violence. The 
recurrence and perpetuation of violence have been because of the nonchalant attitude of 
the state towards these problems. 
As a possible solution to the present problem, Barrister Anthony Amah Amaaze 
notes that land conflicts have been sustained by decrees and ordinances signed by the 
administration. He argues that the government has completely upset the traditional land 
tenure in the North West Region. Prior to the 1974 land ordinances, the customary 
systems settled land disputes in the region. He contends that since 1974, the state has not 
been able to resolve any land dispute by using the modern land tenure system. The error 
of the modern land law has been the transfer of the jurisdiction from the customary courts 
to local administration. In this case, the administration simply places injunctions to pacify 
disputing parties, while awaiting transfer. No efforts are made to listen to the conflicting 
parties so that their grievances are settled. Unfortunately, these injunctions are not 
respected. To salvage the present situation, Barrister Anthony Amah Amaaze believes 
that the state should repeal land ordinances and set up land tribunals headed by judges. In 
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this way, evidence can be studied in a legal manner, documented, admitted, and have 
final judgment passed (Sobseh, 2011). 
 To complement the recommendation of the Barrister Anthony Amah Amaaze, it is 
interesting to note that the modern land tenure system, which is a major part of the 
problem of land conflicts management, has its roots in the colonial administration. This 
reveals the errors of the colonial and post-colonial administrations in the management of 
land conflicts (Sobseh, 2011). To propose a plausible strategy, it will be important to 
revisit the customary laws of the land tenure system. This is to appropriately interpret and 
correct the land problems in the spirit of the African acquisition and understanding of 
land ownership. 
A Legal Advocacy of Non-Violence in Conflict 
The Balikumbat-Bafanji land conflict has resurfaced several times because of the 
poor implementation of resolutions inherited from the past and the violation of the laws 
binding the land tenure system in Cameroon. The conflicts occurred in 1969, 1995, 1997, 
and 1998. Attempts to resolve these disputes have been tried by the ministry of territorial 
administration. These efforts have failed because the parties concerned have not been 
able to abide by the decisions of the court. Before 1995, there was a dispute between the 
two tribes in 1969. That same year, a land consultation committee was put in place by the 
government of the former West Cameroon to resolve the matter. It demarcated the 
disputed area in favour of Bafanji and thus planted pillars indicating that legal 
proceedings had occurred. The Balikumbat, under the reign of Fon Galabe II, challenged 
the decision and sued Bafanji to the Buea Federal Court of Justice. In 1971, the Judiciary 
ruled in favour of Bafanji. Balikumbat declared, “We have been deprived of our land 
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because Muna, who is Prime Minister, influenced the Courts because of a grudge that we 
supported the Bali Nyonga against Widikums” (Kum, 1995, pp. 1-3 in Sobseh, 2011, p. 
257). 
With this resentment, the Balikumbat expressed their dissatisfaction by attacking 
the people of Bafanji on June 3, 1995. Replying to the Herald newspaper, the Fon of 
Bafanji declared,  
The Balikumbat who attacked us first know better. But what is clear is the fact 
that I cannot attribute the immediate cause of the conflict to any land dispute 
because the land problem had been settled by a court decision in 1969. Since then, 
we have lived in peace with Balikumbat people (…). When they came to attack 
my people, the Balikumbat wore black uniforms, meaning that they are prepared 
for war (Herald, 1995, p. 3 in Sobseh 2011, p. 257). 
Following this confrontation between the two tribes, another commission was set 
up which planted pillars for the second time. These pillars were subsequently removed by 
the people of Balikumbat. The Herald newspaper reported that these people vowed,“…to 
never cede an inch of their land to anyone.” 
 In this light, it is therefore imperative to create legal pronouncements and 
advocate for non-violent means of resolving conflicts in this part of the country. To 
succeed in this advocacy, the political and traditional authorities have to be major 
stakeholders. This approach has to begin from the Fon’s meetings at the regional level. 
After one of these meetings, the spokesperson of the Fons of the Northwest region, 
Barrister Nico Ntumfor Haile, claimed that, “The meeting was not a forum for anyone to 
apportion blame for any of the conflicts” (Pefok, The Post, 2007, p.110). According to 
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Barrister Nico Ntumfor Haile, inter-tribal conflicts in the Northwest region are not only 
sensitive, but they are very complicated. There is more to the conflict than the fight over 
land. In his view, Northwest elites perpetrate conflicts for selfish political, material, and 
financial interests. The barrister concludes by saying that “peace is for the strong and 
violence is for the weak” (BOTFON Human Rights Watch, 2007, p. 12). 
In the opinion of the spokesperson of the Northwest Fons, the legal advocacy for 
non-violent resolution of conflicts is possible. Through meetings among the Fons and the 
signing of agreements, this strategy to peace building could be attained. It is important to 
commend the initiative of the eleven out of thirteen Fons of Ndop Cultural Development 
Association (NDECA) to meet to sign a non-aggression pact. Their objective was to 
terminate sporadic inter-ethnic conflicts in the division. The September 9, 1995 meeting 
that culminated in the signing of this pact was part of the recommendations made by the 
General Assembly of NDECA on August 26, 1995. These efforts towards the 
maintenance of peace should be encouraged through the meetings of traditional rulers and 
other means of sensitizing the population. A critical example of the message of peace is 
one offered by Barrister Nico Ntumfor Haile to the Post newspaper,  
I learnt with consternation and indignation of the unfortunate happening between 
brotherly villages (…) in which some considerable damage has been done. While 
regretting this enormous loss, I wish to appeal for calm, reason, responsibility, 
love, peace, dialogue, and reconciliation between people of two villages. I have 
always said and maintain that since history, violence has never solved any single 
problem anywhere in the world. Whatever might have provoked the situation, I 
am on my knees suing for peace between the people. My prayer is that God 
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almighty should bring comfort to the displaced people and peace should reign. 
May God bless us all (The Post, 2007, p. 14). 
This message serves as a campaign speech for those who advocate non-violence 
to the problem of land conflict. The advocacy for peaceful means in conflict resolution 
needs to spell out the penalties awaiting unscrupulous elites and retired big men who 
boast of their unlimited powers and provoke violence between tribes for their personal 
interests. The education of youths on the peaceful means of conflict resolution could 
proceed from the youth associations and sporting activities like the Motor Bike Riders 
Associations and Young Christian workers. In fact, this approach shows promise and 
could minimize the sporadic eruption of violent confrontations in the Balikumbat sub-
division. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter set out to present a discussions of the results. First, the pre-colonial 
indigenous perception of land and its importance was presented and discussed. Second, 
the causes, history, and recurrence of the land dispute detailed. The colonial land policy 
and its role in the land dispute was the third result that was illuminated. Fourth, the role 
of government policy towards the solution of the dispute was presented and discussed. 
Lastly, solutions to the current dispute were considered. Despite small differences in the 
strategies for a solution to the conflict, all respondents stood for a peaceful solution and 
placed their hopes on the government to construct a final borderline between the two 
villages.  
After the discussion of the results, the interpretation and the implications of the 
conflict followed. These implications were examined under socio-economic and political 
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rubrics. From these implications, insights and revelations on issues that were associated 
with the land conflict and why this land conflict is peculiar to others were drawn. From 
this image, it was imperative to delve into possible recommendations for the mitigation of 
future land and boundary conflicts between Balikumbat and Bafanji. While not 
exhaustive, these recommendations reflected on this specific conflict and its recurrent 
nature.  
Conclusion 
This study set out to investigate whether the colonial land tenure system and 
policies have been the root causes of the recurrent land and boundary conflicts of 
Balikumbat and Bafanji people in the Northwest Region of Cameroon. The argument is 
that the advent of colonial masters to Africa set the stage for violent and intractable 
conflicts. The indiscriminate definitions of boundaries without considering indigenous 
customs and beliefs lies at the root of the problem. The present land tenure system, which 
is a product of colonial administration, fails to consider indigenous customs and beliefs, 
which is another root cause of the intractable conflict in the Northwest region.  
To realize the objective of this study, this work has been presented in five 
chapters. In chapter one, the background of the study was presented to ease the 
understanding of the context of the study. With the objective of determining whether the 
colonial land tenure system is responsible for the recurrent land and boundary conflict 
amongst the Balikumbat and the Bafanji, this work raises this research question: “Did the 
colonial land tenure system set the stage for recurrent land and boundary disputes 
between the Balikumbat and Bafanji villages?” To answer this research question, the 
main research question was organized into five different component questions. First, 
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what are the constituents of pre-colonial perception of land and its importance? Second, 
what are the causes, history, and recurrence of the land dispute? Third, to what extent did 
colonial land policy contribute to the land dispute in Balikumbat and Bafanji? Fourth, 
how successful is the present La Republique Cameroon government in establishing a 
solution to the conflict? Fifth, are there possible solutions to the intractable conflict that 
has arisen between the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji? In response, chapter two 
presents a review of relevant literature to this study in three major frameworks: 
Conceptual, Theoretical, and Empirical. 
The Conceptual framework discussed the indigenous conception of land as a 
sacred gift of nature with economic and spiritual ramifications. The Cameroon land 
tenure system was then highlighted from the pre-colonial, through the German and 
Anglo-French colonial periods and finally the post-colonial period within the present 
Cameroon government. Discourse on land tenure was closely followed by a review of 
causes of land and boundary disputes. Systemic and proximate causes were highlighted. 
In the Theoretical framework, two theories were highlighted as being relevant to 
the present study. Human needs theory and post-colonial theory were chosen for the 
study. In relation to human needs theory, conflict can arise as people try to satisfy their 
personal needs. The basic need of food and shelter are fundamental to all human beings 
and these are guaranteed by the possession of land. Hence, with an increase in population 
and a scarcity of land resources, conflict may arise. The need to safeguard land as a 
source of self-esteem for ancestral and sacrificial ceremonies equally falls within human 
needs theory. Post-colonial theory expresses people’s feelings and the hazards caused by 
the colonial period. It finds its explanation in the fact that the colonial masters did not 
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respect the indigenous conception of land and land tenure systems in the demarcation and 
allocation of land. These are primary causes of frequent land disputes. The chapter 
concludes with empirical studies, relevant to this work, that have been completed in 
Cameroon and beyond.   
Research methodology is presented in chapter three. The qualitative method of 
data collection was chosen for the research design. Having described the area of research, 
sample population, and sample technique, our preliminary task of data collection was 
determined. Data collection proceeded by means of a purposeful convenient sampling 
technique. A snowball approach was used with key informants until a saturation point 
was reached. Interviews of different stakeholders proceeded with open-ended questions 
of government officials like the Divisional Officer of the Sub-Division and Mayor of the 
Municipal Council. Traditional and religious authorities of both villages were extensively 
interviewed. Expert participants who experienced incidents of conflict were sought out, 
secured, and interviewed. 
In addition, non-participant observation was used to gain additional knowledge of 
the land and boundary disputes between Balikumbat and Bafanji. Documents were 
reviewed and recorded in a reflective journal to document shifts that occurred during the 
research project. For data administration, the analysis was done following the systematic 
process of thematic and content analysis. The validation strategies of the instrument 
entailed peer briefing, researcher reflexivity, and the development of rich descriptions. A 
critique checklist was set aside to verify all the components that were examined.  
After analyzing the data, chapter four proceeded with a presentation of findings. 
Following the five objectives of the study, these findings can be articulated in relation to 
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the research objectives. The first objective examined the pre-colonial indigenous 
perception of land and its importance. Here, both villages were similar in their perception 
of land and its importance. While the Bafanji laid more emphasis on the traditional value 
of land as providing shrines for sacrifices, the Balikumbat were more concerned with 
land as a source of life sustenance, in relation to cultivation and shelter. The second 
objective presented the causes, history, and recurrence of the land dispute. There are 
striking differences in remote causes, immediate causes, and the historical development 
of the war. Nonetheless, all respondents agreed that the lack of a clear borderline and the 
laxity of the present Cameroonian government to provide one is the reason why this 
border dispute keeps reoccurring. The third objective presented findings on the colonial 
land policy and its role in the land dispute. The respondents acknowledged that there was 
a firm rule of the colonial masters in demarcating boundaries and maintaining peace 
during their era. However, they highlighted major flaws during the colonial reign that 
orchestrated this land dispute. The fourth objective centered on the role of the present 
government in the solution of the dispute. The findings proved that all respondents were 
dissatisfied with government action towards the solution of the dispute. Only the 
presence of the land tenure system was indicated as a positive point. In the fifth objective, 
solutions to the current dispute presented little difference in the strategies for a solution to 
the conflict. All respondents stood for a peaceful solution to the conflict and placed their 
hopes on the government to construct a final borderline between the two villages. 
 A discussion of the results was presented in chapter five. The first point 
highlighted the pre-colonial indigenous perception of land and its importance. The second 
point centered on the causes, history, and recurrence of the land dispute. The third point, 
248 
 
 
focused on the colonial land policy and its role in the land dispute. The fourth point 
examined the role of government policy toward the solution of the dispute. The fifth 
point considered solutions to the current dispute. Despite small differences in strategies 
for a solution to the conflict, all respondents stood for a peaceful solution and placed their 
hopes on the government to construct a final borderline between the two villages.  
 Following the discussion of the results, an interpretation, and the implications of 
the conflict was detailed. These implications were examined under socio-economic and 
political rubrics. From these implications, insights and revelations on the land conflict 
were discussed. From the image given about this conflict and conflict in general, it 
became imperative to delve into possible recommendations for the mitigation of future 
land and boundary conflicts between Balikumbat and Bafanji.   
 From the findings and the advanced arguments, it is probable that the colonial 
land tenure system stands at the ultimate root of the intractable conflict between the 
people of Balikumbat and Bafanji. One explanation to this thesis lies in the fact that the 
colonial land tenure system made indiscriminate boundary demarcations without 
consulting the customs and beliefs of the people. The multiplicity of colonial masters in 
Cameroon and the fact that the British came after the Germans and made decisions and 
definitions of boundaries without considering the historicity of the matter constitute 
another part of the problem. However, the colonial masters are not solely to blame for the 
intractable conflict of the Balikumbat and Bafanji tribes. Tracing the root of the causes 
and recurrence of the conflicts in the findings and discussions of the results, socio-
economic and political motives contributed to the cause and persistence of the conflict. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Various levels of limitation applied to this study. Time factor was a major 
limitation. Because of the structure of the PhD study, data collection provides a snapshot 
in time. Though data was collected by different types of instruments, both participants 
and this researcher were limited by time constraints. Collecting data at regular intervals 
would have made the study more profound. The stakeholders were not always available 
to give information. Some were extremely busy people and others failed to grant 
opportunities for interviews. However, this researcher is grateful to those who were very 
receptive like the government officials of Balikumbat Sub-Division, and the traditional 
and religious authorities of Balikumbat and Bafanji. 
The study was contextual. Only a limited number of respondents were consulted 
in the Balikumbat and Bafanji ethnic groups, which led to more interpretation and 
induction about the colonial role on conflicts in the Northwest Region. Induction, in 
itself, is based on probability and not certainty. The researcher therefore generalizes from 
particular examples. Universal claims cannot be made in all aspects of this study due to 
its limited scope. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 Based on the findings and results of the present study, the following suggestions 
are advanced for further research. 
 This study was designed as case study research. In another dimension, a 
comparative study could be carried out on land disputes within the Northwest 
Region of Cameroon, since inter-tribal land disputes are a common 
phenomenon in this region. 
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 In another study, the customary strategies of land conflict resolution and the 
modern ways of solving land disputes could be evaluated to see which one is 
more efficient. 
 Conflicting land tenure policies appear to be one of the major reasons for 
border disputes. Further study could determine the changing patterns of land 
tenure from the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial period. 
 Changes in land custody from traditional authorities to the state as the only 
custodian of land may be studied as a future possibility.  
General Conclusion 
From the aforementioned, I can conclude that this dissertation has met its 
objectives as set forth above. The contribution that can be extrapolated from this research 
exercise is the notion that land and boundary disputes exist everywhere and are 
omnipresent in the Cameroon context. But the case of the BaliKumbat and Bafanji Land 
Dispute adds another variable to this understanding. It highlights the fact that Colonial 
Land Tenure System, which is individualistic in nature did not align with an indigenous 
understanding of land ownership, which is communalistic in nature. This clash in 
understanding   of land has resulted to the land and boundary dispute in these 
communities.  
Although Colonial Land Tenure is not the only factor that sustains the conflict in 
being, this research reveals that it played a major role in the conflict.  Lastly, while land 
and boundary issues continue to plague the Cameroonian society and elsewhere, this 
research shows that every land and boundary dispute has a unique character and must be 
researched individually.  
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